FOREWORD The past two decades, which have wit- nessed the collapse of European imperialism and the progressive elimination of Western colonialism from Asia and Africa, have wit- nessed also the introduction of a new form of colonialism into the point-of-intersection of those two continents. Thus, the fading-out of a cruel and shameful period of world hist- ory has coincided with the emergence, at the land-bridge between Asia and Africa, of anew offshoot of European imperialism and a new variety of racist colonialism. The fate of Palestine thus represents an anomaly, a radical departure from the trend of contemporary world history. Scores of nations and peoples have come to enjoy their right to self-determination, at the very time when the Arab people of Palestine was finding itself helpless to prevent the culmination of a pro- cess of systematic colonization to which it had been subjected for decades. This climactic de- velopment took the combined form of forcible dispossession of the indigenous population, their expulsion from their own country, the implantation of an alien sovereignty on their soil, and the speedy importation of hordes of aliens to occupy the land thus emptied of its rightful inhabitants. The people of Palestine have lost not only political control over their country, but physical occupation of their country as well; they have been deprived not only of their inalienable right to self-determination, but also of their ele- 1 mental right to exist on their own land! This dual tragedy, which befell the Arab people of Palestine in the middle of the twen- tieth century, symbolizes the dual nature of the Zionist program which had begun to un- fold itself in Palestine in the late nineteenth century. I. THE HISTORICAL SETTING OF ZIONIST COLONIALISM The frenzied “Scramble for Africa” of the 1880's stimulated the beginnings of Zionist colonization in Palestine. As European for- tune-hunters, prospective settlers and em- pire-builders raced for Africa, Zionist settlers and would-be state-builders rushed for Pales- tine. Under the influence of the credo of na- tionalism then sweeping across Europe, some Jews had come to believe that the religious and alleged racial bonds among Jews consti- tuted a Jewish “nationality” and endowed the so-called “Jewish nation” with normal na- tional rights — including the right to separate existence in a territory of its own, and the right to create a Jewish state. If other European na- tions had successfully extended themselves into Asia and Africa, and had annexed to their imperial domains vast portions of those two continents, the “Jewish nation” — it was argued — was entitled and able to do the same thing for itself. By imitating the colonial ven- tures of the “Gentile nations” among whom Jews lived, the “Jewish nation” could send its own colonists into a piece of Afro-Asian terri- tory, establish a settler-community and, in due course, set up its own state — not, indeed, as an imperial outpost of a metropolitan home- base, but as a home-base in its own right, upon which the “entire Jewish nation” would soon- 3 er or later converge from all over the world. “Jewish nationalism” would thus fulfil itself through the process of colonization, which other European nations had utilized for em- pire-building. For Zionism, then, colonization would be the instrument of nation-building, not the by-product of already-fulfilled nation- alism. The improvised process of Jewish coloniz- ation in Palestine which ensued was hardly a spectacular success in spite of lavish financial subsidies from European Jewish financiers. By and large, Jews were more attracted by the new opportunities for migration to the United States or Argentina than by the call for racial self-segregation as a prelude to state-building in Palestine. The objective of escape from an- ti-Jewish practices prevailing in some Euro- pean societies could be attained just as well by emigration to America; the objective of nation-building — which alone could make the alternative solution of large-scale coloniza- tion in Palestine more attractive — was still far from widespread among European Jews in the late nineteenth century. wee The failure of the first sporadic effort to implant a Zionist settler-community in Pal- estine during the first fifteen years of Zionist colonization (1882-1897) prompted serious reappraisal and a radical revision of strategy. This was accomplished by the First Zionist Congress, held at Basle in August 1897 under the leadership of Theodor Herzl. 4 Haphazard colonization of Palestine, sup- ported by wealthy Jewish financiers as a mixed philanthropic-colonial venture, was from then on to be eschewed. It was to be supplanted by a purely nationalistic program of organized col- onization, with clear political goals and mass support. Hence the overall objective of Zion- ism formulated by the Basle Congress: “The aim of Zionism is to create f or the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.”* It is worth noting that, from the Basle Program of 1897 until the Biltmore Program of 1942, Zionists preferred the euphemism “home” to the clear term “state” which would have been certain to arouse opposition in many quarters. But in spite of public assur- ances to the contrary, Zionists were aiming from the outset at the creation ofa settler-state in Palestine. At the conclusion of the Basle Congress, Herzl wrote in his diary: “If I were to sum up the Basle Congress in one word — which I shall not do openly — it would be this: at Basle I founded the Jewish State. If I were to say this today, I would be met by universal laughter. In five years, perhaps, and certainly in fifty, every one will see it.”