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PRISMA Primer on Radical Information for Secure Militant Actions
PRISMA: Primer on Radical Information for Secure Militant Actions Original textin German PRISMA: Prima Radikales Info Sammelsurium Militanter Aktionen 2010 web archive.org/web/20250611231250/https:/militanz blackblogs org/vp- content/uploads/sites/481/2017/11/Prisma.pdf Translation and layout No Trace Project noteace how/cesources/#prisma
Note from the No Trace Project: Compared to the original PRISMA zine, this translation includes chapters one, three, four and five, except for paragraphs and sections related to computer or phone sccurity that we deemed outdated. It does not include chapters two (“The Goals and Motives of Militant Politics) and six (“Action Tactics”) because they are outside the scope of our project.
Contents 1.Let’s Go... 3. Action Preparation and Exceution . The Steps to Success . Beforchand Initial Reconnaissance 9 A General Plan Sccond Reconnaissance ‘The Action Plan .. Plan B Immediate Preparation ..and Action! ... After the Action A Final Note on Security Anti-Repression and Emergency Plans . Communication Structurcs Getting to Know Each Other ... Discuss Emergency Situations Together! 4.Our Security Traces .. Fingerprints DNA Traces . . Options for Creating a Clean Room Aificial DNA Scent Traces Shocprints . Vehicle Traces Tool Traces Fire Traces Witing Traces . Material Traces Purchases A Few Research Tips Technical Surveillance ..
Monitoring Enclosed Spaces Phone Surveillance Postal Service Vehicles Public Space Databases Biometrics E-passport . Surveillance Cameras ... Where Can You Find Therm? What Can They Do and How Can Thc) Be Recognine What Can We Do About Them? .. Physical Surveillance First,a Few Basic Rules When It Comes to Physical Surveillance ........ . Not Everything That Can Be Done Wil Be Done .. You Can Detect a Lot of What Is Being Done You Are Not the Only One Who Could Be Targeted . Your Enemies Don’t Necessarily Know Everything You Know Paranoia Feeds on ltsclf . What You Can Do Specifically Who and What Is at Risk? What Could Be the Reason for the Physical Surveillance? . 71 What Could Be a Threat in the Future? . What You Can Do When You’re Under Physical Surveillance. 5. Documentation . Photos of Actions .
1. Let’s Go... Hello! I¢’s nice that you’re holding this booklet in your hands! We don’t want to keep you from reading for too long, but we’d ke to start by saying what motivated us to put this booklet together (and what didn’s). We are quite a motley crew, active in struggles ranging from opposition o the nuclear industry to opposition to racism against the Roma. In our experience, we have found that it is often difficl to find an overview of different forms of action, especially militant ones, as well as practical and contextual thoughts on different aspects of security and action planning, Sometimes it’s the little things that cause headaches, ike how to il the fire extinguisher with paint. A lot of clever writing has alrcady been published, but where? Not everyone has an archive of radikal’ in their closet, and rummaging through old issucs, as nice as it is, takes a lot of time and is not possible everywhere. That’s why we have collected information about taking action. Collected in the sense that we hope that while browsing through these pages, you’ll come across an idea that you hadn’t thought of yet, or that hasn’t been concretely described anywhere yet, Collected also means that most of the content has alrcady been published somewhere, and we have copied or summarized it. Some of the texts were written specially for this booklet because we couldn’tfind anything alrcady witten on the subject. In the “Action Tactics” chapter,? we deliberately included many very different options. We also received new and imaginative suggestions as we were putting it together. We believe that it can only be a good thing to constantly and creatively reflect on one’s own forms of action. This includes the question of which form best conveys what we want to communicate. That is why this booklct also aims to look at actions in their context There are thoughts about goals, communication, and sceurity. However, \No Trace Projct (N.T2R) mote radikal ws 3 German magazine, frst published in 1976, which included practical information on how to carry out actons. It i banned in Germany: “N.TP e This chaper is ot inchuded in H translation
the thoughts on goals are very general. One of the reasons for this is that the content of our actions s geared to the social conflicts at hand, which are constantly changing. Each context scts its own priorities and needs 0 be discussed anew. We felt that this booklet should contain ideas that can be applicd or transferred to different situations at different times. The cmphasis is on practice because we wanted to be precise and show as many tactics as possibl. We haven’t tested everything ourselves. However, we know some things from experience, and we hav tried to verify and rescarch everything cse to the best of our abilites. For the more complicated content in the chapter, it is always necessary to do tests yourself before putting anything into practice. But you know that. We wanted to avoid creating a hicrarchy of different forms of action. Admittedly some topics take more space here than others. Thisis probably because the more complicated the preparation and the higher the health sisks or the intensity of repression, the longer the descriptions will need o be in order to be accurate. [..] You may have some fundamental objections to publishing such a collection, such as that we shouldn’t unnecessarily give cops or Nazis recipes for the forms of action used by the radical left, because that might make our practices more transparent. But we consider it more important to spread forms and ideas among ourselves. As we said, most of it has already been published and will already be familiar to the cops. We figured that it can be an advantage if many people in many places know and use many forms of action, because then specific practices would not be so casy to attribute, Another diffculty is that such a collection could appear to be the “ultimate collection”. But it isn’t intended to be, and it isn’t; many things arc stll missing, For example,the use of the Internet s given fr too little attention in this booklet, It would be intercsting to think more about sceure Internet access and claiming actions by email or about hacking. In our opinion, ncither Internet cafes nor anonymization software are sufficient. It would also be interesting to have morc information about copicrs and to what extent or how copies can be traced back to specific devices, what is stored and for how long, ctc
And this brings us to the next problem—as much as we would have liked to continue to expand and collectively develop this booklet, this is not immediately possible. However, we would like to sce additions, criticisms, continuations,experiences with individual actions,responses, and anything clse you can think of that would contribute to a discussion on these topics within the radical left. In our opinion, the most suitable medium for this (due to its relatively widespread distribution) is the Berlin-based publication “Interiny”. Unil then, we wish you a lot of fun reading, all the best,great impacts in your projects, and a completely different lie for all of us. lunaties for system change
3. Action Preparation and Execution The Steps to Success Originally published in issue 158 of the German magazine radikal. The comments in square brackets are from the editors of the original PRISMA zine. This text summarizes some things to consider when planning actions. Itis aimed at smaller groups rather than mass mobilizations. However, some of the considerations can be applied to such larger actions. The text is not meant to be a step-by-step guide to action, but rather a collection of things that should be kept in mind if an action s to be successful. The points themsclves arc based on concrete experiences, but are kept general enough to be generally applicable... Beforehand A question precedes any action: what do we want to achieve, what is the goal of the action? It makes a difference whether we want to c propaganda, cause as much economic damage as possible, phy something, or show solidarity with other struggles. Oft achieve a mixture of these different goals In any case, it makes sense to discuss goals as concretely as possible beforchand. Then it’s easier to think about what we want to do and what we need in order to do it. No matter the action (whether you drop a banner or vandalize an office...), for these initial discussions you should choose secure places where you can be confident that you won’t be overheard. Depending on the composition of your group, it may also be important to arrange to meet in a way that isn’t visible to other friends, comrades and ou may not otherwise spend time with this particular group of people very often. We usually have a serics of concrete targets in mind for direct action: every trip to the store, every drive through the roommates, since 8
city or attentive reading of the newspaper ills an imaginary list. Once you have decided what you want the action to accomplish, the next step is to sclect a specific target where the desired impacts can best be achicved. By narrowing down the goal, the tactic, and the specific location, you now have an initial rough plan for your action! After answering the three famous questions “what, how, and where?”, the concrete planning can begin... [In any case, when selecting a target, care must be taken to ensure that no bystanders arc endangered.] Initial Reconnaissance The first step should always be to familiarize yourself with the target location. Ideally, several people should take a look at the chosen location, They should use photos, drawings, and maps to describe the arca to cach other. [We need to point out problems with this approach: you shouldn’t have photos, drawings,etc.lying around at home. If photos and drawings cannot be avoided, they shouldn’t be kept at home and should disappear as soon as possible. If photos are stored digitally, you should carcfully consider where you store them, and how to completely destroy them; more on this in the lst chapter. The very latest that you should destroy everything is right before the action.] More things will be noticed with more pais of eyes, and some things are only really noticed through the process of collective discussion. A small gate, a hidden camera, a tree adjacent to a wall... I€’s often these little things that later become central to the plan. At this carly planning phase, i’s important to develop an eye for what type of movement is typical in the surrounding arca, the ways into and out of the target location, and. possible escape routes. The area to take into account grows if you will be driving to the action by car’ because then you’ll also need to find a good. parking space and well-chosen car routes. It would be really annoying SNLTLR ot Later i the zine, secton on vhicle races concludes that “the use of carshould [..] be avoided whenever posible” 9
to get caught when leaving because of traffic checkpoint or something similar which could have been forescen. AGeneral Plan Based on the initial recon ance, photos, maps, ctc., you can create a general plan, This should include the routes you willtake to arrive and leave which are free of sccurity cameras, the parking options, the location of entrances on the target building, and multiple escape options. Part of this general plan s also to decide whether the action should take place during the day or at night, and how long cach part of the action will take (the arrival route to the meeting point, the route from the mecting point to the target, the duration of the action, the escape routes, including alternative eseape routes). You should also determine the number of people needed during this planning phase, which depends heavily on the tactics chosen and the specific conditions on the ground. How many people are needed for this specific action? How many lookouts? Is it necessary to cavesdrop on the police radio or something similar? How many cars and drivers? Second Reconnaissance The second reconnaissance of the target location takes place with the general plan in mind. Therefore, it should take place ata time of day similar to the time you expect the action to take place. Especially if the action is ‘going to take place at night,it’s important to know the lighting conditions and typical traffc patterns. All participants should have seen the location beforchand to get their own idea of the situation. During this second reconnaissance, the main focus should be on possible sceurity systems and details of the terrain. For example,if you are going to seale a fence, it’s important to know how it’s constructed. Is it topped with barbed wire? Is it made of a material that can be easily cut? How thick is it? Is it made of individual panels that are only bolted together? Where are the screw heads located, what size arc they? After this sccond reconnaissance, everyone should know cnough about the target to be able to decide together what tools and tactics will be needed. It s also essential to test the planned escape routes. Are there 10
