of the

SPEAR

Looking Back on Looking Back:
James “Yaki” Sayles and
Organizing Politics
Underground

g ofth sene
Authoritaianism i spreading across the globe. As the cost of iving increases and

jcal collapse displaces communities workdwide, the urgency t

truggle against
injustices and incqualties becomes ever more pressing So too does the state’s need to
crush protest movements and organizers, 10 control, surveil, and demoralize cntire

populations. Disruptive protest movements and urban rebellions have not stymied

this dynamic in the leas, despite drawing in billions of people across the world. In
some cases, national ulers and corporate oligarchs panic under the weight of social

anger, prompting police and military leaders to take on greater responsibltes in

veming daly lfe

In'ight of all of this, the nced for better organization is becoming clear to many
people who have participated in protests, ots, and uprisings in the past years. But

debates over what kind of organization arc 4 central 0 eadical and revolutionacy

movements as the goals and visions they espouse. This debate i not new. I the 20th
century, subversive groups coordinated their cfforts according to their pltforms and

theories of change. From their ideology emerged thei theories of organization,

tactics, and strategy. Today,things are a bit different.

Protest movements in the s have grown and sharpened since the
it 11 by Oakland police

Oakdand, Califomia, following the murder of Oscar G

ficer Johannes Mehscrle. In cach wave of rsistance, loosely organized groups-
iiends, ncighbors, students, anarchists, and spontancity-orieated Marxists—have
overcome ideological, tactical, and political hurdiesin the heat of struggle. Together,

these movements have brought tens of millions into the streets, Peotest movements

and siots have forced the ruling classes o altr thei policies and plans, pushing them
further toward authoritaianism s they remain unwilling or unable to cave 1o the
pressures fom the popular rage below

Participants in Occupy Wall Street o the 2013 Justice foe Trayvon Martn protests
may not have had a clear deological diecction oe steategy. Today, millons of people
have a much sharpe understanding of the world—and whatis nceded to change it
Even Donald Teump has ascended to porwer by rebranding the Republic Party as a
force of destabalizaion, rebelliousness, and rule-breaking, While the insurrectionists
of decades past focused lasgely on tactcal escalation, itting the committed against
the funt-hearted within movements, today, seversl competing curreats are vying for
prominence within society, and they are willing 0 fake increasingly dire isks 10 do so.

Within these ke wing curzents—abalitionist, anarchis, communist, and democratic-
socialist, the four most influcntal—there arc obvious similarities but aso sharp
politcal and straegic differences. Some of these currents differ more from
themselves than from others. To understand how, we must look at the organizational

theories that have emerged from these tendencies. We also have to appreciate that
these are not hermetically-sealed groups. The beratory movements of the last 15
yeans have produced lasge area of acivity and subversion, and the theories Of those:
who populatethis “arca” often ovelap: abolitionists with anarchist organizational
models, anaschists with communist theories, democeatc socialiss with aboliionist
ideas, and 50 on.

While musch can be ssid about specific practices—decision-making, note-taking,
faciltation, membership—we'll focus on how these organizations relate 10 non
members, 0 acquiantances, and o steangers

4 tpetthesar
Mass Organizations: The primary goal of most groups, though often unrealized, i to
create mass public osganizations—aboveground” groups with open membership,
visble offices, websites, and accessible criteria for foining, The gol here is growth,
reaching as many people as possibl. In the midst of spontancous upheaval, gmups
organized around this mode use the opportunity o recruit. They are genceally not the
groups 1o speashead or agitate for militant action, a their members’identites and
infrastructure are casly accessible and therefore at a higher risk of epression.
Moreover, recruiing a large number of people incentivizes organizers 10 appeal 10
popular nterests and concems, which are shaped by the status quo. This group risks
becoming reformist. 1t can resist the pressue 10 compromise, so the theoey goes,
they stand a geear chance at influencing the dieection oF n upsising or even
revolution.

Collectines: Some groups prefer o stay small, public, with closed or hard-to-attin
membership. Their ideas and actvities are clear and visible, but their operations
remain tightly controlled. Theie focus s on precision and commitment. Their
membership is often well-known to theie community, but more or less secret or
unpublicized

“This type of oxganization ypically provides logistical suppoet, media operations, and
technicalsid o struggles. Movements could not fake place without them. Truly,they
are the backbone of protest camps, demonstraions, il support, and countess direct-
action networks. Whilk they sometimes lead, i's not usually thir ntent. They prefer
10 work within an “ccology” of efforts, specializing i few tasks. Because they do.
not usually vie for influence over the politcal and strategic diection of the movement
they suppor, theie effors are vulnerable 1o recuperation, s other forces shamelessly
take control of struggles.

Affinity Groups: Pasticolrly vosed by anaechists, these geoups are clandestine,
small, and often invisible. They have no known membership, no clear entry points, no
offices, and typically no relable means of contact. Their goal i safey, aglity, and
effectiveness.

Atthigh points in strugele, this form of organization i often associated with a strategy
oF “decentralized autonomy” or “diversity f tactics.” When many such groups come.
together, they do not usully diectly collsborate on specific plans. Instead, they
respect each other's freedom and security to pursue theis own initatives, confident
that thei actions align with the movement' overal political goals. Due to their
clandestine natue, these groups can employ militant methods safely, but generally at
the cost oflosing touch with a brosder base of potential recruits or direct support.

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Struggles cannot do without groups like this. Sl affniy groups cannot by
themselves lead, expand, defend, or accomplih all of the goals 4 ibesatory movement
may set forsclf.