** eee In addition to defining the ultimate ob- jective of Zionism, the Basle Congress made * Cohen, Israel, A Short History of Zionism, London, Frederick Muller Co., 1951, p. 47. “* Herzl, Theodor, Tage Biicher, Vol. 1, p. 24; quoted in Cohen, Israel, A Short History of Zionism, op. cit., pp. 11 and 47-48 5 a diagnosis of the special character and cir- cumstances of Zionist colonization in Pales- tine, and formulated a practical program suit- ed to those special conditions. Three essential features in particular differentiated Zionist colonization in Palestine from European col- onization elsewhere in Asia and Africa, and called for Zionist innovations: (1) Other European settlers who had gone (or were then going) to other parts of Africa and Asia had been animated either by econom- ic or by politico-imperialist motives: they had gone either in order to accumulate fortunes by means of privileged and protected exploita- tion of immense natural resources, or in order to prepare the ground for (or else aid and abet) the annexation of those coveted territories by imperial European governments. The Zionist colonists, on the other hand, were animated by neither impulse. They were driven to the colonization of Palestine by the desire to ar- tain nationhood for themselves, and to establish a Jewish state which would be independent of any existing government and subordinate to none, and which would in due course attract to its territories the Jews of the world. (2) Other European settlers could coexist with the indigenous populations — whom they would exploit and dominate, but whose services they would nevertheless require, and whose continued existence in the coveted ter- ritory they would therefore tolerate. But the Zionist settlers could not countenance in- definite coexistence with the inhabitants of Palestine. For Palestine was fully populated 6 by Arabs, whose national consciousness had already been awakened, and who had already begun to nurse aspirations of independence and national fulfilment. Zionist coloniza- tion could not possibly assume the physical proportions envisaged by Zionism while the ‘Arab people of Palestine continued to in- habit its homeland; nor could the Zionist pol- itical aspirations of racial self-segregation and statehood be accomplished while the nation- ally-conscious Arab people of Palestine con- tinued to exist in that country. Unlike Euro- pean colonization elsewhere, therefore, Zion- ist colonization of Palestine was essentially incompatible with the continued existence of the “native population” in the coveted country. (3) Other European settlers could, without much difficulty, overcome the obstacles ob- structing their settlement in their chosen tar- get-territories: they could count on receiving adequate protection from their imperial spon- sors. But the prospective Zionist colonizers of Palestine could count on no such facilities. For, in addition to the Arab people of Pales- tine, certain to resist any large-scale influx of settlers loudly proclaiming their objective of dispossessing the “natives,” the Zionists were likely to encounter also the resistance of the Ottoman authorities, who could not view with favour the establishment, on an important segment of their Empire, of an alien commun- ity harbouring political designs of independ- ent statehood. It was in order to counteract these pecu- liar factors of its situation that the Zionist movement, while defining its ultimate object- ive at the First Zionist Congress, proceeded to formulate an appropriate practical program as well. This program called for action along three lines: organization, colonization and nego- tiation. (1) The organizational efforts were given supreme priority; for, lacking a state-struc- ture in a home-base of its own to mastermind and supervise the process of overseas coloniz- ation, the Zionist movement required a quasi- state apparatus to perform those functions. The World Zionist Organization — with its federations of local societies, its Congress, its General Council and its Central Executive — was established at Basle in order to play that role. (2) The instruments of systematic coloniz- ation were also promptly readied. The “Jew- ish Colonial Trust” (1898), the “Colonization Commission” (1898), the “Jewish National Fund” (1901), the “Palestine Office” (1908) and the “Palestine Land Development Com- pany” (1908), were among the first institutions established by the Zionist Organization. Their joint purpose was to plan, finance and super- vise the process of colonization, and to ensure that it would not meet the same fate which the earlier experiment of haphazard colonization had met. (3) While the instruments of colonization were being laboriously created, diplomatic ef- forts were also being exerted to produce polit- 8 ical conditions that would permit, facilitate and protect large-scale colonization. At the beginning, these efforts were fo- cussed mainly on the Ottoman Empire, then in control of the political fortunes of Pales- tine. Direct approaches to the Ottoman au- thorities were made; lucrative promises of fi- nancial grants and loans were dangled before the eyes of the Sultan; and European powers were urged to intercede at Porte on behalf of the Zionist Organization, in order to persuade the Sultan to grant the Organization a Charter for an autonomous Zionist settlement in Pal- estine. Other efforts were exerted to induce the German Emperor to endorse the creation of a Chartered Land Development Company, which would be operated by Zionists in Pales- tine under German protection. Still other at- tempts were made to obtain permission from the British government to establish an autono- mous Zionist settlement in the Sinai Penin- sula, as a stepping-stone towards colonization in Palestine. But none of these efforts bore fruit. eee By the end of the first decade following the inauguration of the new Zionist move- ment in 1897, Zionism had made little prog- ress towards putting its elaborate colonization apparatus to work, and had scored even less success in its political efforts to obtain gov- ernmental permission and facilities for col- onization in Palestine. Its hopes for de jure colonization shat- 9 tered, Zionism shifted its strategy once more, and turned to de facto colonization — hoping to gain thereby some political leverage which would serve it in good stead when the time came for renewal of its attempts to secure political recognition. In 1907/1908, there- fore, a new phase of Zionist colonization was inaugurated, without prior “legalization” or sponsorship by a European power. It was more consciously nationalistic in impulse, more militantly segregationist in its attitude towards the Palestinian Arabs, and more con- cerned with strategic and political consider- ations