SECURITY WI
HIERARC

This zine is based on a series of talks with the same title given at anarchist conver-
gences in the summer of 23 in Stockholm, Ljubljana, and St. Imier. Following each
talk, the content of the zine and future talks were improved by the discussions with
others in the rooms and later in the nooks and crannies of the venues. The words on
these pages are not solely my own because knowledge isn't incepted out of nothing
but rather synthesized from our past experiences and interactions with others. We
Learn together, not alone.
Discussions of security culture tend focus on ways to keep out infiltators or avoid
surveillance. We have plans for how to not be recorded or leave a trail of evidence
as we take action, and we have our rituals for keeping infiltrators at bay or rooting
them out when they turm up. These discussions in many cases are less grounded in
the material realities of epression but rather more i the pitting of different dogmatic
approaches to security against each other. When security culture actually is more
broadly discussed, it tends to revolve around the question “are we doing enough?”
‘We reach for zines or hold workshops tht are instructional on how to do “more se-
curity” More security,fewer phones. More secrecy. fewer leaks. There is a lack of
xeflection on how the current application of security might be damaging to individ-
uals or the movement as a whole.

‘Along with al the beneficial ways we apply security culture, there are patholog-
ical applications. Sometimes this happens on accident through many well-meaning
actions whose sum leads us to undesizable behavior. Other times security culture
is weaponized by the Horrible Creatures' who inhabit our scenes and don’t aim to
abolish power over others but instead climb the social ladder to claim the highest
position for themselves, and we also need to account for this in how we construct

What follows i a critical discussion of the ways we pathologically apply secu-
rity culture. The very thing that i intended to protect us from external harms can
be the instrument of harms and disruption itself. When we're not careful, we can
accidentally rinforce existing hierarchies or even create new ones.

ON SECURITY CULTURE TTSELF

What are we talking about when we say security culture? There are many ways to
define it, and some make a point to emphasize the most positive elements, but for
now it's more useful to think about how people actually use the term rather than
how they should use it. A definition that is broad enough to be applicable to both the
beneficial and pathological implementations is: security culture is the practices and
norms that are claimed to protect a group from repression ot (external) disruption.

In 2004, Crimethlnc. published the still-relevant text What Is Security Culture?.
‘The first of their theses on security culture was

The central principle of all security culture, the point that cannot be em-
phasized enough, is that people should never be privy to any sensitive
information they do not need to know.

Regardless of how it was intended or the extent to which it captured practices in
the preceding years, it has become somewhat of an edict in anarchist circles. This
quote recurs in anarchist texts, discussions both online and off, and even in memes

A eferenceto n esay ofthe same fite, which 1 can whole-heartedly recommend.
that get passed around. Or perhaps this quote is popular because modern practition-
ers of security culture find that it mirrors how they approach the topic. In any case,
security culture is often seen as controlling the flow of information.

‘This approach makes sense because we are often trying to keep confidential infor-
mation from being exposed to enemies. A spontancous demonsiration requires that
police are unaware of it existence until after it starts if it i to be successful. The
identities of the individuals who took part in a direct action must remain indefinitely
hidden

‘We are, however, always dealing with varying degrees of uncertainty. Because
we don't have perfect knowledge of those around us, we can't be absolutely sure that
it s safe to tell them anything. Someone might be an opportunist and will rat out
their “comrades” at the first chance to benefit from doing so. A comrades who s 100%
solid today might change their ideals. But also, we cannot be sure who—including
ourselves—will rack under coercion, tortuous o otherwise. O, we don’t know who
is a straight-up police infiltrator. This isn't even including the ways information
accidentally leaks out either through covertly recorded conversations or intercepted
electronic communications. We preemptively cut the flow outward so that leaks
don't spring up further down the line. But, we will never know for certain who is
“safe” and who is “unsafe”

Controling information flows is a specific case of the general phenomenon of
security culture being used to control access to resources. We fear the intelligence
gained by an infiltrator, but we also fear the damage done by a police saboteur, a
wrecker who s out to derail our projects, or an abuser who causes great harms and
breaks our spirits. We might deny access to even casual meetings or social events
to people based on them ot fulfilling some criteria of trustworthiness or assumed
safety. We might not let unknown collectives use the spaces we control, and we
might deny admission in to a collective or working group based on someone being
too “unfamiliar” This suspicion of infiltrators or abusers creates a culture of fear
where groups turn inwards and hold people at arm’s length.