Aboveground/underground conlitin: Thee is a growing desice o link aboveground
and underground forms and styles of organizing, Some hope to create movements
that can utlize separate strategies, based i different ideas of change, all inked
together. The groups in this framework operate separately—aboveground groups
work in the public sphere, while underground activists carry out direct action away
from public scrutny. Although it did not start out this way,this s somewhat similar
10 how the Stop Cop City movement opesated. There are probably countless
examples in, forinstance, the so-called “anti-globalization mosement” of the ‘905 and
early 005 of this acrangement as well. This mode aims 10 involve lagge numbers in
visible work while kecping clandestine aspects intact.

When the same people il both aboseground and underground roles, the mosement
is vulnerable—easy to infitate, attack, and monitor. Split the roles, and division
could follow. Logisticll, the tasks are different and reqire differeat skl
Ideologically, the challenges confronting each group demand diffexent considetions.
Functionally, the abovegeound group may operate leglly—solely handling media,
Fundeaising, and recruitment. Bt if they ace repressed, the underground is eft
exposed, without rearguard 1o nurture it

While this approach may scem practical, it risks fusing the three models improperly. It
combines both the strengehs and, more importandly, the weaknesses of each. History
shows thar, despite its appeal, this approach doesa’t aways deliver the desired
outcomes.

In this essay, we will argue for the necessity of building movements and organizations
based on the principle of mass clandestinity: groups that arc both large and secretive.
“These movements would have no visible membership, no known leaders, and no
headquarters. Neverthelss, they would be bl t0 recruit new members and cultivate
many forms of participation. Rooted in secrecy, they would hase the strength and
scope of a mass phenomenon, not just of a collectve, specific project, o affinity
group.

“To support this asgument, we will anlyze the Black Liberation Aemy and an essay by
New Afikan former prisoner of war James “Yaki” Sayles. We will lso explore the
global context behind the theories and strategies of the BLA, specifically by focusing
on the “foco theory” in Latin Amerika and its long globalinfluence.

o tpofthesar
What Was the Black Liberation Army?

The origins of the Black Liberation Ammy (BLA) are contested. Most commentators
agree on some basic fact: The BLA emerged in the early 19705 as a direct response
ties in the

1o the systemic oppression and violent repression faced by Black comm
s ofthe Black Panther Party (BPP), the

it 10 dismantle the structures of white

united states. Bom from the radicalized frn
BLA was composed of militants who.

supremacy and capitalis exploitation through armed struggle. Rejecting the slow
seforms of mainstream civil ights movements and the centralizing structure of the
BPP, the BLA believed hberation could only be achieved through decisive, dircct

action—an armed confrontation with the forces of the racil state

The BLA was a clandestine and decentralized organization. As repression of the Black

revolutionary let,and of the militant New Left in general, became increasingly

violent and desperate, some Panthers felt the Party's public orientation was no longer

tenable. Chicf among them were the Panther 21 defendants, most of whom lived in
New York City. By 1970, atlea

14 Panthers had been killed by police

Throughout the 19705, the BLA launched a seres of bold, violent actions aimed at

destabilizing the state. In 1971, they raided a New York Ciy police staion, seizing

s tportuemar
weapons and ammunition. In Atlanta, a police officer was ambushed, and BLA
miliants took his badge and weapon. Over the next year,they exceuted sever bank.
cobberies 0 fund theie operations. In 1972, the BLA ambushed police offcers in
Queens, New York, killing one and wounding several others. That same year,they
bombed police staions and courthouses, targeting law enforcement and the judiciary

In 1973, the BLA enaged in a deadly shootout in San Francisco, illng two officers,
then assassinated a police officerin Oakland. They also attempted dramatic prison
bresk, which ended in a shootout. Cells continued theie attacks in 1974, bombing
courthouses and orchestrating a successfuljalbeeak in Maryland 1o free Black
Panthess and othes radicals. In 1975, BLA commandos carred out another robbery
and engaged in a violent shootout n St. Louis, killng and wounding several officers.

In 1979, the BLA libecated Assata Shaku from the NJ Clinton Correctional Facilty
for Women. As a result several other members were eventually captured and sent to
prison, including Sundiata Acol, Sekou Odinga, Masilyn Buck, and Sylvia Baradini;
Shakur remains fre, ving in exile in Cuba o this day. By the end of the 19705,
despite their coondinated assault on state power, the BLA had been reentlessly
pursued and crushed by the govemment.

Who Is Yaki?

James “Vaki” Sayles was bom in Chicago in 1948, He was radicalzed in prison, where
he served time at Pontiac Penitentiary. While there, he joincd a small Black nationalist
group committed t0 organizing for revolution. The plan was simple: once released,
they would reconnect and buid a fighting force.

Upon his release, Yaki found himself immersed in the political currents of the
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), the Republic of New Afrik, and the Black
Panther Party. His loayly semained with the prison group that had shaped him. In
1971, the revolutionary landscape Yaki inhabitated was decply influcnced by Amilcae
(Cabral's The Revolation in Ginea wd Régis Debeay’s Revoton i e Revoltion? Like
many oFhis peers, these works became touchstones for understanding the poliical
tasks of the moment. The lessons they drew from Debray, especialy, played a key
role in shaping their politcal and strategic outlook.

Their misintespretations of these texts, long with the shortcomings of the texts
themselves, proved disastrous for Yaki and his comeades. They derailed theie efforts
and, for mang, destroyed thee lives.