in its selection of locations for its new settlements. But, for all its enhanced dyna- mism and sharpened ideological conscious- ness, the second wave of Zionist colonization was not appreciably more successful than the first, as far as its magnitude was concerned. By the outbreak of the first World War, therefore, the Zionist colonization of Pales- tine had met with only modest success in over thirty years of action. In the first place, Zionists were still an infinitesimal minority of about 1 per cent of the Jews of the world. Their ac- tivities had aroused the fear and opposition of other Jews, who sought the solution of the “Jewish problem” in “assimilation” in West- ern Europe and the United States, not in “self-segregation” in Palestine. Jn the second place, Zionist colonization had proceeded very slowly. After thirty years of immigration to Palestine, Jews were still under 8 per cent of the total population of the country, in posses- sion of no more than 2!/, per cent of the land. 10 And, in the third place, Zionism had failed to obtain political endorsement from the Otto- man authorities controlling Palestine, or from any European power. The War, however, created new circum- stances which were destined to improve con- siderably the fortunes of Zionist colonization in Palestine. For the War set the stage for an alliance — concluded in 1917 — between British imperialism and Zionist colonial- ism, which, during the following thirty years, opened the gates of Palestine to Zionist col- onizers, facilitated the establishment of Zion- ist settler-community, and paved the way for the dispossession and expulsion of the Arab people of Palestine and the creation of the Zionist settler-state in 1948. Whereas unilateral Zionist colonization failed, in the thirty years preceding the First World War, to make much headway, the alli- ance of Zionist colonialism and British imperial- ism succeeded, during the thirty years follow- ing the First World War, in accomplishing the objectives of both parties. 11 Il THE ALLIANCE OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND ZIONIST COLONIALISM Until the First World War, Britain’s policy in the Middle East had revolved around the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Asia. The European domains of the Empire had been emancipated from Ottoman domination, and the North African domains had been annexed by various European pow- ers, long before the War; but the Asian do- mains had been insulated in the meantime from the imperial rivalries of the European powers. Britain’s imperial interests in the area —namely, control over the Suez Canal and im- munization of the region from rival European domination over the “overland route” to India — were better served by a tractable Ottoman Empire than they would have been by a Euro- pean “Scramble for the Middle East,” which might have brought one or another of Britain’s European rivals to the vicinity of the Canal or athwart the “overland route.” When Turkey joined the Central Powers in the War, however, the premises of Britain’s imperial policy for the Middle East were shat- tered overnight. Alternative policies for the post-war period had to be made. At first, Britain envisaged a new order for the Middle East, in which Arab auton- omy would supplant Ottoman imperial rule in southwest Asia. Anglo-Arab agreements to 12 that effect, concluded in the fall of 1915, led to the Arab Revolt against Turkey in 1916. But the pressures of other European pow- ers — then wartime allies of Britain — pre- cluded sole British overlordship. Secret agree- ments were therefore reached in the spring of 1916 between Britain, France and Tsarist Rus- sia for division of the Ottoman spoils. These agreements, however, soon proved irksome to the more empire-minded among Britain’s policy-makers. For they threatened to bring France perilously close to the eastern approaches to the Suez Canal. And as British feelings of security (predicated on the belief in the impenetrability of the Sinai Peninsula) had been destroyed by recent wartime experi- ences, it came to be felt that not only Sinai, but also Palestine, must be made safe in or- der that the Canal might be rendered secure. The 1916 Anglo-French agreement, providing for the internationalization of most of Pales- tine, came therefore to be viewed with alarm by empire-minded British statesmen; and the staking of French claims to the entirety of Pal- estine could hardly have served to allay the aroused apprehensions of British imperialists. By early 1917, a new British cabinet was actively searching for ways and means for ex- tricating itself from the agreements which its predecessor had reached with France for the post-war division of the spoils of war in the Arab domains of the Ottoman Empire. It was at that point that formerly abortive Zionist at- tempts to secure British support for a Zion- ist-dominated Palestine were re-activated at 13 Britain’s instigation. Reciprocal interests had thus come to bind British imperialism and Zionist colonialism. On the one hand, Britain, by utilizing Zionist influence in the United States and in France, would avert international rule in Palestine, on the pretext that a British-sponsored program of Zionist colonization required British rule in Palestine. On the other hand, by playing a catalytic role in bringing about the designa- tion of Britain as the ruling power in Pales- tine, Zionism would at last be able to embark upon the long-awaited program of large-scale colonization in the coveted territory under the auspices and protection of a Great Power. Britain would have the assurance that an em- battled Zionist settler-community would main indefinitely dependent upon Britain’s protection, and would continue to require (and justify) British presence in Palestine; while, for its part, Zionism would also have the assurance that Britain, bound internation- ally by its wartime commitment to facilitate Zionist colonization, would provide the Zion- ist settler-community with the protection it needed, during the formative stages of its establishment, against expected Arab oppos- ition. The alliance of convenience and mutual need, binding British imperialism and Zionist colonialism, was complete. eee Preliminary