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\title{Anarcho-Stoicism: A Primer}
\date{December 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2022}
\author{Jimmy C. Tolbert}
\subtitle{}






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\section{\emph{Abstract}}


This paper explores the connections between and synthesis of Anarchist political philosophy
with the ethical systems of the late Roman Stoics. Utilizing a dialectic virtue model, reminisce of
Hegelian development, the analysis centers around the ways in which stoic virtue theory can be
applied within anarchist social structure and the consequences of such a combination. Anarchism
provides a particularly flexible framework for implementation; such a system’s loose structure, with
the primary thesis of anti-statism, varies greatly between individuals and groups. Stoic ethics share in anarchism’s need to reconcile the individual moral agent with their role in the moral community,
and this connection is one in which the individual sovereignty and the wider community may be
brought into a greater degree of flourishing. Stoicism is oft perceived as mostly conservative, yet
not out of necessity, while Anarchism’s progressive libertarian nature allows for wide interpretation.
A Dialectic Virtue Theory can be utilized as a vehicle to connect these two traditions—Stoicism
being it’s exemplar, and Anarchism’s natural freedom of interpretation and practice. Virtue will then
be explored as something which, when pursued in earnest, increases the flourishing of the
individualist as well as the communitarian. Individual Liberty will take center stage, and as we will
see this is echoed in the stoic conceptions of self-discipline; to discipline one’s own individual
attainment of virtue will have ripple effects when given the space to do so, and since this discipline
does not come from a higher authority (ie. the state), this maps particularly well to anarchist
political thought. Hereby the individual is given the utmost freedom to develop their own ethics of
virtue while contributing positively to the generalized virtue of the larger community, and both
grow evermore sophisticated via this dialectical exploration. This thesis asserts that the system
which can be constructed from these traditions is not only preferable, but logically sound, just, and
attainable. This then ushers in the newest in a long line of anarchist variance which we shall now
call \emph{Anarcho-Stoicism.}

\section{\emph{I. Framework and Method}}


To begin this synthesis, much care must be taken to establish the modes and models used to
structure the Anarcho-Stoic ethical system—to construct the system from the root. The first of these
roots is the logical method applied, namely, \emph{Dialectic Logic}. This will be chosen given a key
feature: it is certainly historically relevant to anarchist thought, but more importantly it’s dynamic
approach to the structure of logic allows the freedom of form, as we will see, characteristic of
anarchist conceptions of Liberty and stoic conceptions of Virtue. Dialectic logic is not a rigid code,
but rather a methodology in which we may analyze and apply certain beliefs and systems. In
opposition to competing models, the dialectic model will be preferred as it supplies a path forward
which allows a greater degree of variable exploration and expression.


Much of philosophy generally owes it’s success to a dialectic model, but for our purposes it
must be known that many of the first anarchists were birthed from the writings of \emph{Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel}, the quintessential dialectician of the modernist period. The Young Hegelians of the
late 19\textsuperscript{th} Century, mostly political radicals, read Hegel’s logic as a wholly progressive system which
prioritized development, growth, and social revolution. Hegel’s notion of \emph{World Spirit} is as a self-actualizing force of history; global consciousness develops as it encounters contradiction. As
contradiction arises, as is inevitable, the two opposing sides cave in on one another in what Hegel
calls \emph{Aufheben} (to sublate): preservation, change, and advancement of the initial premise. Put
simply, we may begin with premise \emph{x}. Eventually, premise \emph{x} is sublated by premise \emph{y}, and the two
struggle with one another until they “grasp the unity of the opposition between the first two
[premises], or [create] the positive result of the dissolution or transition of those [premises]”
(Maybee, 2020). This ushers in a speculative moment, where the synthesis of premise \emph{x} and premise
\emph{y} becomes a new and novel premise: premise \emph{z}. In short, there is a notion, it is challenged, and
through the initial notion and this new challenger we reach a greater grasp of the truth, which
becomes a new novel notion, and the process repeats.