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aki ran a BLA-aligned prison journal called Vi IVa W ars, meaning “People’s War”
in Swahili Tn the joumal's final ssue, published in 1988 (Tssue 12), Yaki fearured 3
fwo-past essay itled “On What It Means to ‘Rebuild Looking Back.” We will focus
on Part 2 f the essay,as it offers valuable insights for the preset, pacticulady
regrding the organizational questions posed above.

Looking Back on “Looking Back”
Analyzing ideological missteps within the BLA

“The BLA.CC besame avanguard withot a reargpard, anse i s asuumed tal
espansibil o the poltical as well s the iliary vty ofthe mases—pust as it had b he
Plereof poviding a base or s own suppor. 1o fores otside s ranks”

“From he beginning te BLA was et with conradictins ot ony vy ikolgy bt oer
stmtralfoom. The defniion o a poiic iy rganition elates 0 o e areas and s
vy been approaced by v opsing pins of "

Organizational and tactical proposals emerge from strategic deology, which emerges
from political conditions. Those who believe that tactics can be used at acertain
Juncture by groups or individuals “without a strategy” may be mistaken. The strategy
of those who efuse to grapple with politcs in a general sense is more grim than

grandiose.

“The animating premise of the BLA—t0 buid the “ammed frone” without est buiding
aparty, 1o engage in milltant actics without waiting for a coherent srategy—was not
‘aunique historical development, but rather an idea present throughout the world in
the early 705, This worldview remains extremely popular and may even be hegemonic
within radical and miltan circles globally Yalki begins his analysis here,

unsurprisingly, by connecting the LA’ early theories to the writings of Régis

Debeay. More specificll, he critiques their (ncorrect) intexpretation of Débray's
“foco theory” as well s the context that gave that theory populasity: stategic ollapse

i the fice of unelenting repeession.

By the early 19705, the “entire movement was being forced underground.” writes
aki. Raids on ofices, murders, beatings, and even massacres were increasingly used
by the state against radical movements of the time, not just the BPP. The Students for
Democratic Society (SDS) had already fragmented completely. Most of the national
leadership abandoned mass organizing in favor of a decade-long bombing campaign
5 the Weather Underground Osganization (WUO). The Black Mask / Up Against

W tperthespar
the Wall Motherfucker (BM/UAWAY group also left New York City to pasticipate in
armed resistance elsewhere. Scctions of the Puerto Rican nationalist movement
formed the Fucrzas Armadas de Liberacidn Nacional (FALN), a candestine, cell
bascd organization. Many belicved the mass structures of the preceding years were
untenable in clandestinity and athat a ncw steategy, based completely in clandestaity

had to be developed. (Ediur: for mur, mad “The Studens Inifada and the Comin
Revoluion,”Rad #1]

Yaki tells us that this was the context in which the BLA began conducting s actions
Wheseas the Black Panther Party held offices, ran a newspapes, hosted press
conferences, and osganized demonstrations,the Black Liberation Army was a
completely deceatralized “front.” Despit its name, it was never an ammy. It was never
seally an organization at all. To avoid police infitration o assassination attempts,
members formed “cells” consisting only of those with whom they had the utmost
trust. There was 1o chain of command and no formalstructure for decision-making

The BLA functionally lacked a unifying theory, logistics, or overarching plans

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Strategic Dissensus

According o Yaki, the BLA was “fighting a war” without a unified conception of
who their allies were—or even what their goals were.

A significant part of their latr confusion stemmed from thei lack of deological and
straegic clariy. There was o consensus on whether they were fighting to build 1
New Afkan republic in the Black Belt or 1o overthrow the us govemment and
establish Black power across sociey. This division not only muddled their strategic:
vision but also weakened their organizational coherence. Without agreement on long-
term objetves, their actions lacked dircction and were nable to withstand the
setbacks and difficultics that followed.

As repression continued to mount against left-wing movements, BLA commandos
escalated theie retaliation against the state, especially the police. The impressive and
justified actions of the movement were not enough to curb the idal wave crashing
down on them, as responding to every attack on the movement would have required
alarge, resourcefl organization—precisely the kind of thing the BLA set out to
avoid.

Theie only lear unity was tacticals uild the armed front, atack the police,
exproprate banks t0 fund the guersilla wa. This “tactical” mentality may be fumiliar
10 some militant organizers today. To some extent, contemporary movements have

sought to make a virtue of necessity, actively celebrating and pursuing organizationsl

and theoretical modes that presume great disharmony and confusion. No surprise,
then, that they must rinvent themselves every few years.

“Rereson of e movemens v of a gualctive nat,demanding o than e armed
esponses by an st sconof e morement”

“The Division between Political & Military Struggle

We saw armed s’ onesidedy and supeical fom theorical as well s il
tandpoint, On the one hand, our iendency was 1 view armed sl onyintems of armed acions
rather than as poliicswith Mowdshed, ¢, palitcalscalrevltion empling armed forms o
gl a vel as narmed forms.”

“The BLA did not simply reect bourgeois politcal partis; they rejected the entire idea
of the party—of a single unifying organization that would bring together collectives,

o tperthespar
icles, groups, and individuls. They could not imagine an organization that operated
i secrecy while simultancously conducting both political and military actions. Instead,
they believed that asmed steuggle could only occur independently of mass politcal
movements. To protect themselves and others, they believed armed militants could
el only on very loose nerwork of guerilla cels. Beyond a strucrural proposa, his
perspective mistakenly treated tactics and “armed struggle” as entirely separate from
other forms of poliics.