‘The result of this is an increased threshold of trust required to engage in even
the most basic of organizing. Security culture in these cases becomes less about
analyzing which information should remain privileged or which activities could lead
to repression, and instead this mistrust leads to restricting allinformation, activities,
and resources.

ON POWER

Anarchism is often defined in its literal sense as being without or against hierarchy.
To me, the root of anarchism is to inerease individual autonomy, and apposing hier-
archy is a natural consequence. If we want autonomy, that which stands in our way

Oratthe very least il that staate of liitaionsfo any criminlized scivity has passed.
is power, or more specifically power over. Capitalist systems have power over you
because they force you to work bullshit jobs to survive. Your landlord has power
over you because the need to pay arbitrary rent restricts what choices you might
otherwise make. A queerphobie society has power over you because forcing oneself
into the closet in order to participate in that society is a reduction of autonomy.

Free choice depends on alternatives existing, and that itself depends on having
both knowledge and access to resources. A farmer's autonomy is increased by hav-
ing greater knowledge of soil, weather, agricultural techniques, or even nurition
which might impact what they choose to cultivate. A disabled person’s autonomy s
increased by having access to adaptive technologies, alternatives, and substitutes

Being able to restrict knowledge and resources is power, and when phrased that
way, it becomes immediately obvious that security culture is—in some ways—at odds
with autonomy. Controlling the flow of information to hinder intelligence gathering
inherently is wielding power over one’s current and would-be comrades. Control-
ling the access to resources—physical spaces, equipment, use of a platform—is again
wielding power. These both restrict others’ autonomy, even if security culture in-
creases everyone's autonomy in other ways, such s by enabling action or preventing
imprisonment. Knowledge gives us more choices and therefore more autonomy.

“This isn't to say that we need to abandon the practices of security culture to
adhere to some strict definition of increasing individual autonomy. It's just drawing
attention to the fact that there is a tension between the prefigurative creation of
autonomy and the need to protect ourselves from threats to our ability to organize.
Security culture in part involves holding power over other people, and we need to
acknowledge this and do what we can to minimize its negative effects and the extent
to which we use it, or at the very least every case needs justfication.

TH PATHOLOGIES

Whatfollows is a description of some of the broad ways that security culture i patho-
logically applied.

PATHOLOGY #1:
REINFORCING IN-GROUP PREFERENCES

“The frst pathological application of security culture s when it is used to create,
strengthen, and justify in-geoup preferences.

‘There's a conflation that happens between *safety” and “security” not just in in-
tent but in hov these words are used. There is only a clear difference in English
between these two words. In German they are both the word Sicherheit. As they e
used in these contexts, secure means being in a state of actual protection, at least
elevant to the original dangers. Safe means being frce of things that cause a feel-
ing of being hurt or harmed (perceived or otherwisc),though sometimes it's used to

mean free of psychological or emotional discomfort. This conflation of terms leads
to accusations of genuine insecurity because of a perceived sense of unsafety.

People who are new aren't trusted because they re unfamiliar. Sometimes they're
alittle different and don't pass the “vibe check ” Maybe this is because theyre socially
awkward, nearodivergent, come from a different cultural background, or are just
having a bad day. New people who don't share to our subeultural traits or adhere to
our subeultural norms are viewed more skeptically,like if their clothes aren't punk
enough or if their interests or hobbies aren't ones we share. Sometimes security
culture tselfis used as shibboleth.* and if someone thinks to ask the wrong question
out of genuine curiosity, they lose social standing or might even be outright shamed
forit. Security culture gets used less as tool for increasing actual security and more
as a signal of already belonging

People use frequency and familiarity as a basis for building trust, and yes, the con-
Versations we need to have to discover shared politics matter, but often its suffcient
that a person has been around at “enough” events to establish some form of “cred:
bility” Varyinglife paths or even disability can make regularity a challenge, and this
method of establishing trust over something like explicit background checks favors
those who are likely to be part of the stercotypical anarchist subculture over people
might be politically anarchist but lead a different lfestyle. Generally. this creates a
boundary between those who are already conneeted to “the scene” and those who
aren't. Those with connections have easier access to spaces, resources, and support.
‘Those without... simply don't