It must be noted that Hegel’s initial interpretation of the end of such a process, as espoused
in his masterwork \emph{The Phenomenology of Spirit}, is The Absolute, or, the final wholly and fully
conscious world spirit achieving maximum self-consciousness, the unity of subject and object, and
most importantly for our analysis, freedom. In his analysis of Hegel, J. N. Findlay writes that



\begin{quote}


“Everything we know must come before us in a living phase of experience (\emph{Erfahrung}). The
substantial, the solidly out there, must slowly be transmuted into the notional, the subjective. Time
simply is the form of this self-realizing process. Until Spirit reaches the end of the requisite
temporal process it cannot achieve complete self-consciousness”
(Hegel, 1977, p. 591).



\end{quote}


The Young Hegelians were enamored with this developmental process of world
spirit\Slash{}consciousness, and were inspired by it to enact their own historical theories; most notably that
The Absolute had yet to be realized, and that there was much work to do. The goals of many of
these thinkers was to push Spirit further along it’s destined path, typically through historical change
by the aforementioned dialectic method. Edgar Bauer, the most anarchistic of the Young Hegelians,
wrote that “Only with revolution, which begins the destruction of the forms of the state, does
genuine history commence, because here it becomes conscious” (Bauer, 1842). Here we see the
beginnings of the anarchist dialectic manifest, of the insufferable struggle between free persons and
the state. The Hegelian logic, the Hegelian dialectic, will thus be our starting point.


We now have our logical framework, but we must now take hold of our second root: an
ethical system in which to utilize our logic. Classical utilitarian or deontological models will be
insufficient, for there is little room for dialectic development. For the utilitarian, the end is always
“utility,” while to the deontologist the end must necessarily be “duty.” These ethics are much too
rigid to apply a dynamic logic to, and thereby we arrive at \emph{Virtue Ethics}. Virtue is itself a
developmental ethic, which makes it invaluable for our system. One begins vicious, and through
practice and growth one arrives at greater virtue; there is a constant vigilance that must be
undertaken in such a practice, as keeping vices at bay and virtues in sight requires consistent
application and re-examination.


Aristotle, the father of the Virtue Ethics tradition, defines Virtue as “a state apt to exercise
deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the [person] of practical
wisdom would determine” (Aristotle, 2005). In his ethics, Aristotle directs us towards relative
means between excess and defect, so that we may someday acquire true self-mastery. The Stoics
later take this methodology and use it to create their system of ethical theory in which to achieve a
good life (Eudaimonia); herein they name four Cardinal Virtues: “temperance, courage, justice and
practical wisdom” (Pigliucci, 2022). Through diligent self-reflection, the stoic arrives at a greater
expression of the virtues, and provide a model in which to live their life by emulating and aspiring
towards ideals. As Seneca writes: “you can never straighten that which is crooked unless you use a
ruler” (Seneca, 1925). The stoic virtues are the ruler in which to measure progress, and they are
arrived at through earnest practice and application.


These two models, dialectics and virtue ethics, marry well together, and give us not only a
method of analysis of conditions but also a metric in which to measure success. We have begun our
synthesis of Anarchism and Stoicism by first connecting each respective discipline’s philosophical
roots, and how these roots are complimentary from the onset. \emph{Dialectic Virtue} is hereby our
framework and method.

\section{\emph{II. The Individual}}


Important to both the stoic and the anarchist is the primacy of the individual (though not
entirely, as we will see in section III). Building upon our stoic ethic, we can borrow from one of the
most notable stoic philosophers of the Roman period: Epictetus. The primary contribution to stoic
ethics made by Epictetus was what is now known as the \emph{Dichotomy of Control}. In \emph{The Enchiridion},
or Manual, he writes that



\begin{quote}


“Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion (ὑπόληψις),
movement toward a thing (ὁρμή), desire, aversion (ἔκκλισις, turning from a thing); and in a word,
whatever are our own acts: not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial
power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts”
(Epictetus, 1877).