“This was a canastrophic strategic error. As Yaki puts it

“IN EFFECT, it was as i the Baberiks had sid thy'd bl te armed fon and b he
Mensheses b he mass frons; s i Mao had s he CCP would buld e armed fon, and
thy'd ke Chiang Kat Stk and the Kmintong bl she mas fon. There is v way 0 i that
armed actions will erate ‘i onction vt e ising melingy ofthe ases” wless te g
pamy—ihe ol miltry orynizason—isleading and ordinting boch Jons'al oms of
gl

“The BLA had no shortage of mosal suppoet. Neighbors and civilians never betraged
theie ighters 0 the police. But sympathy alone wisa't enough. Without cleas
politcal steaegy o rum that suppoe info acive pasticipation, theie¢fforts lacked the
force needed for the “people’s wae” they envisioned. The believed the “armed front”
would spark the revolutionary struggle’s rebisth, but without the mass involvement
reqired for such a transformaion, their hopes were empty.

“This should be a familiarpattern to some readers today. We might revise this section
10 add, “it would be s i the anarchists had sud they'd buld the armed front and let
the liberals build the mass front”

The BLA in a Global Context

n the wrtings of Yaki, the Weathermen, the Panthers, and other miltants of the

ime, one refeain cchoes through reflections, interviews, and memoirs
cead Reolution in the Revluion? by Régis Debray..”

and then we

We don't want to overstate the book's influence on the events of te era, but no
analysis of thse groups is complete without understanding the sprit of the times that
led s0 many young Amerikans to hold it i such regard. So, what was it?

Revoltion i the Revoluion? s seessed in 1967 and circulted t the Organization of
Latin Amerikan Solidariy (OLAS) conference in Havana, Cuba. Among those in

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atendance were RobertF. Willians, Kame Ture John Gerss, Ted God,and a
Hostof other US actiis,joining thousands ofsocilss, communiss, nd organizcrs
from acros the hemispher. Norably bicnr, however, were Che Gucvaesand the
book' auhor, Régis Debray. The eason? Borh were decpinthe Boliian ungl,in
Nancahuai, ying the groundwork for an srmed nucleus—or foco—to buid the
revluton in South Amerik.

In the months that followed, Debray's booklet was widely distabuted throughout the
Caribbean and Latin Amerika. It ideas helped spak bold, controversial cumpaigns in
Guatemala, Colombia, Venezucla, Peru, Argenting, Paraguay, Beazi, and Bolivia. A
Fatah reading group in Beieut used it to develop armed PLO cadees, while fedayeen in
the OIPFG in e studied it closely. So, what did the book propose? What
arguments did it offee, and why did it esonate s0 strongly with those who read if?

What Was the Foco Theory?

In 1961, eflecting on the July 26th Movement's insurrectional campaign,
Guevasa wrote Guerilla W afar. The book outhined the theory, tactic, and steutegy
that had deiven the Cuban Revolution. Though Guevera never used the term, his
ideas came t0 be known as the Foco theory. These ideas were systematized at greater
ength by Régis Debray in his work Reuluion i the Reoluion? Earl Fnglish

translations rtained the Spanish word “foco,” meaning “focus,” “spot,” “source,” or

“nucleus.”

“The foco theory posits that a small gmoup of guersills, by exploitng the strategic
advantages of rurl terein, could evolve into a popular army and, ultimately, a proto-
society that would challenge the stare’s legitimacy. The growth of this iniial band
would not depend on mass agitation or spontancous struggles from unions,students,
o civic movements—though Guevara and Régis Debray respected those fforts—
but on military successes, on being “effective” n the course of their actions. This set
Foco theory apast from conventional revolutionary modls. The guerrill band, in
Guevaa's view, would not be subordinate to a political party it would be the Party.
sl in embryo, uniting both miltary and politcal power in a sinle structure.

Because Cuban guersllas could not rely solly on the impenetrabilty of rurl terrin,
strategy of mobilty and clandestinity was essential to thei success. Prematurely

establishing a fixed base o occupying feritory could force them into a defensive
positon, allowing the state to encircle and crush them. With ifs vt resources, he

state could easily root out the rebels once they had consoldated defensible positions.

o tperthespar
Proponents of foquismo asserted that the inital phase of secrecy and mobilty was
ol temporaey. The nest phase would involve the expansion of defensible ereitory,
the development of counter-power through independent infeastrucrure, and the
incorporation of new forces info the revoluionary ranks. Across the world,
communist and socialst parties denounced proponents of the foco theory for
“anarchist deviationism.”

How did the Cuban revolutionaries develop this strategy and theory? It emerged from
their own experiences within the Latin Amerikan lef, It stemmed from their
membership in political pacties and radical organizationst that lways seemed 1o delay
the real moment of confrontation. By examining the development of the foquista
concepr, we can understand why it would have appealed o young Black militans in
the united sates just a few years ater.

Aprismo and the Pre-History of the Foco Concept

In 1924, Victor Rail Haya de a Torre, a Peruvian political exle in Mesico City,
founded the Amerikan Popular Revolutionary Allance (APRA). Though he engaged
with Mars and Lenin, he crafied a program talored t0 Latin Amerika’s unique needs.
Haya de la Torre drew his main inspiration from the Mexican Revolution. APR's
core mission was clear: politcal sovercignty and cconomic dependence for Latin
Amerikan nations, free from us. imperiaism. For Haya de a Torre,this meant
forging an allince berween the domestic perry-bourgeoisic and the peasantry—not
fustthe proletariar, This pan- Amerikan ant-imperilist strugele would give fise 104
new social ordee—ncither capitalist nor socialit.