Voluntary association is fundamental to anarchism. If someone genuinely doesn’t
want to associate with someone else, that's fine, and they are allowed to create that
separation, but also we know we live in a fucked up world of sexism, racism, and the
like, 50 we stil need to constantly check our preferences to sce if we're expressing
some bias that's so deeply internalized that we don't even see it any more. Even
further, we don't tolerate the creation of racially segregated enclaves, which is to
say: some forms of inclusionexclusion are considered harmful enough to be fought.
We need to be wary of who gets what few privileges our movement affords. Far too
often we only make connection with people who are already “like us’ and we use a
pre-existing knowledge of security culture as one of the filters. Those who aren't are
denied access to helpful information or resources.

PATHOLOGY #2:
ABUSE ENABLING

Similar to the strengthening of in-group preferences, security culture can be used to
enable abusers. This often happen when someone in a group is called out for prob-
lematic behavior, especially more serious accusations of abuse or sexualized violence.

S shibboleth s any custom or radition, usualy a choice of phrasing or even a sinle word, that
distinguishes one group of peopl from another

‘The accuser might themself be accused of being an infiltrator or wrecker who s fab-
ricating the accusations purely as a means of disrupting the group. Security culture
gets perverted from an analysis of conditions and actions into pure reaction against
‘anything that disrupts the stability of the group. It lps the relation from noting that
infiltrators disrupt into asserting that anything that disrupts must be an infiltrator
‘The stability and longevity of the group—and often the most "prestigious” members—
are protected over the accuser. This is generally in alignment with who is currently
privileged and favors, for example, white cis men.

‘The accused and their defenders claim that the accusation is harm because it's
false, and it’s easy for them to point to the “certainty” of the harm the accused
claims to be experiencing. The group had the appearance of stability before the ac-
cuser brought the abuse to attention. The accused fecls attacked, and the group must
change its focus from their primary tasks to dealing with the accusation, thus there
is “disruption” This is pointed out be “obviously harmul and disruptive” and the
accuser’s claims must be more rigorously proved. The disruption is named as really
being the fault of the accuser, and why would they do that i they themselves were
the one who is unsafe? So they are cast out and slandered.* O, to quote Sara Ahmed
as she said in The Complainer as Carceral Feminist: “To locate a problen s to become
the location of a problem.”

‘The enabling of abuse goes beyond the explicit protection of the abuser them-
selves. Its often inadvertently reproduced by the broader milieu. As anarchists, we
don't only refuse to cooperate with police; we're also mindfl that our actions don't
aid them. This creates an internal pressure against publicizing an abuser's action. It
‘might delay a callout or restrict what is said within it to make identifying the indi-
vidual more difficult. We don't want police to leam about rifts in our movement, and
if we don’t want to provide evidence that might doxx a “comrade’ to police or fas-
cists, 50 we say less. Whisper networks and semi-privately held black books rather
than public posts or wheatpastes try to circumvent this issue, but those tactics priv-
ilege people already in the know. People new to the scene are far less protected by
these methods. Even just making a vague callout or using whisper networks can be
Iabeled a security culture violation because it’s exposing “private” internal informa-
tion to those who weren't “permitted” to see it. At the most extreme end, anti-abuse
activists might voluntarily withhold eritical information about a violent abuser from
people they're trying to warn because it would be “dorxing” to do so.

In these cases, even well-meaning comrades can prioritize the safety of the abuser
over other comrades or potential future targets. What's overlooked is that the risk
of the abuser harming again s far greater than the risk of a State response to that
information being made public, and moreover that someone who has intentionally
caused harms has forfeit their right to unlimited protection. They are the danger we
need protection from

oralonger dscusson n
Subeulurs

his scethe sine Btrayal: A Crital Analyss of Rape Culture i Anarchise
6

PATHOLOGY #
CLOUT SEEKING

While it is an ideal held—especially by anarcha-feminists—that all forms of work
within the anarchist movement should be valued. there is undoubtedly a hierarchy
where those who engage in violent direct action are held in greater esteem than those
who don'®. This comes in part from the fact that we sce those who are more willing
o take risks as being more “dedicated” to “the cause” or as being better alles or ac-
complices. I's true to some extent as the converse i true: those who are unwilling
to expose themselves to any risk tend to be unreliable comrades The result of this
ends up where we give social capital to people who engage in direct action or other-
wise take risks, egardless of whether or not they're sensible. However, we end up
with some serics of logical jumps where we assume the causality between dedication.,
isk-taking, and the need for securty i far more pronounced than it actually is.
Alage part of security culture is The Two Nevers:*

Never talk about your or someone else’s involvement in activity that
risks being criminalized. Never talk about someone else’s interest in
eriminalized activity.