Zionist efforts in Washing- ton to secure America’s approval were not unsuccessful — notwithstanding President 14 Wilson's emphasis on the principle of self-de- termination, with which the Zionist coloniz- ation of Palestine despite Arab opposition would clash headlong. Nor were simultaneous Zionist efforts in Paris to secure French ap- proval of the revision of earlier Anglo-French agreements on the future of Palestine entirely discouraging. With such preparatory work out of the way, Britain announced its policy-state- ment of November 2, 1917, commonly known as the Balfour Declaration, proclaiming its support for the establishment of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine. According to plan, the Zionists then requested the Peace Conference to confer the Palestine Mandate on Britain. Britain, in turn, incorporated its undertaking, first enunciated in the Balfour Declaration, in the text of the Palestine Man- date. The path was now clear for both British imperialism and Zionist colonialism to pur- sue jointly their respective objectives. Britain lost no time in creating the ap- propriate conditions for Zionist colonization. It appointed a Zionist Jew as its first High Commissioner in Palestine. It recognized the World Zionist Organization as a representa- tive “Jewish Agency.” It opened the gates of Palestine to massive Zionist immigration, de- spite Arab protests. It transferred state lands to the Zionists for colonization. It protect- ed the institutions of the fledgling “national home.” It permitted the Zionist community to run its own schools and to maintain its mil- itary establishment (the Haganah). It trained mobile Zionist striking force (the Palmach) 15 and condoned the existence of “underground” terrorist organizations (the Stern group and the Irgun). No wonder that, by the mid-thir- ties, a British Royal Commission had come to describe the Zionist settler-community in Pal- estine as a “state within a state.” In the mean- time, the Arab majority — while constantly assured that Britain would see to it that its rights would not be “prejudiced” by the rapid growth of the Zionist settler-community — was denied analogous facilities and deprived of the means for self-protection. After thirty years of British rule, the Zion- ist settler-community grew to twelve times its size in 1917, and came to represent a little under one-third of the total population of Palestine. In the meantime, it had developed, under the auspices of the Mandatory Power, its own quasi-governmental institutions and a sizable military establishment. wee But Britain had not entered into the part- nership with Zionism in Palestine solely in or- der to serve the purposes of Zionist colonial- ism; it had expected the partnership to serve, equally, the purposes of British imperialism as well. Whenever Zionism sought to accel- erate the processes of state-building (which would eventually render Britain’s continued presence in Palestine neither necessary nor desirable in Zionist eyes), Britain pulled in the opposite direction to slow them down. The Second World War precipitated the show- down, which in the end brought about the dis- 16 solution of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance. By the end of the Second World War, Britain’s wartime enfeeblement, and the im- minent independence of India, had led to a relative diminution of Britain's interest in the Alliance, while the growing opposition of newly-emerging Arab states to Britain's role in Palestine had forced Britain to exercise some restraint in its formerly wholehearted support for the Zionist cause. On the other hand, the advent of the United States as an ac- tive world power, with economic and strategic interests in the Middle East, and the growing responsiveness of American politicians to the Zionist cause, offered Zionism the prospects of an alternative Western sponsor for the new fateful phase of its capture of Palestine. In the mid-forties, therefore, Zionist col- onization of Palestine, sheltered and nursed for thirty years by British imperialism, was ready to look for a more powerful and more militant supporter to see it through the forth- coming struggle for outright statehood; and the United States was available as a willing candidate that admirably fitted the require- ments of Zionism. If the League of Nations was the in- strument selected for bestowing upon the Anglo-Zionist partnership a semblance of international respectability, the United Na- tions was selected for a similar purpose by the American-Zionist entente. Britain had prevailed upon a predominantly European League to endorse a program of European Zionist colonization in Palestine: the United 17 States led a European-American majority to overrule the opposition of an Afro-Asian min- ority in the General Assembly, and to endorse the establishment of a colonial Zionist state in the Afro-Asian bridge, the Arab land of Pales- tine. For, apart from the Union of South Afri- ca, itself ruled by an alien settler-minority, no Asian or African country spoke in favour of the “partition plan” proposed to the General Assembly by its Special Committee on Pales- tine; and, although in the final vote on Novem- ber 29, 1947, one Asian and one African coun- try (other than the Union of South Africa) did vote for the adoption of the recommendation, enthusiastic support for the proposal came exclusively from Europe, Australasia and the Western Hemisphere. An alien state was to be planted in the land link between Asia and Afri- ca without the free consent of any neighbour- ing African or Asian country. It was at that stage in the tragic history of Palestine that Palestinian Arabs — debili- tated by thirty years of British suppression — proved incapable of withstanding the assault of the Zionist community, organized and trained and armed as it was, and supported by the European-American international com- munity of the day. The Arab people of Palestine lost not only the battle for the political control of its own country — it lost its country as well. Palestin- ians were forcibly expelled from their home- land; and their land, thus ruthlessly emptied of its rightful inhabitants, was opened for a well-organized and liberally-financed new 