\end{quote}


This cements the common stoic notion of \emph{discipline}. A good stoic practitioner, and any
virtue ethicist for that matter, must rest their laurels on discipline to achieve a higher moral aptitude;
it is through discipline which an individual is able to actualize.


This is related to a common critique which is often raised against Anarchism: that most
ordinary people are not self-disciplined enough to self-govern. This has been addressed by various
anarchist philosophers throughout history; Mikhail Bakunin, member of the First Internationale
alongside his long-time rival Karl Marx, wrote in his essay \emph{On Discipline} the following:



\begin{quote}


“Hostile as I am to the authoritarian conception of discipline, I nevertheless recognize that a
certain kind of discipline, not automatic but voluntary and intelligently understood, is, and will ever
be, necessary \dots{} Power is diffused to the collectivity, and becomes the true expression of the liberty
of everyone, the faithful and sincere realization of the will of all \dots{} this is the only true discipline,
the discipline necessary for the organization of freedom”
(Bakunin, 2002, pp. 414–415).



\end{quote}


Here we see that discipline arrives as a necessity within the anarchist program—individual
responsibility over oneself ripened with virtue. It perhaps may not be the case that many individuals
are exemplars just yet, but upon adopting the method may dialectically assimilate themselves to a
wider scope of self-control and Liberty.


It is important to note that Bakunin, like many anarchists of his time, advocated for a \emph{Social
Revolution}: the progressive adaption of the wider culture towards a more libertarian and free mode
of consciousness. The Stoics, in microcosm, accomplish this feat by default; the ardent stoic
progressively tunes their own sense of virtue and vice until they arrive at a mean in which they are
rewarded with greater mental freedom and Liberty. Being unhindered by those things outside of our
control and focusing with moxie on those remaining things which are provides an immeasurable
benefit to overall well-being and peace of mind. Extended outwardly, this makes one a more
effective and resourceful political actor by way of taking direct action over one’s political existence.


The anarchists call not for anarchy in the immediate sense, but a slow dialectic burn in
which individuals are able to self-actualize towards a more complete Anarchism. There is a sense of
self-regulation that is inherent to anarchist political theory, or else vice would run rampant—this is a
common topic among many contemporary anarchists as the desire for self-management necessitates
\emph{temperance}, whether that be abstention from intoxicants, consumerism, technology, etc.. It must be
stressed that this process is not a clean-cut methodology in the classical sense. Self-actualization
will manifest differently as long as there are varieties of selves. This appears, at first, as a weakness
of the theory, yet I argue it is it’s greatest strength. In a socio-political program designed from the
ground up to maximize Liberty, it is only natural that individuals will be given the freedom to
explore these concepts in their own novel ways, sharing the knowledge and skills they learn to
maximize freedom for all. In building such a system, the individual must be given sovereignty over
their own affairs, and on principle be barred from exercising their will upon others without explicit
consent.


The strength of the stoic model is in it’s assertion of the individual will upon itself. Much of
stoic literature is littered with allusions to individual freedom and taking life into one’s own hands.
Marcus Aurelius, philosopher and last of the great emperors of Rome, tells us that “No man will
hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy own nature: nothing will happen to thee
contrary to the reason of the universal nature” (Aurelius, 2002). Taking dialectic virtue as our
universal nature, it is only natural that while The Absolute marches towards freedom, so too does
the individual person; this freedom cannot by it’s nature be hindered by others.


Herein we have established a tie between the stoic and anarchist interpretations of discipline,
and how these must be a necessary component for our theory. This applies universally to all
peoples: true and ultimate Liberty and freedom to develop on one’s own path toward mental and
political liberation. But it is true that people do not exist within a vacuum. Self-consciousness must
inevitably come into direct contact with other self-consciousnesses.

\section{\emph{III. The Moral Community}}


The goal of any socio-political program must confront the issue of reconciling the individual
with the whole. We have seen how the individual can be self-justified by way of our Anarcho-Stoic
theory, but what of the larger moral community? It is important that one exist within a thriving
social environment in which to attain self-actualization, and the stoics and anarchists have key
insights into how this should be arranged.