“This means we don't—or atleast shouldn't—actually know who s allegedly doing
all this super cool shit, and people know they shouldn't be 5o abvious about naming
themselves as the docrs of cool deeds, so we look for people who hint that they
are. We look for people who make a scene of ther security culture through indirect
bragging.

Indirect bragging is when someone docsn'tdiretly say that they engage in crim-
inalized activity. but they do everything that can to ensure that people assume they
do. Following a big action, people might say that they attended since thisis expected
of most radicals in a scene, but the indirect-braggarts will make a show of stating
that they can't talk about whether or not they were at an action (instead of simply
saying “nah. stayed home’). More generally. they might make a big deal of telling
you how they can never talk about what sortof organizing they re doing or where
they were on any given weekend. Peaple “ooh” and “ahh at their showmanship and
then give them the clout they're do desperately seeking. Because we don't actually
know who is carrying out these actions, we end up applauding people who suggest
that they are the ones who did.

“This behavior feeds offof and reinforces the supremacy violent directaction holds
within anarchist milieus. I creates a hierarchy whereby those who—irrelevant of
whether or not they even do any direct actions—can elevate themselves above others
A social elite can develop by draping oneselfin aggressive sccurity culture

ik i rlativ o one'spersonal siuation and localcontet. Posting sbout ben an antfscistcould
be mor risky for some than dinetly confonting fascists s for others.

“This term and th neversthemselvs e puled directy from the ine Confidnce Courage Connection
st 4 praposal for scurey culre,

PATHOLOGY #:
GATEKEEPING RESOURCES

Under severe repression, the use of cell structures becomes necessary because of
draconian response against anarchists and other activists. This cell structure is rarely.
necessary, and yet we apply it to day-to-day organizing under broadly permissive
“liberal democracies”

Part of security culture is that everyone gets to choose their level of risk and that
everyone isallowed to consent to what isks they take and what information s shared
about them. This includes sharing a phone number or email address. Naturally, if
someone asks for another’s contact details, we shouldn't give it up without explicit
consent. This norm is good and healthy.

‘What can often happen is that one person will act as a gatekeeper between mul-
tiple collectives or even social circles. This allows that one person to mediate all
interactions and even directly preemptively gatekeep access between the collectives.
‘This centers the gatekeeper in all interactions and ensures that they will be brought
into future organizing circles because they have made themselves irreplaceable. This
can factor in to decisions on whether to eject them from a collective or not. By avoid-
ing making themselves redundant,they elevate their importance, and they claim they
can’t be made redundant because doing so would entail sharing private information
which violates the established security culture

In some cases, but not al, this desire to be irreplaceable isn't driven by a lust for
power but rather a fear of being replaced. Anxiety is ever-present in our scenes, and
financial precarity and harsh social censure for minor transgressions increase fear
of rejection and abandonment.” Some people position themselves in eritical roles to
create a sense of safety that the group can't cast them out.

A second way resources are gatekept is side effect of making a scene opaque and
illegible to the State. Information is not made publicly available for events, and ac-
tivities that are not highly repressed have their details closely guarded. What makes
a scene illegible also makes it inaccessible for those that we'd want to join us

“This form of gatekeeping ties in closely with in-group preferences, but it func-
tions slightly differently. Explicit in-group preferences encourage making judge-
‘ments when a person arrives and then using that to deny them access. This illeg-
ibility and opacity is an implicit in-group preference because it is a strong deterrent
for those not already connected enough to a scene to have that information directly
shared with them.