18 wave of colonization, speedily executed in or- der to create a seeming fait accompli, the re- versal of which world public opinion would be reluctant to urge. eee The alliance of Zionist colonialism with one Western imperial power was momentarily dissolved, after it had served its purpose; but it was simultaneously reincarnated in a new form, to suit the new world circumstances and the new stage of Zionist colonialism. As one Western sponsor retreated to the background, other Western sponsors rushed to the fore- ground. Zionist colonialism made a tactical change of allies — but did not abandon the strategy of imperialist alliances as such. For, without the umbilical cord linking the Zion- ist settler-community with its extra-regional sources of supply and power, it has and can have little ability of its own to survive. Even the alliance with British imperialism was dissolved only momentarily. For, when the time came for a revised British imperial strategy, under altered world circumstances, to seek fulfilment through a new alignment with Zionist colonialism — which was then aiming, in its new status as a state, at new ob- jectives of territorial expansion — collusion between the old allies, along with the Fourth French Republic, was readily arranged. The 1956 invasion of Egypt promptly ensued. And, when the collapse of the Fourth Re- public in France and the chastening experi- ence of Britain in Suez made it inexpedient 19 for the Zionist settler-state to continue to de- pend upon those two countries for the tools of further aggressiveness, Zionism appears to have found little difficulty in recruiting an- other European power to serve as a supplier of aggressive weapons. At the bidding of the United States, the Federal Republic of Ger- many rushed to fill the vacuum — supple- menting massive economic aid (which a tor- mented German conscience, cleverly manipu- lated by World Zionism, had prevailed upon the Federal Republic to extend to the Zionist settler-state under the alias of “reparations”) with massive military gifts, secretly agreed upon and stealthily given. wee But, for all the means of survival it man- ages to acquire, now from one Western power and now from another, the Zionist set- tler-state remains an alien body in the region. Not only its vital and continuing association with European imperialism, and its introduc- tion into Palestine of the practices of West- ern colonialism, but also its chosen pattern of racial exclusiveness and self-segregation renders it an alien society in the Middle East. No words could better describe the essential- ly alien character of the Zionist settler-state than the following passage, written by its vet- eran Prime Minister: “The State of Israel is a part of the Middle East only in geography, which is, in the main, a static element. From the decisive aspects of dynamism, creation and growth, Israel is a 20 part of world Jewry. From that Jewry it will draw all the strength and the means for the forging of the nation in Israel and the develop- ment of the Land; through the might of world Jewry it will be built and built again.”* * Ben-Gurion, David, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, New York, Philosophical Library, 1954, p. 489. 21 Ii THE CHARACTER OF THE ZIONIST SETTLER-STATE Apart from its vital link with imperialism and its inescapable status as a total stranger to the Middle East, in the heart of which it has chosen to plant itself, the political em- bodiment of Zionist colonialism (namely, the Zionist settler-state of Israel) is characterized chiefly by three features: (1) its racial complex- ion and racist conduct pattern; (2) its addiction to violence; and (3) its expansionist stance. A. Racism Racism is not an acquired trait of the Zionist settler-state. Nor is it an accidental, passing feature of the Israeli scene. It is con- genital, essential and permanent. For it is in- herent in the very ideology of Zionism and in the basic motivation for Zionist colonization and statehood. Zionism is the belief in the national one- ness of all Jews — who are identified as such in terms of their supposedly common ances- try. Neither religion nor language comprises the alleged “national bond” of Jews according to the Zionist creed: for relatively few Zionists are in fact believing or practising Jews; and the Hebrew language was resuscitated only after the birth of Zionism. Recent legislation and precedent-making court decisions in the Zionist state, as well as the political literature of the Zionist movement since its inception, 22 would appear to indicate that it is ancestry — the sheer biological fact of descent from other Jews — that makes a person “Jewish” in Zion- ist eyes Zionist racial identification produces three corollaries: racial self-segregation, racial exclu- siveness and racial supremacy. These principles constitute the core of the Zionist ideology. The primordial impulse for Zionist col- onialism is the pursuit of “national self-real- ization” by the “Jewish nation,” by means of territorial regrouping and independent state- hood. Racial self-segregation is therefore the quintessence of Zionism. By its very nature, racial self-segrega- tion precludes integration or assimilation. From Herzl to Weizmann, from Ben Gurion to Goldmann, the leaders of Zionism have all believed and preached that the chief ene- my of Zionism is not Gentile “anti-Semitism” but Jewish “assimilation.” “Anti-Semitism” and Zionism thus agree on the basic premise: that all Jews are one nation, with common national characteristics and a common na- tional destiny. The difference between them is that, whereas “anti-Semitism” disdains the alleged “national characteristics” of Jews and delights in Jewish suffering, Zionism ideal- izes those fancied characteristics and strives to bring all Jews together into a single Jewish state, to which even moderate Zionists attrib- ute a “special mission.” According to the Zionist creed, “assimi- lation” is the loss of “Jewish identity;” it is the prelude to the “dissolution” and “elim- 23 ination” of the “Jewish nation.” “Self-seg- regation” is the Zionist retort to the call for “Jewish assimilation;” for “self-segregation” is envisioned as the only pathway to national “redemption,” “salvation” and “fulfilment.” By the same logic, by virtue of which it un- compromisingly repudiates the assimilation of Jews into non-Jewish societies, the funda- mental Zionist principle of racial self-segrega- tion also demands racial purity and racial exclu- siveness in the land in which Jewish self-segre- gation is to be attained. As such, the Zionist credo of racial self-segregation necessarily rejects the coexistence of Jews and non-Jews in the land of Jewish regrouping. Coexistence with non-Jewish communities — including the indigenous inhabitants — in the territory in which Jews are to be assembled is as much of a blemish on the image of pure Zionist racism as is continued Jewish residence in the lands of the Gentiles, i.e., the lands of so-called “Jewish exile.” The Zionist ideal of racial self-segregation demands, with equal imperativeness, the depar- ture of all Jews from the lands of their exile and the eviction of all non-Jews from the land of “Jewish destination,” namely, Palestine. Both are essential conditions of “Zionist ful- filment” and Jewish “national redemption.” It is only in such a condition of thorough- going self-segregation that “Jewish superior- ity” can at last manifest itself, according to the teachings of Zionism: the “chosen people” can attain its “special destiny” only when it is all together and all by itself. 24 Herein lies an important difference be- tween Zionist racism and other forms of Euro- pean racism familiar, since the advent of col- onialism, to the peoples of Asia and Africa. Race-supremacist European settlers elsewhere in ‘Asia and Africa have, by and large, found it possible to express their “supremacy” over the other strands of “lesser peoples” and “inferior races” within the framework of “hierarchical racial coexistence.” Separate and unequal, the European colonists and the “natives” have on the whole coexisted in the same colony or pro- tectorate. Though they have openly disdained the “natives,” ruthlessly suppressed them and methodically discriminated against them, European colonists have as a rule deemed the continued presence of the indigenous popu- lations “useful” for the colonists themselves; and, as such, they have reserved for the “na- tives” all the menial functions and assigned to them inferior roles in the settler-dominated societies. Not so the Zionists! Race-supremacist Zionist settlers in Palestine have found it neces- sary to follow a different course, more in har- mony with their ideological system. They have expressed their fancied “supremacy” over the Arab “natives,” first, by isolating themselves from the Arabs in Palestine and, later on, by evicting the Arabs from their homeland. Nowhere in Asia or Africa — not even in South Africa or Rhodesia — has European race-supremacism expressed itself in so pas- sionate a zeal for thoroughgoing racial exclu- siveness and for physical expulsion of “na- tive” populations across the frontiers of the 25 settler-state, as it has in Palestine, under the compulsion of Zionist doctrines. (Perhaps this divergence of Zionism from the norm of European colonization may be explained in terms of the fact that conscious dedication to the racist doctrines inherent in the ideology of Zionism has preceded, stimulated, inspired and at every stage guided the process of Zion- ist colonization in Palestine — at least since the inauguration of the new Zionist movement in 1897.) So long as they were powerless to dislodge the indigenous Arabs of Palestine (the vast majority of the country’s population), Zion- ist colonists were content with isolating them- selves from the Arab community and institut- ing a systematic boycott of Arab produce and labour. Accordingly, from the earliest days of Zionist colonization, the principle was es- tablished that only Jewish labour would be employed in Zionist colonies. The “Jewish Agency,” the “Jewish National Fund,” the “Palestine Foundation Fund” and the “Jewish Federation of Labour” vigilantly ensured the observance of that fundamental principle of Zionist colonization. Contentment with boycotting the Arabs of Palestine instead of evicting them from their country was, however, only a tactical and temporary suspension of the Zionist dogma of racial exclusiveness. It was forced upon Zionism by the circumstances surrounding the early stages of Zionist colonization. And it was viewed as a necessary evil, to be en- dured only so long as a more rigorous appli- 26 cation of the racist doctrines of Zionism was prevented by extraneous factors beyond the control of the Zionist movement. The ultim- ate aim of ousting the Arab inhabitants of Palestine in order to make possible the incar- nation of the principle of racial exclusiveness, though momentarily suspended, was never abandoned, however. As early as 1895, Herzl was busy devising a plan to “spirit the penni- less population across the frontier by denying it employment;”* and, in 1919, Weizmann was forecasting the creation of a Palestine that would be “as Jewish as England is English,”"** and defining the Zionist program in terms of building “a nationality which would be as Jewish as the French nation was French and the British nation British.”*** Thus, although it was not until 1948 that the Zionist aim was at last fulfilled, through the forcible expulsion of the majority of the Palestinian Arabs from their homeland, the objective of de-Arabizing Palestine (as a requirement of Zionizing that country) had been entertained by the Zionist movement since its inception. The Zionist concept of the “final solu- tion” to the “Arab problem” in Palestine, and the Nazi concept of the “final solution” to * Herzl, Theodor, Complete Diaries, Vol. 1, 1960, p. 88. (Entry of 12 June 1895; quoted in Childers, Erskine B., “Palestine: The Broken Triangle,” in Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965, p. 93). *“* Weizmann, Chaim, Trial and Error, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949, p. 244. *** Quoted in The Political History of Palestine Under British Administration, Jerusalem, Government Printer, 1947, p. 3 (paragraph 12). 