Beginning with the stoics, we see that the writings imply a moral duty to oneself and to the
community. Seneca wrote to his good friend Lucilius that “There is not a man who, when he has
benefited his neighbour, has not benefited himself” (Seneca, 1925). Within the stoic virtue of
\emph{Justice} there is serious attention given to acting in the better interests of not only ourselves but of
others as well. Marcus Aurelius reminds us that we should attain “a mind governed by justice, deeds
directed to the common good, words that never lie, and a disposition that welcomes all that
happens, as necessary, as familiar, as flowing from the same kind of origin and spring” (Aurelius,
2002). A contemporary stoic exercise influenced by the writings of Marcus Aurelius is the \emph{View
From Above}, in which one meditates on oneself, then extends that mindfulness towards one’s
family, friends, community, humanity, and finally the Earth itself from the perspective of world
spirit (see Ralkowski, 2017). This practice, a mainstay in modern stoicism, emphasizes the
interconnected nature that our lives have on the wider moral community, and encourages us to
extend our pursuit of Virtue to inspire those around us.


Anarchists write at much greater length as to how society ought to function—this is
unsurprising as Anarchism is a political ideology. Individual Liberty is surely an important facet,
but arguably more important is the community of free individuals brought together for common
cause. Anarchist prince Peter Kropotkin wrote at length about the nature of what he called Free
Agreement (Also sometimes called Free Association). In his most-known work, \emph{The Conquest of
Bread}, he defines it as such: “\dots{} volunteers organizing in committees and local groups; by mutual
aid and agreement” (Kropotkin, 2015, p. 130). A society rooted in free agreement and association
will better meet the needs of it’s members than any top-down organization on virtue that all
members take an active role in shaping it at all stages.


This is echoed in various anarchist writers, and many demand that when something concerns
an individual that that individual ought to have a say in how it is run. Likewise, American anarchist
Errico Malatesta asserts that we should have an



\begin{quote}


“Organization of social life by means of free association and federations of producers and
consumers, created and modified according to the wishes of their members, guided by science and
experience, and free from any kind of imposition which does not spring from natural needs, to
which everyone, convinced by a feeling of overriding necessity, voluntarily submits”
(Malatesta, 2014, p. 281).



\end{quote}


This is why the majority of anarchists are also anti-capitalist, for even the most studious of
business unions today are not directly managed by the workers themselves. This maps well onto the
aforementioned stoic Dichotomy of Control, for the focus of one’s efforts must necessarily be those
things in which one has direct control over (viz. one’s life and livelihood). This free society, no
doubt built upon some form of direct democracy, would empower all individuals to take charge of
their lives and the development of their communities.


Here we return to Virtue. For this system to be successful, it is imperative that we have
individuals pursuing Virtue and avoiding vice in their own lives, and if this is successful it will
inevitably ripple into wider society. Marcus Aurelius writes that “That which is not good for the
swarm, neither is it good for the bee” (Aurelius, 2005). The virtuous or vicious acts we undertake
affect directly our own lives, but more pertinent to this discussion they affect the world in which we
live. A world of virtuous acts is a more virtuous world by the transitive property. As the Social
Revolution develops dialectically, it inches closer and closer to absolute freedom and Liberty.


This is not to say that things will always progress smoothly. There will be disagreement,
dialogue, and contradiction, as is necessary by the method. In contemporary anarchist theory, much
emphasis is placed on open communication, consensual agreement, and consensus. A consensus
model of politics guarantees that all voices are heard in debates which concern the directly affected
polity. In an anarchist zine cataloged online by Sprout Distro, consensus is defined as:



\begin{quote}


“\dots{} a process for group decision making. It is a democratic method by which an entire group
of people can come to an agreement. The input and ideas of all participants are gathered and
synthesized to arrive at a final decision acceptable to all. Through consensus, we are not only
working to achieve a better solution, but also to promote the growth of community and trust”
(Anonymous, 2012).