“Widspread ansioty especaly n organisng is discused in the 2ine We Ave All Very Ancious: Six
Theseson Anxity and Why I i Effectiely Prevening Miltancy, and One Possble Strategy for Overoming
by The nstitute fo Precarious Consciousness and Crimethine.
8

PATHOLOGY #
ESOTERIC KNOWLEDGE AS POWER

Repression is shrouded in a lack of information, and those who can “see” what the
State (or other agents) are doing hold some esoteric knowledge tht the rest of us do
not. Sometimes this isn't easly directly shared as it may only come with significant
experience or expert knowledge, though some do try to spread this knowledge as
best as possible. One of the most “invisible” kinds of repression is of the information
technology variety. We can't “see’ our messages being sent around the internet, nor
can we “know” they're encrypted. We also can't “see” when we've been hacked or
what data the State is gathering on us in the same way we can see jackboots walking
on the streets or breaking down doors during raids. In part because of ts esoteric
nature, and in part because of the strict rules by which information systems operate,
there tend to be more cut and dry edicts about digital security relative so the social
aspects of security culture®

In many cases, some sort of elte of techies can rise within anarchist circles. They
make demands about security, and they shame those who won't or can't follow their
rules. Because of the alleged absoluteness of IT security, and because these special-
ists hold knowledge of these systems, they often use this to elevate themselves over
others. Often implicitly, but sometimes explicitly, the claim is that only those who
really know security should be leaders, organizers, or principal decision makes. In-
stead of security being a collaborative effort between equals with different expertises
and experiences, the techie asserts authority over others.

“This isn't limited to techies in general, but can also come from any people who.
push security at all. There is some mysticism and ritual in security, and those who
have memorized it the best and make the biggest cries for its implementation can be
the ones who then place themselves in a leadership position. This too is generalized
to not just genuine security but perceived safety. There is a well-documented phe-
nomenon of the individuals with the most conservative stances on a topic driving
discourse, and one might sce this in debates like whether it's a consent violation to
see kink at pride. The demanding security enthusiast might use blocks on consen-
sus to ensure that their needs are met and that the group adheres to their standards.
Instead of being a collaborative effort among all to increase collective security, the
group’s action revolves around the self-appointed expert. Even with the best inten-
tions or when they are actually correct, the person insisting on the most security can
dominate a group simply by forcing unattainable security standards on others.

‘Similar domination via expert knowledge could happen with other forms of anti-
repression measures like counter-surveillance o legal assistance, but I have not yet
scen this, and it seems rather particular to how techies and security enthusiasts in-
teract with security culture”

“Whetheror ot suchstritruls are ecessary o effctiveis another mattr entiely.
Tt sid, physial securty has the pathology of devalving into cop shit and micra-warlordiss, but
THE PROPOSALS

‘The easiest way to attempt to apply security culture is to base it around control of
access to resources. A blanket "no” is a simple answer, and once a small group is
established, sticking to an insular dynamic is the path of least resistance. 1t gives
a great feeling of safety and even importance by assuming that one’s strct security
practices makes them relevant. But maybe there are ways to break the cycle and find
a collaborative way forward to create a more inclusive security culture.

PROPOSAL #1:
EMBRACE DISCOMFORT

There is no singular anarchism, nor s there some utopia where we will never ex-
perience distress or discomfort. We will always be exposed to others with differing
ideas, norms, and cultural practices. It will never be possible to create an in-group
free of discomfort, and this includes of people who might be allies but haven't yet
learned—and kept up with!—the rapidly changing vocabulary that aims to reduce
harms. There might be places where this method is necessary for the work at hand
such as in trauma support groups, but it shouldn't be the default method of all orga-
nizing.

‘We should avoid labeling someone as unsafe or dangerous just because we have
perfectly healthy disagreements with them or that they mistakes while learning.
Walling people off for perceived or even anticipated differences can be called secu-
xity, but often it's just simply exclusion in the name of homogeneity. Some people
contrast the approach of ereating braver spaces (those that acknowledge that con-
flicts will exist and promise to work through them) with that of creating safer spaces
(those that aim to minimize discomfort). The end goal might be quite similar, but the
change in framing can drastically shift the norms and group dynamics.