seally no surveillance cameras along the routes? Is our car really the only one that parks there, or is the spot also used by others? Is the parking location visible from a distance, or is it hidden from view? Is there enough ro0m to turn the car around? Are any tie tracks left behind? It’s often the litle things that make the difference between success and falure. Another important step is to preciscly measure the time it takes to get from the target to where you can get into the car. If this escape time is not fast enough, the car must cither be moved closer or driven towards the people escaping so that everyone disappears quickly cnough. It can be uscful to agrec on 2 meeting point after an action so that you can drive back from this meeting point together, but these routes and locations also need to be checked for suitability. Part of this second reconnaissance should also involve thinking about where the clothes and tools should disappear to after the action s carried out. Its clear that we should at least get rid of our “outer layer” (shoes, pants, jackets, gloves and hats) as well as any tools which leave behind traces useful to the police. Otherwise, we can never know how likely it is that these items will be found and linked to us at some point. At this stage, the most sensible means of communication must also be diseussed. Can everyone always have a line of sight to cach other and thus communicate with signs? Do we need walkie-talkics or other forms of All forms of communication need to be tested femote communicatio on the ground to make sure it isn’t too dark to sc each other, or that a previously unnoticed building docsn’t block radio communication. The Action Plan To ereate a detailed plan, everyone involved in the reconnaissance first gocs over all the new information together. In practice, it usually makes sense to ask very specific questions about each report. Most of us aren’t trained to describe a situation in detail ke police officers and journalists. Soit’s important to ask cach other questions in order to collectively acquire accurate descriptions of things. A detailed action plan begins with the mecting point of the active participants and does not end until everyone has dispersed. 1
[The individual escape routes should also be discussed together. Keep in mind that your homes may be under surveillance.] Every step in between must be clarified and recorded in a schedule. At every stage of the action, everyone must know what needs to be done and who is communicating with whom. What tools are needed when? How will they get to where they are needed? And how will the tools be disposed of? Al roles must be clearly described (driver, lookouts, people who will be directly at or in the target....) An important decision at this stage is also whether there should be some form of back-up. By this we mean a trusted person who, in the case of failure or danger, can be contacted far away from the action by phonc or other suitable means to organize external support. This is not uscful or necessary for all actions. [In our opinion, telephone communication during or shortly after an action is a major security risk. We have no way of knowing if the contact’s phonc is being tapped. It may be possible to usc a burner phone with an unused card, but even this should be carefully considered. It’s probably better to arrange a mecting place beforchand. ] PlanB I¢’s often a good idea to think of solutions to problems that may arisc. A door that cannot be opened docs not necessarily mean the end of an action. If you run through several alternatives in advance, you will be able to deal with a “deviation from the plan” more quickly and casily 1It’s even possible to decide on a completely different goal in case there are insurmountable problems with the planned action. However, you should also decide which situations should cause the action to be aborted altogether—discuss beforchand the conditions under which it should not be continued. Immediate Preparation In the lead up to the action, the detailed plan should be rehearsed until everyone can confidently carry out their *role.” It’s usually useful for all pasticipants to be aware of cach other’s tasks so that at any given moment 12
they can assess what stage the action is at. It is also important to set aside cnough time in an carlicr preparation phase to talk about fears and feclings, not only to find a *solution,”but also to make cach participant’s actions more predictable for everyone. It’s not helpful if somcone acts super cool during the whole preparation and then is panicked and erratie during the action itself. The more we can collcctively open up about our supposed weaknesses, the stronger the group can be when it gocs into action. There is often a lot to coordinate and arrange during the preparation phase. It is ofien a good test of how reliable and focused the individuals in the group are. Set a clear and realistic timeline for getting everything you need. Especially when it comes to tools that leave traces, it is always a good idea not to get them from the storc around the corner, but to think carcfully about how this or that can be obtained without being surveilled. It’s also important to pay attention to the combinations of things you buy—it may be tempting to get cverything you need in one go at a hardware store, but putting a crowbar, a jerryan and gloves in the same shopping cart can ‘backfire. Prepare a plausible cover story for your shopping, cven though 10 one will ask you most of the time. This will regulate the contents of your “shopping cart”and give you a sense of sceuity: [Keep in mind, however, that even with a good cover story, the cashier ‘may remember you after a conspicuous purchase.] At this stage, it also important to consider the possibility of failure. What could happen if things go wrong? Are we taking a health risk with this action? What if the cops catch us? Who will give notice at work or pick up the kids from school? The better prepared we are for bad situations, the better we can deal with them. Depending on the tactic, there should always be agreements about who can take care of whom if something goes wrong. I¢s often necessary to involve friends who aren’t dircetly involved in the action. They don’t need to be privy to all the details, but there should be clear agreements about what should happen if they can’t manage to get in touch with you by an agreed time. 13
...and Action! On the day of the action, give yourself plenty of time to go over the plan in ‘your mind beforchand and to prepare and assemble the necessary clothes, tools, etc. in peace and quict. You should also give yoursclf more time to get to the mecting point than you anticipate actually needing. Your security depends on whether or not someone is following you and thus surveilling the action. So choose paths and routes that give you as many opportunities as possible to detect whether you are really alone. It goes without saying that mobile phones or devices with GPS functionality should not be taken along on the day of the action. If you want to be even more sceure when you head out, get help from friends and comrades. With help from two or three others, one can usually make a fuly reliable judgment about whether someone i really traveling alone. You need to prepare a route in advance that can be obscrved by the helpers at specific points. You need to plan in advance how to communicate the “results” whether the person is under surveillance, Take an hour or two o think about these questions and you will certainly be able to develop a suitable plan.* It’s important to pay attention to surveillance cameras and the like on the way to the meeting point—you don’t want the route you’ve put cffort into securing to be reconstructed later. When it comes to clothing, you always have to find a compromise between practicality and inconspicuousness. For example, it is of little use if you are geared-out with quasi-military cquipment, but are thus very suspicious in the cyes of surveillance systems. On the other hand, a fine suit or high-hecled shoes are quite hindrance for some actions. So, you’ll have to find a compromise. At the meeting place, try to get a quick sense of the mood. Is everyone still committed to the action? Does everyone have a good fecling? When you’re ready to go, compare your watches again and synchronize the time. For night-time activitics, give your eycs time to adjust to the darkness. “NTP note The practice of detecting physical suveillance with the help ofa trusted third party, called counter-surceillane, s described in more details in Surveillance Countermeasues.* *hitps:/fmotsace.howcesources/fsurveillance-countermeasures. 14
A normal human eye takes about 20 minutes to reach maximum visual acuity in the dark. When the action begins, focus with all your senses. Try t0 keep reminding yourself of the plan and act accordingly. Check your communication system right at the beginning. Can everyone be scen or reached? The most important rule during the action and later on, on the way back—don’t panic. Calm is a relisble companion, especially in difficult situations. If you’ve planned the action well, not much can happen which you’re not prepared for. No matter what happens, you should always try o be deliberate and thoughtful about cach of your actions. This i often diffcult, especially in stressful situations During the action itself—and this should defiitcly be a significant part of your preparations—you must be extremely careful not to leave any traces behind. This includes not only fingerprints, shocprints and car traces, but also clothing fibers, wear-marks or identifiable features on the tools you use, and any amount of genetic material that can be analyzed (from saliva on a cigarette butt to hair that has fallen out). Dispose of the tools and your “outer layer” (shoes, pants,jackets, gloves, and headgear) the same night as the action, once you are a significant distance away from the target. It’s a good idea to spread out this disposal across different places, all of which can’tbe traced back to you (so don’t use your home trash can!). Ifyou can’t do without a car, then you’ll need to find a solution for its tires or even the entire car. The guiding principle is to rule out any connection between apossible trace and yourself. Even a rental car won’t provide any sccurity if the rental process can be traced back. Whether a car has to be stolen for every action or alltires have to be changed is ultimately your decision, Last but not least, it also depends on how much cffort an investigation can be expected to put into tracing the car. After the Action It makes sense, but is not always feasible, to have collective debrict, prefrablyin the days following the action. This is when memories are fresh and details can be discussed. Such a debrief should take into account the preparation phase so you can draw conclusions for next time. What worked, where did problems come up, what could have been better prepared? Were 15
there moments of anxiety for the participants, and how can such situations be handled? Sharing individual coping strategics can also be helpful, An important part of the post-action period is recovery. Since almost all direct actions necessarily involve a period of intense concentration and time pressure, it i important to allow yourself and your social environment o recover. A mentality of “the fight is my life” docsn’t help anyone, Apart from the cffccts of this mentality on group dynamics, lack of breaks and recovery phases also limits performance and concentration, Some time after the action, you can evaluate its political and strategic aspeets. This evaluation can include the initial public reactions and, on this basis, you can assess whether the method and goal of the action matched your political intentions. Was the impact as you imagined it? ‘Were there any shortcomings, and how can they be addressed next time? In some cases, it makes sense to somehow publicly communicate about the action at a later date. Although publishing an action claim may be part of the initial plan, you can always publish an additional explanation later Public communication should distinguish between at least three intended audiences: the “gencral public,” the “dircct public” (.5. through fiyers in the neighborhood), and the “scene public.” I important to think carcfully about who you want to address, with what information, how, and why. A Final Note on Security Achieving complete sccurity simply isn’t possible. Every action has a risk. That means dealing with potential consequences and determining the implications of a worst case scenario, if someone gets caught. Police investigations often thrive on chance, but n almost all cases, it’s avoidable mistakes that ultimately lead investigators on the right track. But mistakes can be avoided. The key is to have as detailed a plan as possible that specifies what o do and what not to do at each step of the action. This way, you can think about what traces you might leave behind at cach step. And, during the action, you can take appropriate countermeasures. If you have to climb over pointy fence, be prepared for clothing fibers to get caught. If you walk over sand or soil, be prepared for shocprints. 1 you make a phone call, the call can be traced. If you send a leteer, the 16