\end{quote}


This will no doubt sound familiar to our exploration of dialectics (dialectic itself
etymologically related to \emph{dialogue}). When an individual perfects their Virtue, they dialogue with
themselves to reach a greater mean of truth, while when a community creates the space for open
dialogue among members it will reflect the greater perfection of the Virtue of the collective.


We have seen how the stoic and anarchist interpretations of social life mesh well together.
To answer the question of “how we reconcile the individual with the whole” we have developed a
system which promotes Virtue within individuals and the communities comprised thereof. A
collection of evermore virtuous individuals will manifest an evermore virtuous society.

\section{\emph{IV. Objections}}


Admittedly, more objections are typically raised in opposition to the Anarchist than the
Stoic. For instance, what do we do when, in a large community, a single obstinate individual halts
some social aim? If we are to take the consensus model seriously, and no consensus can be reached,
what’s to stop one person from pumping the brakes whenever they wish? One place where we may
find solace is to return to Kropotkin’s principle of free association. It would be unjust, naturally, for
any majority of community members to forcefully assert their will upon the individual without their
consent, but it must be remembered that the community and individual retain the Liberty to refuse
association as well. If an individual does not advocate the decisions of a certain community they
can, by virtue of free association, remove themselves from the equation as far as is possible;
likewise a community may separate from an individual. The community\Slash{}individual may pursue
their own goals insofar as the results of which do not inhibit the Liberty of the other.


It must be emphasized here that both Anarchism and Virtue Theory denounce vapid
discrimination such as sexism, racism, and other such kinds of unjust prejudice. Andrew Fiala
writes that “A thorough-going anarchism would thus offer a critique of anything and everything that
smacks of hierarchy, domination, centralization, and unjustified authority” (Fiala, 2021). The
realms of sexism and racism are social structures in which there are unjustified hierarchies of
peoples from arbitrary distinctions. To the stoic, we would see such prejudices as a breach of the
virtues of \emph{practical wisdom} and \emph{justice}, for it would be unwise to unfairly discriminate against a
person due to arbitrary characteristics beyond their control. Thereby the right to free association, as
discussed above, would not welcome bigotry as a means to any end (ie. ostracizing or segregating
members of the community on such grounds).


The largest difficulty that arises is in those who go against the grain, but this reveals itself to
be perhaps a benefit. No one is forced to associate with anyone they do not wish to, and this
paradigm allows the possibility for an expression of individuality as well as communitarianism. If
all members of a society take an active role in organizing said society, it will inevitably reflect their
preferences quite well, and those who disagree may branch off to start their own communities
which better reflect their needs.


As for Virtue Ethics, there is some uncertainty as to whether or not the anarchists will
adhere earnestly to the stoic model. The model as expressed herein is presented as an optimal moral
theory for the preferred application, yet there will inevitably be deontologists and utilitarians who
may object to the moral system itself. This is perhaps a subject ideal for an entire book, but I will
address common concerns here. The most espoused, is in Virtue Ethics’ anti-codifiability—that is,
it is not a strict and definite doctrine which can give us absolutely conclusive answers to what
decisions we ought to make. To respond, we must remember that Virtue is a developmental
practice. On the onset, many of the virtues discussed may appear vague, yet we are dealing with the
development of \emph{character}, first and foremost. A virtuous character will know \emph{intuitively} what right
actions there are to take, and the emulation of such characters will inform the course for others; this
is a continuous process, and while it may lack codified rules, so to speak, it must be remembered
that morality is not such a simple matter of having a definitive rule for all moral actions, as
demonstrated by the many criticisms of more rigid ethical theories. Moreover, the Virtue Ethics
model allows for \emph{independent} moral growth, where competing theories leave no such room for
adaptation in their rigid adherence to law, authority, utilitarian analysis, or universal maxims—
recall the words of Bakunin in that we may seek earnest advice from others without being subject to
them as ultimate authorities, viz. we can emulate the Virtue of others on our own terms.