27 the “Jewish problem” in Germany, consisted essentially of the same basic ingredient: the elimination of the unwanted human element in question. The creation of a “Jew-free Ger- many” was indeed sought by Nazism through more ruthless and more inhuman methods than was the creation of an “Arab-free Pales- tine” accomplished by the Zionists, but behind the difference in techniques lay an identity of goals. eae If racial discrimination against the “inferior natives” was the motto of race-supremacist European settler-regimes in Asia and Africa, the motto of the race-supremacist Zionist set- tler-regime in Palestine was racial elimination. Discriminatory treatment has been reserved by the Zionists for those remnants of the Palestin- ian Arab people who have stubbornly stayed behind in their homeland in spite of all efforts to dispossess and evict them, and in defiance of the Zionist dictum of racial exclusiveness. It is against these remnants of the rightful inhabitants of Palestine that Zionist settlers have revealed the behavioural patterns of ra- cial supremacy, and practised the precepts of racial discrimination, already made famous by other racist European colonists elsewhere in Asia and Africa. In fact, in its practice of racial discrimina- tion against the vestiges of Palestinian Arabs, the Zionist settler-state has learned all the lessons which the various discriminatory re- gimes of white settler-states in Asia and Afri- 28 ca can teach it. And it has proved itself in this endeavour an ardent and apt pupil, not incap- able of surpassing its teachers. For, whereas the Afrikaner apostles of apartheid in South Africa, for example, brazenly proclaim their sin, the Zionist practitioners of apartheid in Palestine beguilingly protest their innocence! The remnants of Palestine’s Arabs who have continued to live in the Zionist set- tler-state since 1948 have their own “Bantu- stans,” their “native reserves,” their “Ghet- toes” — although the institution which they encounter in their daily lives is given by the Zionist authorities the euphemistic name, “security zone.” About 90 per cent of the Arabs living under Israel's jurisdiction live in such “secur- ity zones.” Alone in the Zionist settler-state, these Arabs live under martial law. Whereas, in other parts of the country, civil administration pre- vails, in the Arab-inhabited “security zones” the administrative functionaries are military officers, serving under the Ministry of De- fence. Arabs charged with offences under the martial law in force in the “security zones” (the “Emergency [Defence] Regulations”) are prosecuted before military tribunals, the de- cisions of which are not appealable. Deporta- tion and forced residence, by fiat of the Mil- itary Governor, are commonplace. Alone in the Zionist settler-state, Arab in- habitants of the “security zones” are subject to the pass system, which harshly restricts their movement and travel. 29 Alone in the Zionist settler-state, Arabs are denied the basic rights of expression, as- sembly and association. They are not permit- ted to publish newspapers or to form political organizations. Educational opportunities for Arabs are severely restricted; the higher the level of education, the more discriminatory the re- striction of opportunities. Nor is the quality of the educational system to which Arabs have disproportionately-limited access faintly comparable to the educational system open to Jews. Economically, Arabs in the Zionist set- tler-state suffer from a threefold handicap: their limited access to employment opportun- ities creates large-scale unemployment; such employment as they are permitted to obtain is confined largely to menial services, and they are denied the right to “equal pay for equal work.” The agricultural lands and homes of the Arabs of the Zionist settler-state are subject to confiscation by administrative decree, under a succession of drastic laws, introduced by the state between 1948 and 1953, which deny aggrieved owners the ability to seek redress through the courts. Whole Arab villages have been expropriated and given to Jews for the establishment of Zionist settlements. Arab participation in the administration of the Zionist settler-state, on any level of mean- ingful responsibility, is virtually unknown; in most government departments, Arab partici- pation on any level is completely non-existent. 30 Even in the government office charged with Arab affairs, no Arab is employed! Finally, the enjoyment by Arabs of the elementary right to citizenship in their own country is curtailed by natatory discrimination. Whereas a Jew, under the Nationality Law, is eligible for citizenship immediately upon arrival, indigenous Arabs of the Zionist set- tler-state are subject to a system of qualified eligibility which has left a majority of Israel’s Arabs languishing in the limbo of non-cit- izenship. B. Violence and Terrorism Habitual resort to force, by the military or paramilitary arms of the Zionist settler-state, has been directed principally against the Arabs — whose very existence in the land coveted by the Zionists rendered them automatically the primary and the ultimate target of Zion- ist hostility. But this addiction to violence has not been totally confined, in its manifesta- tions, to Zionist relations with the Arabs. To- wards the end of the British Mandate — when the alliance of British imperialism and Zion- ist colonialism, having served its purpose, was beginning to undergo the strains which finally led to its dissolution — the paramilitary and terrorist Zionist organizations (which Britain had respectively aided and condoned for dec- ades) turned against the British garrison and British civil authorities in Palestine. And, af- ter the outbreak of Zionist-Arab hostilities in Palestine, and the advent of United Nations mediators and truce observers, Zionist vio- 31 lence turned against the international person- nel also. The assassination of the first United Nations Mediator and his military aide, and the occasional detention of United Nations observers, have served notice that no one who stands athwart the path of Zionism is immune from Zionist vengeance. But, obviously, it is against the Arabs that Zionist violence has been most long-lasting, most methodical and most ruthless. Prenatally and at birth, the Zionist set- tler-state resorted to violence as its chosen