mailbox or post office can be traced. If you pay with a bank card, the data is stored.... So there are always traces and they cannot be avoided. The crucial question is whether they can be traced back to you. There are no “one size fits all” solutions—we must thoroughly think through cach step (even the preparatory steps) and, if possible, collectively discuss them. Have fun and good luck! Anti-Repression and Emergency Plans In small autonomous groups—be prepared for emergencies together! We believe it is important for militant groups to prepare for what needs to happen if something goes wrong. In addition to conerete preparations for the action, we should discuss the participants ife situations, possible fears, communication channels, and what to do in emergencics such as an injury or repression. Here are some thoughts, based ither on our experience or our expectations. The better we know each other and the more we prepare for emergencics in suffcient detail,the better we can act or react at the crucial moment. In difficult situations (e.g. particularly committed citizens acting as auxiliary police, arrests, etc.), panic sets in quickly. Already having a clear plan of how to react is very helpful, because at this point there’s usually no time to think. OF course, detailed preparation is not a cure-all. There are always situations in which fear causes us to ignore all previous agreements. So it’s especially important for contingency plans to be part of the preparation. Each individual, their fears, insecurities, and life situation should be taken into account. Everyonc should feel safe and be able to rely on the others. On the basis of such trust, we can overcome our fears together. Our limits are certainly different, but there are usually solutions (c.g. by discussing task distribution openly and honestly). For example, someone may not like being the lookout because they know that they vill panic if they have nothing to do and may give a stop signal befor Someone else, on the other hand, may already have trouble throwing and aiming even before taking fear into account, so when the excitement of the action is added to the mix, nothing works. So think carefully about who is best suited for cach role. Think also about preparation tasks, such t s actually necessary. 17
as producing the action materials, shopping, writing an action claim, publishing it the next day, cte. For example, it can be very helpful if the people whoare building an incendiary device during the day (and thus may come into contact with gasoline) are not present at the action that night —this takes pressurc off everyone involved and, if someone is arrested, it reduces the risk of traces being found on their body. Communication Structures Communication in small autonomous groups is not casy. Phone calls, texts, emails... al of these modern communication channels can be easily monitored and are therefore unsuitable for clandestine organizing. So we continue to rely on face-to-face mectings, which of course are not without risk. I¥’s not always easy to find a suitable place to meet and talk. “The criteria should be that the place is unlikely to be bugged (i.c. not ‘your apartment or a bar you regularly frequent), there are no other people within earshot, and ideally it isn’t obvious from a distance that you’re having a clandestine meeting. For added security, during the meeting you can avoid mentioning locations, names, and dates (and also avoid showing them with hand gestures), writing them down instead. Be careful because this can be very conspicuous. It’s also important to think about how to communicate in an cmergency situation. After house raids and the like, the cops sometimes pay very close attention to who is talking to whom or who is meeting up. It can be helpful to arrange an emergency meeting point for this scenario, To share information or arrange meeting detail, i’s also a good idea to think about who is already sceing cach other in everyday life (at home, work, school or university) so that arrangements can be made inconspicuously. “This can also be a way to create information rclays. Getting to Know Each Other If repression happens, what should we know about cach other in order to feel safe and trust that the others will take care of everything? Although this will certainly vary from person to person, here are some suggestions of what information might be important: 18
* Names, legal and actual addresses, dates of birth, + Personal situation and responsibilities (c.g. job, children, carc for parents, pets.) * Living situation (c.g living with parents, alone, with roommates.) * Who should be contacted in an cmergency? * How do they relate to things ike stress, health, fears? + Distribution of tasks and preferences for actions. * Wishes for lawyers (possibly powers of attorney.) « History of repression (cascs, convictions, probation, surveillance...) + Sharing experiences of repression to be better preparcd. + Dealing with repression and the refusal to testify. * What kind of support is desired in case of arrests (c.g. solidarity actions)? * How do they evaluate risks and successes? * What to do in different emergency situations (cops, “good citizens”, direct confrontation, prosceution.) Discuss Emergency Situations Together! Everyone should prepare for repression and emergency situations, prefer- ably together. The book “Wege durch die Wiiste™ (Paths Thraugh the Desert) can serve as a basis for discussion. A wide range of information is also available from Rote Hilfe® and Ermittlungsausschuss.” Important topics include arrests, house raids, pre-trial detention, prison, refusal to testify; lawyers, and how trials work. You should also discuss how to react if an injury happens. What to do if someone is injured (lightly, moderately,or seriously)? Can people find trustworthy doctors? One thing is clear: in an emergency, health comes first! Remember that injuries can happen not only during actions, but also during preparation. tps/farchive.org/detils Weg durch.die Waeste TP nte: Rote Hilf i a German prisoner support group. INTE note: Esmitungsausschuss (Incesigation Commites)is 2 German legal support group 19
4. Our Security Traces Let’sstart with something important—we don’twant this chapter to cause panic! When dealing with the topic of traces, i’ casy to get the impression that it’s impossible not to leave trace. However, militant actions from the last few years show that a lot i possible, and that successful investigations are actually quite rare. So don’t be put off and be carcfil! Knowing the other side’s capabilities and acting with caution are the most important factors to avoid prosceution by the cops and courts. A trace can be anything, no matter how small o inconspicuous. Every change in the cnvironment leaves traces, so it’s impossible to leave absolutely no trace. What’s important is to leave as few traces as possible, and to make sure that they can’t be linked back to you. To this end, no expense or effort should be spared. Gloves and other action materials and tools should always be bought new, for single use. “The police will look for traces dircctly at the action site, on any suspects and in the places they frequent (home, workplace, etc.) So it not enough 0 only pay attention to traces at the action site—you may also bring traces from the action site home with you. An example is sand or soil composition can be analyzed and identified quite precisely by forensic laboratories. So if you bring home mud from a dirt road on the soles of your shocs, this can prove that you walked on that dirt road. Such subtle traces quickly become difficult to analyze. If unlucky, however,there may be cnough of a trace left to reconstruct a connection to you, which can then be interpreted as evidence of your involvement in an action. This is even casicr with traces of glass or DNA, .. anything that doesn’t degrade quickly. If you deliberately leave something at the action site, you can be sure that it will attract special attention. The same goes for action claims sent in the mail, or if any remnants of the materials you used fall into the hands of the police. their 2
Securing and analyzing evidence is time-consuming and expensive. The full repertoire of forensic gadgets is not always used. Most of the time, the bigger the damage or the attention, the more they will invest in the investigation. It’s also important to keep in mind that forensic methods are constantly cvolving, and methods that were introduced recently are becoming standardized and widely used. Precautions that we consider excessive today may not be sufficient in the future. A good cxample of this cvolution is DNA analysis. Thirty years ago, hardly anyone foresaw this relatively new investigative method, which naturally meant that minimal precautions were taken to avoid leaving DNA traces. As the example of federal prosecutor Buback (who was shot dead by the RAF commando Ulrike Meinhof in 1977) demonstrates, with the right political pressure, traces found decades carlicr can be re-cxamined. In this way, the State shows that it docsn’t forget, and perhaps also trics to deter today’s militants In addition to the problem that old traces can eventually be analyzed using. new methods,these new methods can become increasingly widespread and less expensive through their further development and standardization. The threshold is lowering for sing DNA samples as evidence in increasingly petty crimes on the basis of vague suspicion. The amount of genetic material required for analysis has also been reduced. Specific laws could also be overturncd, such as the ban on storing infor- mation about certain physical characteristis or discases in the databascs of the BKA” and LKA, since they alrcady allow storing information about genctic sex. OF course, we can only present the topic of traces in the context of today’s forensic methods. But we think it’s important to take into account the constant development of these methods, even if we can’t foresce it. New methods are often considered, discussed, and tested before they are actually NP note: Red Asmy Faction, a West German far-left militant group founded in 1970. "N note: The Bundeskeiminalamt (BKA, Federal Criminal Poice Offc) s the federa investigative police agency of Germany: VN TP ot The Landesksiminalamt (LKA, State Criminal Police Ofc) i the State- level police agency of Germany. 21
used. (The fact that they are then used before they are legalized is another matter...) So we think if’s important to keep an eye on these developments and keep cach other informed by discussing them in our publications. Phones and the Internet arc not discussed in this chapter. But just bricfly, we think it goes without saying that phones should not be involved in actions or their preparation. They can be used to ereate movement profiles as well as turned into bugs. They arc full of information about you and your contacts. Every click on the Internet leaves several traces on the computer you are using, on the server you are accessing, and on all the servers in between. Some of these traces can be avoided or controlled, but that would be a whole other chapter. ‘We cannot provide a complete list of possible traces here. So it’s important that you think through all the steps yourself and consider where you may leave traces. “The fact that there is no such thing as 100% sccurity is used by the police 0 portray themselves as omnipotent. The evidence gathering process and forensic investigations also have a psychological function. The point is to use the gathered evidence to convince you that you’re already found guilty. “This is how they extort confessions. Even if the evidence is elear, it is ofien only circumstantial and not proof of your involvement in the crime, A convietion usually requires more than just cireumstantial evidence. So even if the cops charge you and claim they have enough cvidence against you, stay silent during all interrogations! Fingerprints Fingerprints arc a criminology classic. They come from the thin layer of acid, grease, and dirt from our fingertips which is left on objects we touch. Police also record the prints of the entire hand, including the palm, Fingerprints are considered unique to an individual. When you are charged with a erime, i’s standard procedure to have your fingerprints taken for comparison. They are still often taken with ink and paper, but seanners that digitize them dircctly for storage in the relevant databases are becoming increasingly popular. Meanwhile, the State has already turned its attention to the new passport production process which makes it mandatory to 2
provide fingerprints in order to obtain a passport. It remains to be seen how this will affect police practice. Fingerprints are stored in databascs called AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems) in order to compare prints from current and past cases. The best remedy for fingerprints is to consistently avoid leaving them. “This means not touching any objects that could fall into the hands of the police with your bare hands to begin with,rather than relying on cleaning them off. Fingerprints are on of the most durable traccs. They are often left carelessly and can persist for years. Even on objects that have been submerged in water for years, fingerprints can still be recovered under certain conditions. Almost any material can bear fingerprints. Other countermeasures cxist. To remove fingerprints, thorough cleaning. with a degreasing agent (such as an alcohol-based cleaning agent) is secommended. Glass and smooth plastic surfaces arc the casicst to clean; it’s cnough to thoroughly and intensively clean and wipe them with an alcohol-based cleaning agent or,if used thoroughly, dishwashing soap. When removing fingerprints from metal surfaces, it s imperative to use a surface-altering agent such as steel wool. Fingerprints are slightly acidic, s0 they etch into metal. Cops can make them visible again with the help of a laser, depending on their motivation. Scratching the surfice with steel wool or sandpaper is one of the best options. Unpainted wood can be trcated like metal. Painted o coated wood can be treated like plastic surfaces. Although fabrics are poor carriers of fingerprints, they can be identified by their unique composition, and they also carry DNA. Be carcfil what you leave behind at the action site! If you have touched a piece of paper with your fingers, you should make aclean copy then destroy the original, as it’s impossible to clean it. When photocopying, you should make sure that you never dircetly touch the copies with your hands. Since it can atract unnecessary attention to wear gloves in a copy shop, you should simply make a few blank copies before and after the pages you want to keep clean. Then touch the stack of paper only from the outside and place it in something like a new folder Don’t use acopy shop where you are known. Use disguises because it may be possible for the cops to trace which specific copier was used (the same applies to laser printers, sec Writing Traces, p. 34). Copiers can store information on 23