Could Comanunist parties, whether independent or controlled by Moscow, be trusted
10 seize revolutionary opportunities s they arose? Were their structures and
deologies capable of adaping to the shiffing tides around them Could they be relied
upon 1o actn the people’s interests? Aprstas across the continent seemed to offer a
solution to this uncertainty—but they, 100, would collapse under the weight of these.
same dilemmas.

In 1934, the Partido Revolucionario Cubano — Auténtico (PRC-A), o the Auténticos,
emerged under the influence of Victor Ral Haya de I Torre,in opposition o Cuba's
former dictator, Gerardo Machado. Fulgencio Batists, asergeant in the Cuban
miltary, also rose to power theough the overthrow of Machado. Backed by the .,
Batista would lter govem Cuba. By 194, the Auténticos had grown in strength,
defearing Carlos Saladrigas Zayes (Barista’s handpicked successoe)in the polls and
propelling Ramdn Grau San Mastin 10 the presidency
With Grau's backing, a coalition of forces—socialst, Dominican exiles, Spanish Civil
Wae veterans, and Cuban students—hatched 1 plan 10 stsike against Rafael Teujill,
the ws.-backed dictator of the Dominican Republic. Fidel Castro, one of the student
leadess, o0k charge of aplatoon for the mission. The group assembled for the
assaul, setting up tesining camps aceoss C
the launch point for the atack. Aems, explosives, and fighters arsived from all
comers—Argentina, New York City, wherever they could be smuggled in. The stage.

abefore converging on Cayo Conites,

Under mounting pressure from the w.s. and the Dominican Republic, the expedition
collapsed. Fidel Castro and his group, led by Juan Bosch, tried to press on, but they
were unable 1o g0 at it lone. Rather than renouncing armed struggle aliogether,
Casteo's fustration focused on how the Cayo Confites mission had been hasely
conceived and then abandoned by Grau and the Auténtico Party. It wasn't the
straegy that he condemned—it was the betrayal of i

In 1952, just months before Cuba's scheduled presidential lection, Fulgencio Batista
staged a coup.

“The Orthodos Pasty condemned Barstas coup, calling for resistance theough civl
means,legal action, and non-violence. The Cuban Communists, in contrast, were
more lenient towand Batista and uncertain about opposing the coup. In response,
Castro and other radical members of the Orthodox Party began organizing their own
faction, complete with their own propaganda, and pushing for u revolutionary seizure
of power. On July 26th, 1953, this group launched an attack on the Moncada military
bacracks in Santiago de Cuba. The plan was simple: seize arms and spack a nationwide.
revolt. Tt was a disater. Soldiees killed dozens in the Seefight. Some survivors fled to
the mountains, hoping 1o establish a guerslla base and rebuld thei forces. Within

week, Batista had encircled and captused them.

“The Moncadistas—Castro and his comrades—set about rebuikding theie efforts in
Mexico afte theie release from prison. There, they encountered Alberto Bayo—a
veteran of the Spanish Civil War—and a young Argentine named Emesto Guevara.
Bayo, with his experience in rural guerrila wasfare from the fight against Feanco in
revoluionary Catalonia trsined the insurgents in his methods and theories.

With fresh insight and a efined straegy, they formed the July 26th Movement,
named afer their fald attack on the Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, Several
children of the Spanish Republican exies took up important positions within the
group, including Camilo Cien ugos and Haydée Suntamaria. Their emphasis on

W tperthespar
n and the crucial role of a tightly organized rural base was one

it within Aprismo.

When the July 26 guerslas successfuly scized power in Janary 1959 thei focus on

rural insur entional party model now faced

Serious competition within the intemational socialist movement.

>

BLACK LIBERATION ARMY

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Rejection of Foquismo, Rise of the Urban Guerrillas

In the carly 1960, the ws. developed new counter-insurgency strategis o combat
sural-based guersillas and quickly exported them to Latin Amerika. .. special forces.
conducted hundreds of counter insusgency missions across the continent. In addition
10 providing air support and specialized training for w.s.-bicked govermments, the us.
launched aid and propaganda progeams tugeting rural areas. These iniitives were
carried out through poliical campaigns, USAID, and the Peace Corps.

By 1966, when the Black Panther Pasty was formed, the rural guersilla struggles in
Latin Amerika faced serious problems. Although each country was also victim o
unique circumstances, in Argentina, Bruzl, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, the
‘Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Paraguay, rural focos falled t0 spack the
revoluionary upheaval they had envisioned, whether againststrongman regimes or
“preudo-democratic” neo-colonies. This was in no small part due to the inability of
the guerrillas 0 understand the language, customs, and culfure of the rural

populations living where they operated. In Peru, for exampl, Hector Bejar remarks in
his “Peru 1965
peasants in Ayacucho did not speak Spanish, while many of the communist and
socialist organizers of the time did not speak Quechua. This kind of oversight was
common among the foquistas, since the subject of the revolutionary struggle they
hoped 1o build were the guerilas themselves. The susrounding populice, the terrain,
the animals, plants, and precipitation eates were al reated ahistorically, as passive
objects around which the heroic fighters must mancuver. These theoreticalerrors cost

Notes on a Guerrilla Experience” that a large number of the Quechua

them dearl. One by one, the focos were munded up, gunned down, and liquidated.