One may then ask “how will we know when we’ve identified a truly virtuous and exemplary
character?” This is another common criticism of Virtue Theory, and one which requires a certain
degree of exploration in the virtues discussed. There are clear cases in which someone violates
moral virtue; for example, we know that a pathological drunkard is not exercising \emph{temperance}, and
we know that a person who avoids responsibility out of fear is not exhibiting \emph{courage}. As
mentioned above, it is evident that a person who is bigoted does not embody the virtues of \emph{practical}
\emph{wisdom} or \emph{justice}. It is admittedly simpler to spot vice (as it is sadly more apparent), but this leads
us to wonder in which ways such individuals may better express Virtue. We can view a person’s
character in such a way to ascertain in what virtues they are exemplars, and in which they may need
improvement. It may be rare to find an individual who is wholly virtuous by all accounts, but we
can find individual instances of moral expertise in which to serve as a role model for ourselves. If a
person is found to be acting courageously, we can ask “in what ways can I act courageous in a
similar scenario?” Similarly, if we encounter an especially vicious person, we can use their example
as a way \emph{not} to be.

\section{\emph{V. Conclusion}}


To create a truly free philosophical and political system is no easy task, yet we see the
beginnings of hope within the laid out conclusions of the Anarcho-Stoic model. Building upon
foundations of Dialectic Theory and Virtue Ethics, reconciling individual Liberty with societal
freedom and cooperation, we arrive at a quite promising path in which to move forward. This “no state” of affairs is not only desirable, but perhaps the consequent stage in the development of world
history. In a world which asserts itself as overtly authoritarian, advocating for an alternate world in
which personal Liberty and free association are truly attainable beckons to us as a utopian dream
not yet manifest. To quote Kropotkin once more: “That we are utopians is well known” (Kropotkin,
2015, p. 54). There is value in striving for utopia, if only to dialectically march closer towards it
over time, to achieve self-mastery and embrace individual and worldly progress. In our synthesis we
have found that Anarcho-Stoicism, while incredibly ambitious in its goals, is not a logical
impossibility; it requires only that we personally create the conditions for our Social Revolution
rooted in the name of Virtue. Epictetus has some words of encouragement for us: “Everything has
two handles, the one by which it may be borne, the other by which it may not” (Epictetus, 1877).


Let us hereby grasp the handle of Liberty, freedom, and self-determination, and in doing so create a
more virtuous world.

\section{\emph{Bibliography}}



\begin{amusebiblio}


Anonymous. “Consensus: A Brief Introductory Guide.” Sprout Distro, 2012,
https:\Slash{}\Slash{}www.sproutdistro.com\Slash{}catalog\Slash{}zines\Slash{}organizing\Slash{}consensus-a-brief-introductoryguide.


Aristotle. The Ethics of Aristotle. Project Gutenberg, 2005,
gutenberg.org\Slash{}cache\Slash{}epub\Slash{}8438\Slash{}pg8438-images.html.


Aurelius, Marcus. Meditations. Translated by Gregory Hays, Modern Library, 2002.


Bakunin, Mikhail Aleksandrovich. Bakunin on Anarchism. Edited by Sam Dolgoff, Black Rose
Books, 2002, pp. 414–415.


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2021, https:\Slash{}\Slash{}plato.stanford.edu\Slash{}entries\Slash{}anarchism\Slash{}.


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Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 591.


Kropotkin, Peter. The Conquest of Bread. Translated by David Priestland, Penguin Classics, 2015,
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Malatesta, Errico. “An Anarchist Programme”, The Method of Freedom: An Errico Malatesta
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Ralkowski, Mark. “The View from Above: The Life-Changing and Humbling Exercise from Stoic
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The Anarchist Library



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Jimmy C. Tolbert

Anarcho-Stoicism: A Primer



December 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2022


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https:\Slash{}\Slash{}philpapers.org\Slash{}rec\Slash{}TOLAAP-3
   

       

       
         This is the first in a further exploration of Virtue Theory within an anarchist paradigm. I hope to write more on the subject and respond to criticisms as they arise.\forcelinebreak  This paper was written for a Senior Philosophy Seminar at Rowan University.
       

       

       

       

       

   



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