what they’ve copicd, and this information is not overwritten by making a few additional copes Gloves are the simplest and safest way to avoid fingerprints. But there stll are a few things to keep in mind—rubber gloves tear casily and fingerprints remain on the inside and on the cuff, Thin latex gloves can cven allow fingerprints to pass through them. One option is to wear two pairs on top of cach other or to usc dishwashing gloves. In contrast, fabric gloves have the advantage of being difficult to leave fingerprints on. But coarsely woven fabric gloves can get holes, especially with repeated use, and thus should be avoided. Fabric gloves also absorb much mor dust and DNA traces than rubber gloves, and are virtually impossible to clean. Leather gloves are relatively expensive and, as with all gloves, must be disposed of after use. This is a significant disadvantage in our opinion. In general, keep in mind that traces remain on the inside of gloves. In our opinion, gloves that have been used during an action should always be disposed of. “This is because traces that remain on the gloves which can be linked to 2 specific action. Gloves also leave traces of their individual profile or minor irregularities at the action site (sce Material Traces, p. 36). During house raids, cops are often particularly cager to find such equipment. There are other ways to avoid leaving fingerprints, especially when wearing gloves is not an option. One is to apply a thick layer of liquid bandage to the fingers and let them dry. Another is to place regular band-aids around or on the fingertips. We do not consider cither of these methods to be particularly sceure, they are just a way to reduce the amount of traces. A new method currently being tested in the U.S. makes it possible to analyze the chemical composition of fingerprints. This analysis makes it possible to identify and detect drugs, explosives and certain metabolic products, and draw conclusions about possible “perpetrators.” The analysis process s fast and can be done dircctly on site. Although it has not yet been used as evidence, i’ only a matter of time. 24
DNA Traces In recent years, DNA traces have become an increasingly important part of dealing with repression. The repressive apparatus has a strong interest in emphasizing both their inevitability and their lack of ambiguity. 1It’strue that DNA traces can often only be avoided with significant effort and that they are almost impossible for us to detcet due to their near invisibility. And they are often considered irrefutable evidence if found at a erime scenc. How these traces got there is often hardly taken into account. For example, a blanket used to cover a tool can carry the DNA traces of someone who slept under it years ago. DNA traces cannot be avoided, and under certain storage conditions they simply do not degrade. Decades after the fact, cases arc being reopened based on DNA evidence colleeted carlier. DNA traces are left behind by blood, hair, saliva, urine, and skin cells. In other words, everything that comes out of your body or falls off it. But not every trace is sufficient for DNA comparison. Laboratory testing still requires a certain quantity of DNA material, preferably one or more intact cells. But the technology is becoming increasingly sophisticated. DDNA analysis is expensive. This means that it’s not ordered in every case. Generally, the greater the political or cconomic damage, the greater the technical effort. Though this may change in the near future. Cheaper tests are being researched and DNA analysis may become the standard. DNA databases have been flled for years. 1I¢’s relatively casy to determine genetic sex using DNA. To be able to analyze the trace beyond that, the police need a comparison sample from you.Such a sample i cither obtained during an 1D check or from personal items such as a comb found at your workplace, during house raids, etc There have also been instances of police forcing relatives of defendants to give samples because their DNA is similar. You should never give samples voluntarily. Protest and object, don’t sign anything! In some cases,it has been possible to prevent or at least delay the submission of DNA samples with the help of lawyers. 25
Since it difficult to avoid leaving DNA traces, it’s important to minimize them, This starts with not taking a piss near your target or leaving cigarette with spit on i, It’s best not to smoke at all during an action. Avoid hair traces by wearing caps and balaclavas. Long sleeves, even in summer, reduce the amount of skin particles and small hairs that fall of: A face mask helps aguinst saliva and nasal mucus. 1f you bring tools and bags with you that you have previously stored at home, make sure they are free of not only fingerprints but also hair and skin cclls. They can very much carry DNA. The same gocs for your clothes and shoes. It’s best to keep everything you bring to the action separated in clean containers, such as unused garbage bags. You should avoid storing important action materials at home. Hair from your pets can also be traced back. Action claims sent through the mail are often cxamined for DNA traces on the paper, the envelope and the postage stamp. Saliva on the adhesive surfuce of envelopes is particularly easy to analyze because it docsn’t degrade. When producing anything that could fall into the hands of the policc, such as letters and the remains of your action materias, you should always minimize the sk of leaving DNA traces. Options for Creating a Clean Room For cartain tasks, it makes sense to set up a “clean room?” that is more or less free of DNA. This soom’s fnction is both to minimize the traces you ‘might leave on an item and—to the greatest extent possible—to minimize leaving traces in the room tself. This is certainly time consuming and not inexpensive, but ultimately you have to make your own decisions about how sceure you want to be. When weighing sccurity precautions, consider not only the intensity of the action, the motivation of future investigators, and your own security needs, but also the likelihood of an action item flling into the hands of the authoritics. For example, you can be sure that letters sent to the press will end up with the police sooner or later ‘The following description may scem extreme to many, and certainly not all of the following precautions are necessary for every action. However, in light of the rapidly developing ficld of DNA analysis, we think it’s 26
important to be aware of the issues and risks involved. Choose the precautions you feel are necessary for your action and don’t be deterred! To set up a clean room, you’ll need to put on protective clothing before entering the room for the first time to avoid leaving DNA traces in the room. You can use coveralls (still in their unopened packaging!) from the hardware store, which are relatively inexpensive. Put them on and also put on an unworn balaclava—pull the hood of the coverall over it Bathing caps arc also good for covering your hair, as they arc cven more impermeable and your hair won’t be able to poke through. Next, place cach foot in a garbage bag and tape the bags to the legs of the coveralls Then put on rubber dishwashing gloves and tape them to the sleeves. 1f possible, put a mask over your mouth to block droplets of saliva, and put on protective goggles that also cover your cycbrows. Always work in pairs and make sure no skin is exposed. Choose a place to work where your hair and skin cells are not already fying around. It should also be frce of hair from a dog, cat, o other animal companion that could be classified as your pet. For example, use the basement or garage of friends (who are not politically active), or rent a hotel room. Set up a clean work surface, preferably with tarp, or if you want to be on the safe side, st up an unused tent in the room. This tent will at least keep most traces of your work inside, and you can dispose of it securely afterwards. When you work, you should have different garbage bags ready and scparate the waste according to how risky it is for you (e.g. waste from a device component in a bag, the Ziploc packaging in another, ctc.) When scparating waste, you should also consider which packaging has your fingerprints on it and which docsn’t. Obviously, none of these garbage bags should be put in your houschold trash. Be aware that working in these clothes is both sweaty and tiring, and consider relicving cach other or sharing the work if necessary, as interrup- tions will require you to change clothes again. Remember not to seratch your head or face while wearing gloves. For cxample, a good division of laboris to have one group prcpare the clean room and another group enter it to work. Store finished components or items in new freezer bags or Tupperware containcrs. 27
When you put on protective clothing, and at every step of the process, think about what items your DNA traces may adhere to. For example, if you bought something in packaging, you probably handled it without gloves so it may have skin cells on it If you touch the packaging with clean gloves, you can transfer DNA from the packaging to the gloves and from there to the items you’re working on. To avoid this, you must work with alot of discipline and change your gloves several times, which is casier to do i you wear a second pair of gloves over the taped gloves." Artificial DNA Artificial DNA is a new method of deterring and prosceuting theft. It may be less relevant for the radical left at the moment, but who knows what the future holds? Like human DNA, artifcial DNA is unique and uniquely identifiable. It is placed in an adhesive carrier liquid that glows purple under UV light, along with equally unique micro-platclets. The substance can be applied to valuable objects with a brush, or buildings can be cquipped with so-called DNA showers, The marking on objects is permanent and resistant to normal cleaning. If you come into contact with the substance, it willstick to you for about six weeks. This relatively new process was introduced as a pilot project at the end of 2009 at schools in Bremen, Germany in two residential arcas and in some petrol stations. It has been used in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for some time. Scent Traces A more recent development s the collection of scent samples, as was done during the raids on militants suspected of opposing the Heiligendamm G8 summit in 2007. Although thesc are rather dubious, even according. to the BAW," they could contribute to an “overall assessment”. Most importantly,they are casier to obtain than DNA samples. YN TP note: For more information on creating @ lean room, see “DNA You Say? Bum Everything to Burn Longer: A Guide to Leaving No Traces”* hetpse//notrace how/resources/fdna-you-say NI note: Bundesanwalischaft (BAW) is a name given to Germany’s federal prosecutor office. 2
According to scientific findings, every person has a unique and unmis- takable scent. Even the most meticulous cleanliness and hygiene cannot prevent this scent trace, known in technical jargon as a “human scent signature.” It is made up of various components, but mainly of decomposed skin cells. People shed these every second, whether they are sitting, walking or standing. The decomposition of skin cells by bacteria produces gascs that can be detected by sniffer dogs with their highly sensitive noses. The goal is to match body scents with scent traces that have been left at a Shoeprints Shocprints are an often underestimated potential danger. They are as individual as fingerprints and can be used to draw conclusions about the height, weight, gait, ctc. of the person who left them. If the shoe that left the shocprints is found during a house raid, it can be identified with relative certainty, depending on the quality of the prints. Traces of soil or plant residuc left on the shoe will do the rest. It i therefore advisable to dispose of your shoes after an action, especially if you have walked over snow,soil . However, shocprints don’t depend only on the shoe’s model, but also on the way it’s worn. All shoes worn by the same person will show the same type of wear. If shoceprints are left in soil or snow, the police can make a plaster cast from it. Using this cast, they can often not only identify the shoc that left the print, but also match other shoes worn by the suspect to the cast based on the specific wear patterns found on the cast. So don’t use old, worn shoes of yours, especially i you have to walk on soft surfaces. If you really want to be sure, buy cheap shoes just before an action and throw them away afterwards. However, there are bound to be DNA traces on shoes you used, so never dispose of them near the action site. Another way to make the cops’ job more difficult is to wear socks over your shocs. This disguises the model and profile of the shoc and can also protect against video surveillance. But before doing this, try walking and running with the socks on. 29