In response o these setbacks,
Amenikan war of independence” could effectively overthrow w.s. imperialism and
build socialism.

Guevara proposed that only a “sccond Latin

To achieve this, Che sought 0 create acontinent-wide sty centered around
single “polisco-miltary” muleus i the rualheselands of Nancahuazi, Bolia. He

envisioned revolutionarcs from across Latin Amerika oining his small band,

receiving political and military esining, and bulding a muli-Front people’s army
spread throughout the continent. This army would operate independenly of any
single communist party or nationalist faction, which Che believed were no longer
sufficent for the task of revolution.

Initially, Guevar's group reled on the support of Mario Monie’s Bolivian
Communist Party for basi logistical id. This pasty vacillted continuously on is

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commitments to provide sid, recauits, an information. This dependence proved
disasteous. The teagic outcome of Guevan's Bolivian cumpaign—his dearh and the.
destruction of the guerslla nucleus—was secorded by survivors Pombo, Pereto, and
Debeay. Thei reflections on ths campaign offer crucialinsights into the filures of
the cural straregy—insights that semain valuable for those srudying the theory of
amed struggle in Latin Amerks

Afer Che's death, the stategy of armed guerilla wasfare shified to the cites. Inspired
by the ideas of Spanish anarchist exile Abraham Gullén, Cuba-sligned revolutionaries
launched ueban gersla operations in Uragusy, Argenting, and Beasil. The actions
and writings of groups like the Tupamaros and figureslike Carlos Marighella gined
global traction. In the w.s.,they were translated and republished in jouenals such as
Leviathan, Radical Amerika, Monthly Revier, and elsewhere. Their theories became 1
blueprint for revolutionary movements worklwide, influencing groups such as the
Provisional Irsh Republican Amny, the Brigate Rosse, and the Red Army Faction. In
the end, the urban guerrlas were even less successful than thei rural counterpars

In 1968-1969, as translators beowght powesful stories and asticles from Unuguay and
Bl to the Bnglish-speking world, actvists in the united states were searching for
new ideas amid ever mounting repression.

From “Build to Win” to “Rebuild”

“The sogan ‘Bl 10 W' was formed and sed n e s of artidar el and exteral,
subjctive and bjecive condiions. Those condions o ongr exit”

“The Black Panther Party simed 1o develop a secet armed wing to advance the
politcal gouls set by the osganization. This approach aligned them with Moscow-
supported Communist Partes worldwide, 2 well 1 with groups like APRA in Latin
Amerika. In contrast, the Black Liberation Army (BLA) envisioned small urban
guersll cells that would inspise the masses 10 form 4 revoluionary movement

through their bold, heroic actions, much like theie Latin Amerikan counterparts in
Brasl and Uruguay. The phrase “Build to Win” encapsulred this approach, serving
both s a guiding principle and a strategic assessment of thei revolurionasy path

As conditions changed, some within the BLA recognized that their current seategy
was fuiling. By the lte 19705, dozens of BLA participants were sitting i jail cels, and
the entire movement was in retreat. This led a fuction callng tself the Black

Libesation Aemy - Coordinating Comamitice (BLA-

10 revise theie approach and
adopt a new strategy under the banner of “Rebuild.”

me W
“The shift in strategy was irst outlined in a document titled “A Message to the Black
Movement.” According o Yaki, the concept of “Rebuild”emerged from the
realizarion that asmed strugele had 10 be ully integeated with mass polical
organizing—no as an “armed wing,” 15 the Panthers had envisioned, noe 2 an
“amned nucleus” of the sevolution, as the carly BLA had believed. The “Rebuid”
faction argued that the movement could not remain fragmented into isolated fronts—
one clandestine, one mass; one armed, the other politcal. Both had to merge into
unified force,

‘Vaki argues that the flure of the BLA layin theie inabiliy 1o buikd a mass
underground movement capable of integeating both politcal and mltary tasks under
the same bannee,

Isolation Was Qualitative

As noted carlies, Yaki distinguishes berween the BLA's isolation in terms of moral
support and its straegic solation a5 & political catalyst. While many, especially within
Black communites, sympathized with and supported the BLA—offerng shelter,
public soldariy, and logistical help—their actions remained disconnected from the.
broader mass struggles that could have provided real force and meaning The BLA
failed to brdge the gap berween guerril fighters and the large revolutionary social
movements. There was no clear path for meaningful participation, and their gerrills
factics did not create a mass armed insurrection capable of foppling he s
govermment.

Like their counterpasts in the Weathermen and the Black Panther Party,the BLA
never developed a concrete relationship with the spontancous rots, uprisings, and
blockades that marked the late 19605 and 19705 Instead, they viewed these
phenomena with,at best, suspicion. Though these were pivotal moments of politcal
violence and resistance, the BLA remained detached from them. Yaki doesn't address
this gap in his essay, peshaps because, even by 1988, he had no fully recognized the
politcal mistake it eeprescated. Revolutionary action, i this context,required
systematic and organized pacticipation n lagge-scale social disaffection—which
included rior, strikes, and uprisings.