PROPOSAL #2:
CRITICALLY EVALUATE RISK

Not all anarchist organizing is under equal threat. This is abundantly clear, and it's
hot to say that we should abandon security or be careless for everything but the
most risky activities. When we over-apply security culture to casual organizing, we
inhibit new connections. This can be by making a scene inaccessible to newcomers
by overemphasizing security culture rituals or even not spreading basic information
out of paranoia about where it might end up. This prevents people within our scene
from accessing resource or information or expanding their social network.

T{somewhat arbitarly) dra 3 dstnction between security culture and physical secuity even though
they are quite related
10

‘Social movements survive repression by creating robust networks. Robust means
that any cuts to the network don't cause it to collapse and that there is redundancy
of connections for accessing resources or providing solidarity. While some caution
is unquestionably necessary, we risk harming our networks and ourselves when we
principally base our security on our fears. Our caution should scale with the extent
which our activities are—or in the near future will be—criminalized. This means
developing an accurate understanding of the repression we face and ensuring our
security cultures specifically target those State actions.

PROPOSAL #3:
HAVE INTENTIONAL DISCUSSIONS OF
SECURITY CULTURE

Within our groups, our security culture discussions are frequently limited to debat-
ing if a single application of a rule is justified or not. We avoid some of the finer

points of security culture such as refining practices or changing behavior. People

have strong opinions about security and trying to change practices often causes peo-
ple dig their heels in and resist anything that might be called a loosening of security.

They insist on perpetuating practices that create a feeling of safety, and those who.

want to change a practice often are less invested in changing the behavior than those

who want to keep it. Forcing the issue—if we ever actually do it—can create divides.
in groups, and so in the name of coherence and unity, we avoid them.

The proposal is that we should force the issue. Avoiding these discussions and
letting pathological security culture practices proliferate harms the movement. Ifyou
informally organize, discuss this with your comrades the next time you hang out. If
you have formal meetings, make it an agenda item. If these conversations can't or
won't happen, chances are you are part of a project with strong informal hierarchies,
and you might be better offleaving to start your own.

As noted before, many people’s pursuit of safety is a trauma response, and work-
ing through such trauma can lead to a healthier security culture. There is no re-
placement for therapy—professional or autonomously organized—but the threats of
repression can be demystified by having these intentional discussions of security,
and this goes hand in hand with critically evaluating risk. Instead of a vague spook
of the State looming over our every action, we can outline not just what threats we
face but what we can do about it fogether to create genuine security for everyone.

Having these discussions can also be educational in a general sense. This cuts
into the authority the techies and security enthusiasts have with regards to the se-
curity practices of a group, and it allows us to build up shared knowledge so that
we can reason through decisions together instead of relying on the words of a single.
individual

1

PROPOSAL #4:
CALL OUT PROTECTIONISM

As part of the intentional discussions, but o every time it happens, we need to call
out the ways security culture becomes protectionism. This is often made difficult if
there i already a culture of exclusion that permits the accentuation of in-group pref-
erences. Countering protectionism under the name of security culture starts with
changing the underlying social relations that pathological security eulture justifies
To change a culture is no small task, but it’s also something we can all start by being
more open with how we organize in a general sense. When a security practice starts
to veer into protectionism or in-group preference over genuine security, we need
to pause and reflect on it. Usually specific and intentional interventions are neces-
sary, and examples of these can be intentionally inviting others to a shared space or
hosting events whose purpose is facilitating the building of new social connections.

PROPOSAL #5:
MOVE BEYOND “US AND THEM"

Related to the critical evaluation o risk, and perhaps both the most practical and
important of al, s to move beyond the idea of there being a clear *us” and “them”
Such a false dichotom tends to mean drawing a line where people on the same side
are assumed to be safer and more trustworthy and people on the other ide less so.
“This is a poor heuristic. Of course, not everyone has such strict lines. Within the
sphere of “us” and “them” there are varying levels of trust and assumed safety, but
broadly speaking trust gets over or under assumed depending on where someone
falls on that line. One way to conceptualiz thinking in this manner of trust i that
itis like an egg. There's 2 hard outer shell that keeps the bad things out, but once
something gets in, it can scramble the insides quite easily.