Vehicle Traces You should think carefully about the type of vehicle used during an action. Think about whether a car is really necessary, because it brings many risks Cars leave behind tire tracks and, in the event of an accident, traces from the car’s paint. Traces (especially paint) from an accident can be found both on the car and at the scene of the accident. Tire tracks and paint chips can be used to determine the car’s model, and if the car is found, to determine whether the traces were left by this car specifically. Changing. the tires,if possible both before and after the action, can make it more difficult to identify the tire tracks. Simply changing the tires after the action is not cnough, as the police may be able to compare the tire tracks found at the action site with tire tracks outside your home or in your garage. Also, when using a car, watch for leaking oil or fluids. But by far the most important identifying feature of a car is its license plate. In order to pass at least one license plate check without being pulled. over, the car’s license plate can be swapped with another. Since most of us aren’t able to manufacture license plates, you can steal them just before the action. It’s important that the car from which you steal the plate is the same model and color as the one used in the action, because, s a standard procedure, cops check the license plates of cars and know whether they have been reported stolen, their color and model. If the car hasn’t been reported stolen and has the correct model and color, the ikelihood of being pulled over is somewhat reduced. Stolen license plates will however not pass a proper vehicle inspection. To prepare for the risk of a vehicle inspection, you should hide your action materials well and, if possible, not in the obvious location of the trunk. Make sure the vehicle meets all legal standards. In Germany, don’t forget your legally required warning triangle and first aid kit To remove a license plate, a serewdriver will usually do the trick. Try this for the first time in a quict place where you can work without stress. After unserewing it, you can use double-sided tape to attach the license VN TP e I you steal a license plate from a cas, you can replace it with another, randorm lcense plate (¢hat cannot be traced back to you). This wa, it might take longer for the ear owner to notce the theft and report the lcense plat as solen. 30
plate to your car (watch out for rain) so it’s casy to remove after the action.* Alternatively, you can smudge or mask license plates, especially on motorcycles, but this is conspicuous. Dealing with the license plate is also important for countering the increasing surveillance by toll and traffic management systems. Toll systems are sometimes used for Automatic License Plate Recognition. Be aware of the risk of leaving traces in the car and try to avoid this, e.g. by packing the action materials well. In our opinion, it is almost impossible t0 avoid leaving DNA traces in the car. Not only is a car a good carrier of traces, but it is also casy to track if a covert location tracker has been installed on it. The use of a car should therefore be avoided whenever possible. Bikes can be a good alternative. They also leav tirc tracks behind, which is often overlooked. We therefore recommend that you do not park the bike in the immediate vicinity of the action site. Depending on the surfices, it may be a good idea to change the tires before and after the action, Individual features such as brand stickers can be casily covered with tape.® A brightly colored bike can easily be an eye-catcher. As with cars, it is important to meet the legal requirements for bikes, cspecially when you are out and about at night. Tool Traces There are many ways that tools can leave traces, and each tool i different. Thercfore, we can only write a few basic things about the topic here. By ool traces, we mean identifying traces on both the tool and the object the ool i used on. Each tool s unique and can be identified through both smallirregulasities from its production process, and normal wear and tear. Each tool leaves N TR note:Rather than tape, e reco o attach the license plate to the car. BN.T not: Covering features with tape s not ideal, a a taped up bike can look conspicuous. In addition, many bike features (c.g.the model and shape) cannot be concealed with tape. One solution is to steal s new bike for each setion and dispose of it afterwards. nd using a “magneticlicense plate holder” 31
unique traces on the object itis used on. For example, a cut sheet of paper can be matched to a specific pair of scissors (only if the cops have the scissors, of course). If the cops do not have the tool in their possession, typically only the type of tool can be determined, at least for mechanical tools which come into direct contact with the object the tool is used on. Therefore, you should dispose of bolt cutters,screwdrivers, or whatever clse is used in an action—get rid of any tool that came in dircet contact with an object it was used on. Unfortunately, getting rid of the tool afterwards s not cnough by itself. To stay with the scissors and paper example, the cops can not only match the cut paper to a particular pair of scissors, but also determine if separate picces of paper were cut by the same scissors. So if you open a fence with the same bolt cutters you used to build your loft bed, the cops will be able to determine this, cven if the tool is long gone. “This is why it’s necessary to acquire new tools for an action in order to worlk sccurely. They don’t always have to be the best and most expensive. Consumables such as tape, ope, cable (and their remnants) can be matched 0 cach other. A small picce of cable in your home that matches a cable in the cops’ possession can be a strong piece of evidence. ‘When working with cither tape o glue, you need to be especially careful about cleanlincss, as both collect dust and DNA traces. Identifying traces can also be found on tools you make yourself, such as an incendiary device, Such traces are not imited to DNA or fingerprints. For example to determine whether the same person made separate incendiary devices, it’s often sufficient to cxamine identifying characteristics of the way the devices were constructed. Everyone interprets and implements a general, simple st of instructions differently. For cxample, everyone ties knots in a particular way, tapes something differently, uses a different construction method, and so on. The lst does not end there and identifying characteristics cannot be completely avoided, but they can be reduced if you are aware of them. Even taking turns within the group to build materials for the action makes it harder for cops to attribute them to a specific group o person—this is cven more relevant if an incendiary VNP note: And i therefore secovered intact by the police. 32
device fils to ignite.’* Additionally, sharing the task of building materials prevents unnceessary specialization within your group. In the self-critical dissolution statement of the K.OM.LTEE." published in 1995, they wrote that the cops were only able to easily attribute some actions to them because they always used the same type of igniter for their incendiary devices. So the decision for or against variation in device construction has to be made consciously and contextually. This also applies to possible variations in the chemicals used for an action and, as far as possible, their mixing ratios. Similarly, you should not always use the same brands or component types. In general, the simpler the igniter, the less evidence it will leave behind. A Molotov s the casiest to keep clean, and a chemical delay mechanism leaves fewer traces than a mechanical or cleetrical one. Serial numbers on components can also be a problem, especially with clectrical delays. In the mid-19805,an alarm clock used ina RZ* action was attributed to Ingrid Strobl due to a large-scale operation by the BKA in hardware stores. Since, according to the BKA, the RZ always used the same model of alarm clock, the stock of this model was given a unique serial number and everyone who bought it was filmed. This operation resulted in two people being jailed for a long time, and the radical left movement was thoroughly investigated in a “§1292” case."” W therefore recommend varying the selection of means and materials, such as alarm clocks. It is difficult to remove serial numbers from alarm clocks because they are often located underneath fixed components. Embossing marks in metal can be milled out, but can nonetheless be restored by the cops because an embossing dic also deforms the metal underneath. Embossing marks can only be permancntly removed by embossing o chiseling over them, as this changes the structure of the entire pice, just like the initial embossing process VNTE note: The K.OMITE . was a German far-left m 1994 and 1995, "N.T:P note The Revolutionie Zellen (RZ, Revolutionary Cell) were a German far-left militant group acive from 1973 to 1995, NT note: The term *§1294”refers o & pasagraph in the German penal code that deals with the formation 4 terrorst association. at group active in 33
Fire Traces Even though you must always be prepared for the risk of an incendiary device fling toignite and thus leaving traces, it should be noted that even after a successful fire some traces can be analyzed. A fire leaves precise clues about what materials were used, the type of igniter and the place where the fire started. The police can reconstruct a lot from traces of soot, the gases in the air at the scene of a irc,as well s how and to what extent something was burned. Again, it is important to vary and use the simplest possible means. Always using the same mixture of accelerant or the same type of igniter is like leaving an autograph. Writing Traces Handswriting is very individual and casy to attribute on the basis of the lincs, the dots when the pen is picked up or put down, and the amount of pressurc applicd to the pen. Calendars, diaries, handwritten letters and even shopping lists can be used as comparison samples. The color and ink of the writing instrument or the composition of the pencil lcad can also provide clucs. Block letters are usually less identifying than cursive because many lin characteristics are missing. Felt-tip and fiber-tip pens leave behind identifying writing characteristics (c.g. depending on the position of the hand o the pressure exerted when writing), but less so than, for example, ‘ballpoint or fountain pens. Remember to always write on a firm surface, Witing presscs through the ‘material underneath. If you write on a pad of paper, you will leave leave marks not only on the next sheet, but also on the following sheets. The best writing surfaces are glass or metal. Of course, nothing handwritten should be Ieft behind or published—these handwriting tips are meant to be helpful for writing messages to cach other. Grammar,spelling, vocabulary, regional diosyncrasies and dialect can now be compared using computer progeams. This analysis is not as conclusive as handwriting analysis, but it’s becoming increasingly sophisticated. The BKA has a database of extortion letters and action claims that the police 34
use for comparison. In one blackmail case, the perpetrators tried to disguise the fact that they were native German speakers by making grammatical mistakes, but the cops were able to detect this because the authors correctly spelled difficult words. ‘Wiite simple sentences, avoiding unnecessary use of foreign words or jargon from your professional feld. Vary the spelling of dates, abbreviations, and similarly distinctive references. An investigation into the alleged members of the “militante gruppe”™ demonstrated that the police substantially cross- compare the content of action claims. Keywords and even slogans that appearin other texts—even publicly signed ones—are used by investigators to sniff in certain directions. Proofiead your texts collectively and take turns writing them. This not only prevents specialization, but also protects you because everyone has their own individual writing style. In the best case scenario, the texts cannot be directly attributed to one person. Write only the bare minimum. The shorter the text, the less material you give the cops. L It’s becoming more popular to use a Linux computer with a “live system” that runs in memory. But we should briefly discuss problems with printing. Printers leave traces, so your home printer is not suitable for anything sensitive. At least color laser printers are known to hide their serial number in the printed sheet. We do not know if this problem also applies to copiers, but it should be assumed. Keep this in mind when printing anything! The same problem exists with CD and DVD burners. They burn the unique serial number of the device onto the CD. SNTP noe: The militante gruppe (g, militant graup) was 3 Gers et militant group active from 2001 to 2009 NP ote: The original PRISMA ine included several paragraphs about sendingg action claim through the Internet is almost always a better approach. On his topic, see the zine “How to submit an anonymous communiqué and get away with it" *hitps:/fmotsace.how/zesousces/fhow-submit N2 note: For more information on how printers hide information in printed sheets, sce “Printer Tracking: Is Your Printer Spying On You?"> *hitps://notrace.howzesources/Fprinter-tracking 35