means of intimidating the Arabs of Palestine and evicting them. Such massacres as those which were perpetrated at Dair Yaseen, Ain ez-Zaitoun and Salah ed-Deen (in April 1948) were calculated measures in a formal program of eviction-by-terrorization. Since its establishment, the Zionist set- tler-state has turned its violence both inward- ly and outwardly; against the Arabs remain- ing under its jurisdiction, and against the neighbouring Arab states. In the Zionist-occupied territories of Pal- estine, massacres and other outrages visited upon such Arab towns and villages as Iqrith (December 1951), Al-Tirah (July 1953), Abu Ghosh (September 1953), Kafr Qasim (Octo- ber 1956), and Acre (June 1965) have been the most infamous — but by no means the only — instances of a program of racial hate ele- vated to the level of state policy and efficiently executed by the official apparatus of the state. To these instances must be added the large-scale pogroms unleashed on the Arab 32 population of Gaza and Khan Younis during the brief but eventful period of Zionist occu- pation of the area, in the wake of the Tripart- ite Invasion of Egypt in 1956. Systematic military attacks on the territor- ies of neighbouring Arab states are perhaps the most widely known manifestations of Israel’s ready resort to violence — for many of these attacks were fully discussed by the United Nations Security Council. In addition to the full-scale war, launched jointly by Zionist colonialism and British and French imperial- ism against Egypt in 1956, and deplored by the General Assembly in six resolutions adopted between November 2, 1956 and February 2, 1957, smaller-scale attacks on Hamma (April 1951), Qibiya (October 1953), Gaza (February 1955), and across Lake Tiberias (December 1955 and March 1962) were duly condemned by the Security Council, on May 18, 1951, November 24, 1953, March 29, 1955, January 19, 1956 and April 9, 1962, respectively. Other attacks, too numerous to cite individually, have elicited similar condemnations from the competent Mixed Armistice Commissions. C. Territorial Expansion No student of the behavioural pattern of the Zionist movement and the modus operandi of the Zionist settler-state can fail to realize that Zionist attainments at any given moment, if they fall short of the standing objective con- stantly aimed at by the Zionist movement, are only temporary stations along the road to ul- timate self-fulfilment and not terminal points 33 of the Zionist journey — notwithstanding the assurances to the contrary which are solemnly given by Zionist and Israeli leaders. For example, although from 1897 until 1942 the official leaders of Zionism constant- ly denied in public any intention of seeking “statehood,” emphasizing that it was merely a “home” that they were after, the internal documents of the movement and the diaries of its leaders clearly indicate that, notwithstand- ing public disavowals, it was indeed statehood that was the objective of Zionism all along. (The goal of establishing a Zionist state, first admitted openly in 1942, was attained six years later.) Similarly, until 1948, the leaders of Zion- ism were constantly assuring the world that they harboured no intention of dispossessing or evicting the Arabs of Palestine from their homeland — although evidence abounds that, in fact, they were aiming at nothing less than the thorough Zionization and de-Arabization of Palestine from the very beginning; and, when the opportunity arose in 1948, Zionists wasted no time in pushing the Arabs across the frontiers. In these two vital matters, the true aims of Zionism had been well known to all stu- dents and close observers of the movement; the Zionist stratagem of public disavowal was merely a smoke-screen designed to conceal the true and unchanging objectives, in order to gain time for preparing the ground for the right move at the right moment. Territorial extent is a third element of the 34 Zionist plan, regarding which the same strata- gem of deceptive public disavowal has been utilized. It differs from the other two elements (viz., statehood and eviction of Arabs) only in that, whereas these two aims have been real- ized and the camouflage has finally been re- moved, the third aim (viz., territorial expan- sion) remains only partly realized, and the veil remains only partially lifted. The perennial aim of Zionism was and still is statehood in all of Palestine (called by Zionists “Eretz Israel,” or the Land of Israel), completely emptied of its Arabs. The minimum definition of the territorial scope of Palestine, as Zionism envision it, was officially formulat- ed in 1919; and it covers about double the area currently occupied by the Zionist settler-state. It includes — in present geographical termin- ology — the Kingdom of Jordan (on both sides of the River), the “Gaza Strip,” south- ern Lebanon, and southern and southwestern Syria, as well as the portions of Palestine now occupied by the Zionists. This area still falls short of the territory bounded, in accordance with the famous Biblical phrase, by the Nile and the Euphrates — which is the territory claimed as their national heritage by Zionist “extremists.” But even if only the minimum Zionist concept of Palestine is taken to be the real basis of Zionist planning, that will leave the road towards Zionist territorial expansion in the future wide and open. For no more than one-half of this coveted area is now under the control of the Zionist settler-state. (See maps on pages 36 and 37). 35 ‘The maps on these two pages show the expansionist designs of Zionism in Palestine and in the neighbouring Arab countries. The map on this page shows the portions of Palestine actually occupied at present by the Zionist settler-state. ‘Compare with the map on the opposite page, drawn on the same scale. “uo s918] ,,wodn paaufe aq 01,, pur] pa1aA09 ay} Jo Jap10q WLayINOS ay}.J9] LINpUIOWIAWY 181U01Z, TeHOYJo BY “T]om Se 4011119) uoUdéy Jo uoLI0d pouyapun ue poppe aq isn Rare SIY) OL, «Anqunod ayp Jo uoRepunoy a1W10UOD9 ay} 10] [eHUESsa,, $B WIOI9u) Paqiiosep SeM pur ‘2dU9IaJUOD d9vaq OY} 0} VONEZIULBIO ISIUOI, PION Bq) £q parntwgns 6161 *¢ AzeNI -qaq Jo winpurroWayy ay} UI PoyoUTTap AI[eIOyJO Sem Bare papEYs ay] “WSIUOIZ