A more useful way of raming security to imagine concentric and overlapping
circls. Large circles that include more individuals are for organizing mass events:
demonstrations, workplace unions, or even just events like info evenings or film
screenings. These events are low-risk, s0 we don't need to work about heavy secu-
rity norms. These large circles might overlap where people who attend book read-
ings also show up to cook in the community Kitchens. There are also progressively
smaller circles as one moves from minimally repressed actvities o heavily repressed
ones. The circles get smaller because we need to have already established high trust
which takes time thus limiting the number of people who could conceivably be in-
volved. Larger crcles might have more overlap with other large circes, but because
of the higher security needed. smaller circles might intentionally not overlap (but
sometimes they will.

Importantly. progressively smaller cicles are nested within within the larger cir-
cles. These smaller collectives down to afinity groups are not isolated from within
12

the broader milicu, but rather are embedded in it. This embedding is important be-
cause it allows us to mediate the flow between larger and smaller circles, from areas
of lower trust to higher trust. Decpening relations allows us to deepen trust, and
this deepened trust is a necessary criteria for taking radical action. Isolated affin-
ity groups that aren't embedded within a broader scene wil eventually die out, and
without pullng in new comrades, they will not reproduce. This is a dead-end for
anarchism.

Instead of restricting the flow of information and connection, we want to encour-
age overlap between circles. We want to faciltate connection. This doesn’t mean
giving up control, but instead guiding growth. We want comrades to be mutually
involved and develop both decp and broad connections.

One note on this method is that in smaller cites with a limited scene, and espe-
cally in small town organizing, there might simply not be enough of a scen for this
strategy to work. The lack of anonymity of a bi ity means everyone knows a ttle
bit what everyone s up to, and two insurrectos who propose conflictuality as astrat-
cgy might be “known’ to all 2 the ones who carried out some direct action simply
because they are the only ones who might conceivably even do it. | unfortunately
cannot offer meaningful advice on hov to modelthis kind of security as [ have insuf-
ficient experience in such contexts. Perhaps then I'll leave this as an exercise to the
reader

CLOSING WORDS

Security culture is a necessity for organizing, but when we're not careful, we can
ereate hierarchies. This often comes from trying to control the flow of information
or access to resources, but it can also come from reinforcing in-group preferences,
protecting the coherence of an organization, or repelling those who might challenge
informal power structures. Like many anarchist methods, they can be pathologically
applied, misused, and perverted to serve authoritarian and malicious ends. This isnt
an argument against security culture. It's acknowledging the ways that we end up
having to wield power—even just a bit, even nobly—to protect ourselves. Power
and hierarchy can never be fully abolished, and we will perpetually fight against
them no matter how utopian our world becomes. Maybe this shouldn't have been
called Security Without Hierarchy but instead Hierarchy-Conscious Security, though
that doesn't have quite the same ring to it

Now, where do we go from here?

We're going to have security culture, but whether or not it's predominantly ben-
eficial or predominantly pathological depends on how we approach it If we're inten-
tional about building open, mutual relationships, we might end up with a healthier
security culture that contributes to a healthier scene. 1f we stick with tradition or
aren't able to counter those who use security as a weapon, how we organize might
be anarchist in name only. There’s no approach that is guaranteed to work, and I
can't pretend to be able to say that there's solutions that work everywhere or even
that these proposals work at all. T've just experienced harmful dynamics driven by
security or atleast that use security as their justification. Maybe by naming them and
describing how they function, we can all find ways to counter these trends so that
we can forge new and strong connections we can use in the fight to end coercion.

FURTHER READING

If you've seen some of these patterns, and if you want to find ways to understand
them better or even address them, there’s a few other texts you might want to con-
sider. Confidence, Courage, Connection, Trust: a proposal for security culture by an
anonymous comrade s probably the most useful modern text on security culture,
and it deseribes approaches for taking a positive rather than negative approach to
security. Stop Huntin’ Sheep: A Guide to Creating Safer Networks by Sirens of a Vio-
lent Storm offers practical advice on how to deal with infltrators so that we can stop
turning security against ourselves. Secrets and Lies by Ungrateful Hyenas Editions is
similar to this text in that it describes pathological applications of security culture,
though it does so from a different angle.
Power can creep into every part of how we organize, take root,
and create hierarchies. Security culture is one such case, and
through both accident and malice, we can create new
hierarchies and exacerbate existing ones. This zine reflects on
the ways security culture can lead to harmful organizational
patterns and structures within our collectives and movements,
and it offers some possible methods for addressing it.

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