Material Traces By material traces (also known as “trace evidence”), we mean all traces that are unintentionally left behind on you, on your clothes or in places you have used. Again, there is no such thing as 100% security, but we can at least make the cops’ job more difficult. Let’s start with traces on your clothes. Though invisible to the naked cye, there are many traces on your clothes that can’t necessarily be removed by washing them. Depending on the type of action, these traces can be used by the cops in different ways. If you use spray paint, you can be sure that even though you can’t see it ine particles of paint will be on your clothes, especially on your pants and shoes. The police can make these particles glow with a special lamp which is available in every police station. These traces of paint cannot be removed. It’salso impossible to remove the fine glass particles that are created when a pane of glass is broken. Unfortunately, these particles can be attributed 10 a specific pane based on the type of breakage. Again, washing clothes is of litele help. Blood stains are also impossible to remove, Disposing of your action clothing is often the only way to be as free of traces as possible. A simple, inexpensive coverall from the hardware store can help. You can take it off soon after the action and wear inconspicuous clothing underncath. However,be sure to practice taking it off beforchand and, if necessary, cut the bottom of the pant legs a lttle so you can get it over your shocs. Under no circumstances should you dispose of it near the action site,as it is sure to contain at least some traces of your DNA. We have already covered the topic of shoes and shocprints. Any clothing you wear will leave traces on your body. This is especially important if you are wearing gloves, as the cops will be able to tell that you were wearing gloves, and which ones, by looking for traces of fibers under your ingernail, for example. Disguises such as beards and wigs also leave traces. Although it’s almost impossible to prevent this, you should be avare that even after changing clothes and putting some distance between yourself and the action site, you will not be completely free of traces, and You may have left traces of fabric behind. 36
Itis important to not wear anything with buttons that could get lost, and to avoid long scarves or clothing with fringes. Not only will they hinder your escape, but fabric can easily be left behind at the action site. If you come into contact with gasoline during the action or while building adevice, you should be aware that the scent is almost impossible to remove, which may be a problem if you are stopped by the police. Be careful not to spill accelerant on your skin or clothing when throwing a Molotov: The problem here is your own sense of smell—your nose develops a certain tolerance to a smell after being exposed to i for a long time, and you will 1o longer be able to tell if you smell like a small gas station. 1 this is the case, and for example if they are investigating an arson, the police may put your hands in plastic bags so that they can later analyze whatever traces were on them. This i especially true for traces of gunshot residue that are eftafter firing a gun. Smoke residue tests are now also used to determine if an arrested demonstrator shot a fircwork or if someone set fire to a car with firlighter cubes. Traces of smoke often remain even after washing, which is another reason to dispose of your gloves. Making action materials can also leave traces. I you work with powdered substances, you must assume that both your workspace and your clothes will be full of them. As far as we know, it’s impossible to completely clean aworkspace such that nothing is found by chemical forensic methods. So if you want to be on the safe side, your home should not be used for this type of work. Instead, use places which scem safe and cannot be traced back to you (i.c. not places linked to the radical left), such as abandoned buildings. Wherever you end up working, you should be careful to avoid leaving behind any fingerprints, DNA traces, or picces of wire, no matter how small Purchases You should be especially carefil when shopping. Buy only one item at a time in a store. Pay with cash, not a eredit o debit card. Destroy your seceipts. Think carcfully beforchand about what you are going to buy and where, and perhaps test the store with something inconspicuous to fecl it out. 37
Large stores with lots of customers allow for some anonymity; but usually have surveillance cameras. Sometimes the footage is deleted after 48 hours. Take advantage of this and plan ahead, but don’t rely on it. Its always better to shop a reasonable amount of time before an action. This way, you won’t be in a hurry and get carcless if something isn’t available. Small stores have the advantage that they often don’t have surveillance cameras, but cashiers can be very good at remembering who they sold what and when, Small disguises can go a long way to make you unrecognizable. From non- prescription glasses to fake beards, wigs, colored contact lenses and hair dyes, from suits to jogging outits, there are no limits to the imagination, Even theatrical makeup or latex masks can be uscful. However, you should feel comfortable in your disguise and appear normal and inconspicuous If possible, always buy everything in packaging. Ask for a bag, the cashier will often pack your purchases for you. In winter, it can be inconspicuous to shop with (unused!) gloves. If gloves are too conspicuous you can use liquid bandage to somewhat reduce fingerprints (sce Fingerprints, p. 22), but this docsn’t completely prevent them, and you will still leave DNA traces. Do not go shopping with your car o motoreyele. Of course, you should also leave your mobile phone at home. The same precautions apply when shopping as when doing reconnaissance at the action site. I you do actions frequently,vary which storcs and brands you usc,as wellas the time periods and days of the wek you buy certain items. Sometimes it’s worth traveling a bt further away or even to the next town. Make sure it isn’t possible to determine where you live based on your purchases. For specialty parts, come up with a story that explains why you need them for legal reasons. Do your rescarch beforchand. Also prepare a story for small talk with other shoppers,just in casc. Some chemicals require your signature. Practice fake signature and use block letters for forms. Bring a felt-tip pen (sce Witing Traces, p. 34). 38
A Few Research Tips When you prepare for an action, you leave behind not only material traces, ‘but digital ones as well. Here arc a few basic procedures for doing rescarch in preparation for an action.” “The books you order or borrow from a library can be traced back to you, and the cops check the library accounts of suspects. Avoid libraries at all costs. Some libraries are also under video surveillance. [..] Leave your mobile phone at home when doing reseasch. Remember that Internet cafes often have surveillance cameras, so try to avoid them.[...] You should be aware that even in cafes without cameras, staff may still be able to remember you. Try to wear disguises and be as inconspicuous as possible. Remember that your fingerprints can also be found on cash you handled, at least for a short time. Technical Surveillance Originally published in Repression und Widerstand (Repression and Resistance). With small additions from the editors of the original PRISMA zine. What technical capacities are used for surveillance? And how can we counter them? TP note: Tn the original PRISMA zine, this section assumed that you would do reseasch for an action using a public computer at an Internet cafe or a similsr location. We advise against this, and therefore omitted most of the original section i this ranslation. From “How to submit an anonymous communiqué and get away with i€ “The geners recommendation for most people is o use s pessonsl computer thati only for Tail,on public WAFi. ...] Public computers themselves could be compromised at the hardhware level or through intention collsboration betuween their owner-operatorsand aw enforcement,and this could be almost mpossible to detect.” *hitps//motrace.how/resousces/fhow-submit 39
‘We’ve all seen it in spy movies: bugs in lamps and cameras behind one- way mirrors in 1960s thrillers. Or the modern operations centers in more recent movies that can lsten in on every phone call within seconds and track everyone via satellte surveillance. “The reality is somewhere between these two portrayals. Not every police force has access to the same technical equipment (and trained personnl), and will only request it if the associated costs can be justificd with an appropriate threat scenario or scrious “crime” that has already been committed. Nevertheless,the State’s intercst in prosecution and eriminalization should not be underestimated. Police and intelligence agencies will ry to justify the purchase and maintenance of expensive cquipment by using it as frequently as possible. This text explains the current technical capacities of police and intelligence agencies (as of 2006). The most effective countermeasures are very simple and can be implemented without detailed technical knowledge: meet in places where surveillance is highly unlikely and do not use risky communication channels (phone, mail) for political purposes. Monitoring Enclosed Spaces All of the instruments available for monitoring enclosed spaces have two major disadvantages: they require advance preparation and they are relatvely expensive. Bugs Of all the lstening methods described here, bugs provide the best sound quality. Depending on what they are used for, they can be very small (2-3 millimeters thick), but can also be the size of a sugar cube or even a matchbox. They are almost indistinguishable from other clectronic components and are sometimes camouflaged, i.c. permanently installed in other objects, rooms or vehicls. Preferred places to install bugs are electrical outlets, light switches, indline phones and other clectrical devices that are continuously supplied with 40
power. If necessary, holes are drilled in furniture to place microphones as close as possible to the people speaking. Bugs can eavesdrop on conversations within a radius of about 10 meters. One bug is enough to monitor a room of about 100 square meters Depending on it battery, bug can operate between several weeks (button cell) and several months (9 volt battery). Of course, bugs thatare connected to an electrical source or a phone cable will “live” longer. Bugs with built-in radio transmitters arc among the larger variants and. can reach radio ranges of several hundred meters or up to two kilometers, depending on the building.2* Electrical and phone lines can also be used to transmit the intercepted conversations. Special microphones hidden in landline phones or their jacks can be remotely activated and listencd to, Countermeasures against bugs: Of course, anyone can search for bugs themselves. Special bug detectors are available for purchase at different price ranges, and services can also be hired. Professional bug hunters charge lot of money. And they usually have a history as intelligence agents, military personnel, or police officers, and will therefore be wary of fouling their nests. If you find bugs it’s proof that a bugging operation took place, but there’s no guarantce that there aren’t more hidden microphones which haven’t been found. Playing music, tapes of other conversations, or the radio docs not help prevent bugging. Modern technology can casily ilter out individual voices. Special audio jammers can help. The noise they produce is barely audible to the human car, but prevents the recording of conversations. They also help against the other cavesdropping capabilities described below and are available from around 500 euros. NP moter As of 2025, it appeass that the majority of bugs used by police and intellgence agencics that remotely transmit theie recordings do so throvugh the mobile phone netveork. Those bugs can transmit theie recordings as long as they can communicate with cell towes. a1
If you really want to be on the safe side, you should generally refrain from mentioning important dates, places and actions and instcad use pen and paper and then destroy what you’ve written. 8] Stethoscapes Rooms can be listened to from the outside using electronic stethoscopes.* These devices can amplify the smallest sound waves that pass through ‘walls, doors, and water pipes up to 40,000 times to make them audible. “This can be prevented by audio jammers cquipped with special contact resonators. Window Panes Vibrations ‘The noise generated in a room causes the window panes to vibrate slighly. Using an invisible infrarcd laser, these vibrations can be measured at a distance of up to 200 meters and converted back into sound waves, Complete systems (ransmitters and receivers disguised as cameras, amplifiers, and noise filtrs) are available for less than 10,000 euros and are therefore likely to be used relatively frequently The drawbacks of this technology are that there must be a line of sight 103 window in the room being monitorcd, and that the results are rather poor for double-panc windows. Video Surveillance Cameras with built-in radio transmitters can be as small as a matchbox, And the lenses of such cameras are barely larger than pinheads and can be camouflaged very effectively. For example, they can be hidden behind sickers or disguised as Phillips-head screws. Completely camouflaged systems are also available in the form of smoke detectors, desk lumps, and other everyday objects These special cameras can capture footage of very high quality. Their operating time and radio range are comparable to those of acoustic bugs. SN.TR not: Contact microphones* can also be used for the same purpose *hitps:/fen.vwikipedia.org/iki/Contact_microphone. 42