‘The Riots Never Ended

Because many New Left groups shified focus in the eady 1970s—from mass revolt 10
organized subversion and sabotage—many today assume that rots and uprisings

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stopped around 1970 and 1971, This is wrong Aftr the May 4, 1970 uprising,
spasked by the kiling of four srudents at Kent Stat, siors, rebellions, and community-
led class combat continued. From 1970 0 1979 (and wellinto the 19805),large-scale
uprisings—broken windows, rock-hrowing, buming barricades, looting, gun btles
with the police, and tear gas—eocked cities across the countey,driven by the same
rage that had fueled the late 1960, Radical groups n the counterculture, abor,
feminist, and student movements remained active into the *T0s. But, by 1971, after
George Jackson's death and the Attica revolt, a clear pattern had emerged. The
Weathermen, the Black Liberation Army, the George Jackson Brigade, and countess
others rumed their focus to sabotage, bombings, and politcal violence. We can hasdly
blame them for the impasses the beration movements encountered. Many more
reteeated into spectatorship, cheesing on, celebrating, o propagandizing around these
actions from the sidelines, or lsc, crtcizing them without charting altemate paths
forwar.

Let's briefly examine a few ueban revolt that took place afer Attica, without the clear
involsement of organized militunt groups. For this discussion, we'll exclude organized
insuerections, standoffs, and rakds—events like the Second Wounded Knee. We don't
intend to cheapen orignore these acts of organized militancy, but we want 10 focus
on spontancous uprisings, deiven by uneuly crowd dynamics—poor, racalized, and
angey people acting without laborate planning, coordination, of progeams.

In February 1972, hundreds of Latinos in Phar, Texas, ioted against police brutality.
fipping cars and breaking windows. The police responded by fising on the crowd,
Killing one person. In April, Chicanos in Santa Paula, California,clashed with the
police, using guns and Molotov cocktals. In May, over 200 arests were made afier
thousands of anti-war protesters fought with police for hours in Gainesville, Florda.
“The following year, in Apal 1973, 10-yeac-old Clfford Glover was murdered by the
NYPD in South Jamaica, Queens, catalyzing days of soting. In rsponse, the
Weathermen bombed the 103rd precinct the next month. In 1974, racist iots broke
outin Boston over school busing, Thousands of white sudents burned cars and
threw stones at Black residents, who defended themselves in kind. In August 1975,
after a white bar owner killed Black teenager Obie Wynn in Detroit, days of roting.
followed near Livemnois-Fenkell In February 1976, Pensacola, Florda, erupred afiee
high school students clashed over the Confederate Rebel mascor at Escambia County
High School. When Chicago police killed fwo Puerto Ricans in June 1977, thousands
in Humboldt Pack fough the cops with Moloto cocktals and stones for two days.
During the iots, The Fuerzas Armadas Liberacién Nacional (FALN) bombed the
Cook County govermment building, even before the fighting started. The events go.
on and on. Days of rioting and looting in NYC during the 1977 blackout. Widespread

wme n
unrestin Miami following the 1979 killing of Acthue McDuffie by the police. The
1981 uprising in Wilimington. Justce for Eugene Walkes sots in Chicago in 1983,

16 we include self organized wildeat ibor resistance—like the Arhanta Mead
Corporation stsike (1972), the Kentucky Brookside Mine strike (1973), or the Detroit
Dodge widcatstrike (1974)—the list could go on for many pages. The uprisings
didn'tstop, and many continued into the 19805 and ‘%0,

“The BLA, along with their contemporaris, led to connect with the popular tactcs
o subversion, isolaing themseles from the very people they needed to buld a
revolutionaey organization. This mistake canniot be repeated.

Revolutonaries oday must secognize the necessity of engaging with mass acts of
spontaneous unrest. Whether riots,strikes, blockades, or occupations, hese eruptions
of popular resistance are cstcal moments when people take their strggl directly
into the srcets, Revolutionaries must be humbly linked to these actions—not mercly
a5 supporters but as active participants, helping to shape the course of uprsings and.
pushing them oward revolutionaey goals. The clandestine organization, borh political
and “military,” must remain accountable 0 the forces of popula insurrection and
unsest. The revoluionary Organization—mass yet seceer, populae yet covert—finds s
true puepose ol in strets choked with fear gas, littered with bricks and broken
glas, cars overturned, and helicopters buzzing overhead.

Toward a Mass Clandestinity

“The central argument of “On What It Means to Rebuld’ Looking Back” i that the
entire revolutionary movement must be rebuilt n secrecy. Yaki strsses that armed
struggle cannot be separated fmom politcal struggle, and vice versa. Many, perhaps.
most, veterans of the BLA, the BPP, and similar formations have concluded that their
primary fuilure stemmed from inadequatel scparating legal from gl fronts or
activites. Tn his bre
this positon succinctly: “There should have been a clear separation berween the
above-ground Party and the undergeound amed appararus.” This idea i gaining
traction once agin—but it is mistaken. It misdiagnoses the politcal problems
confronting militat resstance. The revolution cannot succeed by relying on
anonymous guersla cells or afinity groups. It cannot be led by spokespersons,
democratic groups, or civic organizations. Simply connecting these two types of
groups through covert communications or anonymous liaisons will not suffice.

informative history of the BPP, Sundiata Acoli summasizes

S0 what does this mean? How can something be “mass” i it s hidden? How can 1

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movement or organization be secret if everyone knows about it? £t operates in the
shadows, how can it be participatory? According to conventional thinking, these ideas

cannot coexist. By certan standards,they are outright conradictions.

fieca

The Fjéscito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (FZLN), or the Zapatista
powerful example of alange, secretive organization—an underground mass
movement. Campesinas, teachers, guerrills, spokespeopl, and entire support
networks operate n the shadows, intricately woven into the fibric of Chiapas’ Mayan

society. Thousands gather for meetings, dances, and markets,al while masked in

balaclavas, their tru identitcs conceled within a complex web of social fcs.
The Frente Sandinista de Liberacidn Nacional (FSLN), or Sandinistas, followed a
similar path. Theis approach 1o osganizing allowed union keaders, srudent acivses,
poets,saboteurs, and rural guerrlas 10 sustain a decade-long guerrilla war with only a
flew hundred members. Their strength lay in thei ability to seamessly integrte new
prtcipants, bringing thousands into their ranks throughout 1978 slone.