Cameras can be found with bug detectors i they are equipped with radio transmitters. Phane Surveillance In 2004, more than 30,000 phone surveillance orders were issued in Germany to investigate criminal offenscs. In more than 60 percent of the cases, the conversations of uninvolved people were tapped, while the conversations of suspects accounted for just under 40 percent. These figures do not include wiretaps by intelligence agencics or preventive police Internationally, Germany is considered the world champion in wirctapping, and the numbers are increasing every year. In December 2005, the new federal government announced that it would revise the related legal regulations by mid-2007 (under pressure from the Federal Constitutional Court). According to the law, anyone whose phone has been tapped must be informed after the investigation is completed, but this rarcly happens. “The high rate of cases of phone surveillance comes from the fact that it is one of the easicst surveillance measures to carry out—they simply obtain a court order and notify the relevant phone company. All calls to the targeted phones are then redirccted to another number or voicemail for ‘monitoring. Because all the equipment used is digital, there s no telltale crackling or hissing. ‘The phone companies do not record calls without a court order. However, all call metadata is recorded—the exact details of when and for how long the call was made and to which number This metadata can be crucial to police investigating crimes that have alrcady been committed. For example, it can provide a basis for identifying social connections in a scenc, or help prove the existence of an alleged criminal association. The BEV* and forcign intelligence agencies are constantly listening to as many phone lines as possible for tellale keywords. This surveillance is T note: The Bundesamt fir Verfassungsschutz (BEV, Federal Ofice fr the Protection o the Consitution)is Germany’s federal domestic inteligence agency. 3
fully automated with the help of sophisticated voice recognition software. “This software is capable of linking information together to create patterns of meaning. Conspicuous conversations are stored and then manually analyzed. Itis highly likely that voice recognition will also make it possible to identify somebody with a recording of their voice. All international calls are intercepted. Intelligence agencies will almost certainly intercept all satellite calls The most advanced interception system of this kind is operated by the English-speaking intelligence agencies under the name *Echelon”. The US National Sccurity Agency (NSA) alone employs about 28,000 people for this purpose and is able to record and analyze a large portion of Internet communications. There is relatively close cooperation between intelligence agencics, cspe- cially when laws make it difficult to surveil onc’s own country. Landline Phones and Fax Machines Landline phones can also be tapped dircctly without the help of phone companies. Bugs in the phone, in the wall socket, in the house switch box or in the distribution box on the street are relatively easy to install. Fax connections are intercepted in the same way. “Dumb” phones make their job even casier—their signals can be intercepted and decoded from just outside the home. Publc Payphones and Phone Cards It also possible to monitor all phone calls made with a phone card from public payphones. To do this, the cops make the operator transmit all connection data for this specific phone card number. Mobile phones Mobile phones can be tapped with the help of phone companics. And they offer additional attack vectors for investigators: they can be used to determine the user’s location, their communications can be intercepted by IMSI-catchers, and they can be infected with malware. 44
L7 Countermeasures “There is not much that can be done to prevent landline and mobile phone calls from being tapped.2* At best, it would be possible to use coded language when making calls But s safer o avoid phone communications altogether when dealing with sensitive content, .. to avoid scheduling mectings and demonstrations by phone. It’s best not to bring a mobile phone to demonstrations and other political events. If you still need a phone, it’s best to get a second device with an empty contact list, call log, and SIM card, used only in such “insecure” situations. Mobile phones should be left at home before anyone leaves for a mecting or event. Especially if it takes place in a location you don’t normally frequent By the way,caller ID suppression i ineffective when the police are involved. Postal Service Letters can be scanned with X-rays, which makes it casier for the snoopers to decide whether the mail is worth opening. Wrapping the mail contents in aluminum foil prevents cffective scanning, which probably makes the package really eyc-catching. Letters can also be opened with steam. 7N TR o The original PRISMA zine ncluded a longer section on mobile phones, For more information sbout mobile phones, see AnarSec’s guide *Kill the cop in your pocket”* “hetpse//anarsec guide/posts/nophones T note: To prevent phone communications from being tapped, you can use smaephones with end-to-end encrypted messaging applications. For more information, see AnarSec’s guide *Encryped Messaging for Anarchists”» *hitps:/fanassec guide/posts/edee 45
Vehicles The Global Positioning System (GPS) makes it possible to determine position with a precision of a few meters. The system has been operated. by the U.S. military since the carly 1990s and currently consists of 28 satelltes, 4 of which are accessible at any given time. In 2000, the artificial inaccuracy introduced for civilian GPS devices was removed. Since then, GPS has been used in applications like car navigation systems, and by police and intelligence agencies for monitoring vehicles. GPS trackers can be smaller than a matchbox and determine their position about every 10 seconds. Depending on the model, this data is stored ocally or sent by radio (usually through the mobile phone network) to the monitoring agency where it can be displayed over city maps. GPS trackers can be easily attached to the underside of cars using magnets or glue. In rare cases, they can be noticed by a buzzing or humming sound when the car radio i tumed on. In addition to GPS trackers, smaller radio trackers (15 x 35 mm with 2 15 cm antenna) are also used, and require significantly less power, Thanks to their small size, these transmitters can be installed in bicycles and smaller portable objects. However, they do not transmit position data. A recciver can only determine the dircction the signal is coming from. This makes it casicr to tail someonc, for example. OF course, all bugs that can be used in buildings can also be used in vehicles. Preferred locations for the installation of such devices are the interior side panels and the roof of the car. The lights built into the roof can provide a power supply. In Germany, there are growing calls for the mandatory installation of so-called accident data recorders (ADR). These “black boxes” store all important data, especially speeds and distances, which are intended to be used to reconstruct accidents, but are of particular value to the police during investigations. They are standard in U, cars. In Europe they are used in rental cars and in some car modcls. 46
Public Space With the help of modern surveillance technology, police and intelligence agencics arc often closer to what is happening in public than their targets would like them to be. Binoculars, night vision devices, and dircetional microphones can be used to listen to, photograph and film conversations from a significant distance. Therefore, outdoor meetings should be planned and conducted with at least as much care as indoor meetings Directional Microphones Small and handy, they can pick up conversations from 50 to 200 meters away, depending on the model and the line of sight. They amplify only the frequency range of the human voice and can therefore also be used in noisy environments such as pubs. It’s not possible to listen into closed rooms (through windows or walls) with directional microphones (although this is possible with other tools such as stethoscopes), Binoculars Portable binoculars can elearly identify faces up to a distance of about one kilometer, Cameras attached to these binoeulars can be used to take photos and videos. Night Vision Devices Residual light amplifiers make it possible to sce in partial darkness by amplifying the existing weak light. “True” night vision devices work in total darkness by illuminating the surrounding environment with infrared radiation. This light s invisible to ye. The night vision device displays it in black and white. Since infrared radiation penctrates fog better than light, these devices can be used in poor weather conditions. More advanced night vision devices use millimeter wave radiation instead of infrarcd radiation and can therefore also sce through thin walls. Thermal imaging devices operate without the need for residual light or an astificial source of infrarcd radiation. They graphically display the heat a7
given off by the objects they observe and are used, for example, to check the insulation of houses. During the Castor rail blockades, these camerss were used from the air to locate people hidden in open arcas and forests. They can also be used to detect recent changes to the ground. However, heavy rain, fog, or blowing snow can limit their effectiveness. Fixed Surveillance Cameras An increasingly dense network of fixed surveillance cameras is being installed in Germany, with the aim of increasing security in strcets, squares, and public transport. In train stations and airports in particular, almost every square meter is covered by video surveillance. The number of cameras installed in subways and buses is also growing. The footage from surveillance cameras i usually displayed live on monitors (eg-in control centers) and also stored for later review. Both color and black-and-white cameras are used, but black-and-white cameras are more sensitive to light and can be easily combined with infrared systems. “There are two trends in video surveillance: + Automatic License Plate Recognition works virtually fawlessly and is already used in truck tolling systems. These systems also record the Ticense plates of cars that arc not subject to tolls. Both the license plate and the driver arc photographed. So i it’s not possible to avoid toll cameras, you should make sure that at least the passengers are not recognizable in the photos. For example, you can fold down the sun visors and tilt them to obstruct the view from the cameras. + Several major German cities plan to go much further. They want to sctup systems that specifically scarch for wanted license plates. Hamburg has already adapted is police law to use mobile surveillance cameras for this purposc. RFID Chips. Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) chips are used in applications like car keys,ibrary books,tickets for the World Cup,and to track animals, N TP nte: From the mid-1990s onwasds, many anti-nucleas protests in Germany, luding rail blockades, were dirccted against transports of radioactive waste called “Castor” 48
‘The integration of these chips into credit cards and new passports is concerning. Another application being discussed is car license plates with RFID chips. In supermarkets, RFID chips are intended to eventually replace today’s barcode price tags. At the checkout,all items will be automatically identified by radio. The RFID chips arc then marked as *paid” but can stillbe read. To read RFID chips, a “reader” interacts with them wirclessly via radio waves, and the chips send back the requested data. RFID chips can be rewritten several times with different data, The commonly used “passive” RFID chips do not require their own power supply: They draw their power from the radio waves they reccive and are connected to long, usually helical antennas. The range of most of these chips is from a few centimeters to several meters. “The main problem with RFID chips s that the owner has no control over what information s requested and retricved via these chips, when, and by which “reader.” Depending on the design of the chips, the police could determine a person’s identity by radio at any time without them noticing or being able to prevent it. It would be possible to sce which debit card they have and that they have just purchased certain products (or are carrying products that are not marked as “paid for”). Horror scenarios such as “scanning” entire demonstrations or “sensitive” locations arc also conceivable Fortunately, there are simple and effective countermeasurcs against this type of spying: RFID chips wrapped in aluminum foil completely stop working. Separating the millimeter-sized chips from their larger antennas also renders them uscless. Databases Virtually all companies want to collect as much data as possible about their customers. Customers have only limited control over this collection, and even when very strict legal regulations exist, in practice they are not enforced. And the data protection regulations can be overridden by a customer signature. 49