The Provisional Iish Republican Army (IRA, or Provos) coordinated around 10,000

volunteers in Belfas alone during the late '60s and carly "705. Confronting the full
force of Bitish colonial terrorism and pacamiltay violence, membership in their
ranks was kept catieely sccret. Restaurants, grocery stores, churches, bars, and
apartment compleses became hidden meeting places where the movement thrived in

the shadows.

The Underground Railroad offers another example. More 4 network than an actusl
organizaiton, this sccretive web of relations allowed Afikan slaves to escape from
plantations across the South, relying on a vast conspiratorialsystem dedicared to

ending human bondage. Comprised mostly of free Black people and white

abolitioniss,the Unde

round Rairoad connected drivers, churches, safe houscs,

lawyers, famers, and armed insurgents. Members dentiied themselves as “agents

R

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“conductors,” “stations,” and “stockholders,” based on theie respective

responsibiliies. Their clandestine nerwork helped over 100,000 escape 10 freedom.

Looking Forward

For anarchists and other anti-uthortarians, organizing collectives, media projects,
and even murual aid nitatves under reative anonymity and sccrecy comes almost
naturally. This stems partly from the regular cycle of repression within anarchist
spaces and partly from politcal easoning, Anarchists oppose authosty, gurcheads,
and representatives. As a resul,even groups with rlatively open membership models
rarely have spokespeople. The leadership dynamic that spokespeople representis
believed to breed undesirable power imbalances within groups and movemeas. Whie
this approach has benefits, it aso camies 4 cost—many anarchist groups remain
deeply misunderstood by the public

In contrast, most adical groups from orher theoretical traditions openly reject
clandestinity. Mecting notes are shared on Google Docs, intemal conversations fake
place on Slack. Press releses casey real names, and members regularly post from their
social media accounts. Spokespeople give specches without any atiempt (0 obscure
theie identites or aflations. This transparency has benefits but lso drawbacks.

Many radical groups become deeply invested in law fulness due t0 their constant
exposure to surveillance. Repression never even enters the picture, because these.

groups offen restesin their political imagination to law-abiding means alonc.

For those accustomed to onganizing anti-repression groups, mutual id committes,
publishing projects, or small affniy groups, the principle of mass candestinity can be
diffcult to grasp. Are they “above ground” when distributing fers to the Fumiles of
prisonens? Are they “clandestine” because they operate closed collectives with no
gl ientiies attached?

Simvilaly, it may be hard for those involved in “mass” oeganizations o understand
what they stand to g from protecting thcie members’ identities—and what they risk
by faling 10 do so.

We believe forming collectives and organizing groups, 4 s common in narchist
networks,is important. Working with undocumented people, prsoners, ant-fascists,
and abortion access groups is essential. But this approach alone is insufficient for
revolutionary struggl. It allows people to accomplish specific tasks, often well. Butin
times of heightencd social polasization and criss, it can't address socity’s broader
nceds. A social revolution requires 4 guiding orientation for specific projects and

3 tperthespar
fronts. In such a context,tasks shaped by social stsife, class conflict, and possibly civil
wae will be necessary. We must focus on building emancipatory commusities,
infrastructures, unions—and evenrually entee regions. A revolutionary osganization
dedicated 1o fighting class domination and the state must be built,distinct from the
specific nceds of a collective, union, or afiiry group.

Attempes to form an “open’” revolutionary pasty or federation are drawn from a
troubled, ulimately doomed history. The stae will ot allow activist istservs,
Instagram personalities, NGO stffers, or elected steering committees t0 overthrow
the most unequal sociery in history. Leaders will be sounded up, members scattered
“The organization will strugele to seconstiute ifslfin secrecy, as morale will be low
and panic high. We do not believe we can persuade those invested in publicty 1o
change counse. But those of us who operate under the radar, mainining political
independence, should focus on buiding mass revolutionary federations and
networks—groups dedicated not ust o activism or propaganda, but o revolutionary
strategy—in secrecy.

One person can casey out an assassination, but hey are unlikely 1o escape live or
free. A small group can breakk someone out of prison, but they cannot lbesate all he
cages or desteoy the faciliy. 500 people can vandalize 4 shopping center, but they
cannot topple & police department. An uneuly ceowd can desteoy polce station, but
they cannot defeat the National Guard. In revolution, the oppressed will rise up to do
ll o this—and much more. They will seize warehouses, fumland, and fictories,
demolish penitentiaries and courthouses, dismantle baeracks,take over media stations,
collectvize resources. These tasks will unfold over months or years,in paralle to the
capitaliststate which will unleash terror and misinformation against the
revoluionasies. The two forces will compete for influence n the same ciies, the same.
ncighborhoods. Anyone who believes i revolution must admit that specific
structures are necessary to faciltare paticipation and action on this scale. When the
streets are lined with tanks and barbed wire, when helicopters hover overhead and.
snipers line roofiops, improvisation wil be dificult

Rebuild the underground!

Rerluionary Interommatin Researsh Gronp.

wme x
ROUND!

Gt

e,

z