These databases don’t just store data on all transactions (purchascs, orders), complaints, information requests, etc. With the help of appro- priate software, reasonably aceurate customer profiles are also ereated, by “residential area’, “number of phone conncctions per house” and similar publicly available data. The next time someone calls a company, this can determine whether they arc put through immediately or put on hold. In addition, various “data brokers” offer data for sale that they could not have obained legally. Even if very few of these corporate data collections are direetly “tapped” by surveillance authorities, they can be stolen by hackers,for example, and possibly end up with the police as part of an investigation. Typically, police and intelligence agencies have a much greater interest in the following types of customer data: * Bank and credit card accounts: They provide information about moncy movements. Using debit and eredit cards also generates information about transactions, including their cxact time and place. + Libraries and mail-order bookstores: This can reveal the political interests of individuals and is therefore highly relevant to mass surveillance. Amazon has already been forced by ULS. authorities to hand over its user data. - Of similar importance arc the semi-legal file-sharing networks that allow downloading movies and music. The only difference here s that users of those networks usually do not leave any personal information other than their IP address. * Membership lsts of political and religious commaunities, and martial arts schools and clubs, + Air and rail travel: The names of all passengers on flights to the US. are submitted to ULS. authoritics. Depending on the potential threat posed by such passengers, several airplanes have been forced to turn back or land in Canada. Depending on the “threat situation’ and the government, such surveillance can also be implemented in Germany and other European countrics Security countermeasures are not straightforward when it comes to data collection. OF course, we all have bank accounts and need to withdraw 50
money from ATMs from time to time. But if you don’t want to leave too much of a trail, you should be extremely carcful about giving out personal information and as much as possible avoid ordering things online or paying by card. Cash payments leave the fewest traces. Biometrics Biometricsis a branch of science concerned with the collection and analysis of physical and behavioral characteristics of living beings. When applicd to humans, the focus is on computer-aided identification (“Who is this person?”) and authentication (“Is this person who they say they arc?”). In practice, this is intended to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to rooms or systems to which they shouldn’t have access, even if they have stolen or otherwise acquired PIN or passwords. The characteristics used include an individual’s body size, iris and retina, fingerprints, facial geometry, handwriting, DNA, voice, git, o even typing behavior on keyboards Most o these methods are tilin the testing phase; heir results are cither 100 inaccurate or too complicated to use in practice. Currentlyiris, retina, fingerprint, and facial recognition systems are the most common. There are currently very few such systems in the public sector. Examples include the Hannover 200, where visitors with an annul pass are admitted using a facial recognition system, or the Frankfurt airport, where travelers can pass through border control with an irs scan (in conjunction with their passport). Facial recognition systems measure the relative distances between the cyes, nose and mouth, usually stasting from the eyes. To be correctly identified, a person must be facing forward, still, and very close to a camera (and their face must have been previously filmed or photographed from the front, measured, and then storcd in the relevant system). There are already attempts at 3D recognition, i.c. the ability to recognize faces from any angle,but these are not yet ready for practical use.” N TR te: As of 2025, fcil rcogition systemscan recognize fces from diffrent angles. 51
In addition to access control, the automatic identification of wanted persons with the help of publicly installed surveillance cameras is an aspirational and advertised goal. Allattempts to do so have failed due to the high frequency of alse positives. It’s not possible to cstimate how long it will take before these systems can automatically identify wanted suspects in real time. I¢’s also possible, for cxample, to manually “eut out” faces from photos of demonstrations and have them identificd automatically. A relatively simple trick to prevent this (or unwanted facial recognition in general) is to wear sunglasses or a low-cut baseball cap.”* E-passport Following an EU decision, since November 2007 German passports contain biometric data. As of November 2007, this involves two finger- prints. This data (as well as most other passport data) is stored enerypted. on a newly introduced RFID chip. You can find out what data is stored. from the passport authorities. The new passport is touted as being extremely forgery-proof. As with all RFID chips, there i a risk of unnoticed reading. To prevent this, the chip only transmits after the “standard” passport data have been read. The seader tels the chip that it knows this data, and the chip then makes itsclf readable. Docsn’t sound bad at first, at least if you trust the technology created by the State and its compliance with the law. If this trust is lacking, you can shield the chip (with aluminum foil or a protective cover that can be purchased). In principle, the chip can also be destroyed, e.g.in a microwave: Put the passport in, sct the microwave at its lowest level, and switch it on very briefly (shorter than briefly). The passport remains valid even if the chip is not working (but only the chip—burned holes in the cover are bad, of course). TP note: As of 2025, weasing sunglasses or & low-cat bascball ap does not nccessrlly prevent fcial ecogaition. On this topc, sce the text “How To Prevent Facial Recognition Technology From Identifying You’.* *hitps://notsace.how/cesources/ Fprevent-fucial-recogition 52
Surveillance Cameras Imagine: the cops end up arresting Anna™ near a smashed police station, Anna is found not guilty because she was wearing a mask (of coursel), For our own security, when we do reconnaissance, carry out a clandestine action, and leave the action site, we must make sure that no surveillance cameras are recording us. Sometimes they are very small and hidden, sometimes they are large and obvious or installed as a deterrent. The latter is unfortunately not always the case, especially when police and intelligence agencies have installed them for surveillance purposes. Their number has increased in recent years and will continue to do so. However, we shouldn’t let this deter us from doing what needs to be done, but rather we should increase our knowledge—about their proliferation, their technical capabilities, and how we can render them harmless. Where Can You Find Them? (Almost) always in places considered sensitive to the State, such as banks, cmbassies, ministrics, warchouses, the homes of high-ranking individuals, and corporate headquarters. Often and increasingly at train stations, on trains and buses, in front of garages, driveways, parking lots, and st entrances, where they sometimes also record the sidewalks. Internet cafe and sometimes even copy shops are often monitored by cameras. Targeted camera surveillance of public places is still very controversial and therefore exists only in isolated cases and with media attention. Entrances to well- known places of the radical left, autonomous social centers or squats are monitored as inconspicuously as possible and usually not continuously, if they are monitored at all. However, individual cases of continuous camera surveillance over many years have been revealed during political trial. Its certainly worth obscrving the windows opposite the entrances of such places (even at a very oblique angle). The BfV sometimes rents apartments for this purpose. Normal tenants have also been asked to make their “N.TB nte: The name “Anna”is 3 eference to a slogan of the German radical lef encouraging people to not give statements to the police, “Anna und Arthu haltens Maul® Gna and Arthu keep their mouths shut) 53
windows available for a surveillance camera. A secondary entrance and exit, via courtyards or rooftops, may therefore be useful. Of course, cumeras can be installed there as well Recordings made with mobile phones arc increasingly becoming another source of danger. They can be used to ilm or photograph people in locations that are far away from any buildings. We also shouldn’t forget the police who are constantly recording at demonstrations. Journalist footage or private recordings can also be scized by the police. What Can They Do and How Can They Be Recagnized? Several books could be filled with information on camera types and applications, but a rough overview will suffice here. Surveillance cameras record in different ways depending on the application. As a deterrent, sometimes only fake cameras or “You are being recorded”signs arc installed without a device actually being present. If the recordings arc meant to be used toinvestigate possible crimes,they are not only displayed on monitors but also saved. Saved recordings can later be viewed remotely or accessed via the Internet. All of these variants can be wireless or wired. Interms of camera types, there are large, highly visible cameras that are prefrrcd for deterrence. These are the traditional box cameras, box-shaped long-range infrared cameras or the large versions of dome cameras. Small to medium-sized pen cameras (round, pen-shaped), small dome cameras or mini cameras are used as recognizable but more inconspicuous, discreet cameras. And, of course, there arc hidden cameras: very small mini cameras (e.g-integrated almost unnoticeably in doorbells, on front doors or gates), and cameras that arc completely disguised in clocks, behind one-way windows, in motion detectors or smoke detectors. All camera types can be cquipped with various functions: zoom, pan and rotate, extra wide radius, night vision. They vary in their sensitivity to ight, type of focus (variable or fixed), and image resolution. With high resolu- tions, people or license plates can be recognized and identified. So-called “intelligent cameras,” which recognize previously stored characteristics of people, such as eye-mouth-nose distance,iris or gait, and then sound an alarm, are not yet in use in Germany. In general, the latest technology 54
is not used everywhere, but it tends to get better and cheaper. The type of camera and its capabilities cannot be identified at strcet level, o only roughly So your asscssment of a camera type can be based on the location and the level of surveillance you think is likely there. What Can We Do About Them? We can choose our routes and targets so that no surveillance cameras record us. But we can also try to outwit them: hold something in front of the camera if it isn’t mounted too high (e.g. an umbrella, cardboard, or even just a bag placed over the lens). Spray paint the lens or apply paint with paint sprayers or eggs flled with paint, apply stickers o cut the cables (be carefl, always use insulated tools!). Stones or hammer blows will also help if you are well masked or not positioned in the camera’s field of view. Though it’s easy to make mistakes in this regard as some cameras have a wider range than is appaent from the outside. Sometimes i’s enough to wear clothing that conceals your body shape, such as a garbage bag, or to puta rain cover over your bike to obscure it (when the camera is far away). Afterwards, you should dispose of your clothes and, of course, not use your everyday clothes in which you may have already been photographed. We recommend reversible jackets, masks, umbrellas, or placing cushions and pillows under your clothes that change the shape of your body. Beards, wigs, paint on your face, or picces of apple in your checks can also change your face. However, aways consider whether the circumstances allow you to be a little sloppy with the (possible) cameras! If in doubt, don’t do it, rather than put yourself at unnecessary risk! Physical Surveillance Originally published as Tausend Augen (d Thousand Eyes) in part 2 of issuc 153 of the German magazine radikal. ‘The comment in square brackets is from the editors of the original PRISMA zine. 55
[This text is a bit old, but still quite relevant. It will be clear to anyone who has walked down a busy street that mobile phone technology has evolved...] Eyes starc out of windows everywhere you go... A car rolls slowly past you, two young guys sitting in it, watching you out of the corner of their eyes.... Another car has been parked in front of your door for days.... The phone suddenly crackles in a way it didn’t before... A satellite antenna has recently been installed on the house across the street, pointing dircctly at you... A helicopter has been fiying over your strect a lot latcly.. Someone has asked for you.... Beyond the blue summer sky; a spy satellite orbits and photographs you fifty times per second as you walk through deserted strects.... “The scason is called PARANOIA. All of us who are close to anti-authoritarian ideas (nd hopefully actions) are familiar with this time of year. Many of us have experienced various forms of repression in our years of political activity: the police baton at demonstrations,investigations, rial,raids,prison. Although these dircetly experienced patterns and forms of repression can be somewhat demystified over the years itis abways frightening how little we collectively learn from these experiences. New campaigns for refusing to testify in police stations and during trial continue to be necessary,and people stillfeel helpless when caught in the thorns of the court and prison apparatus, often repeating the same old mistakes. There are piles of texts on all kinds of repression, but it makes a big difference whether you experience something yoursclf or just read about it. What is truc of dircct, overt experiences of repression is all the more true of the more covert forms. The radical left knows a lot about the apparatuses of s enemics, or at least has theorctical knowledge, but in practice takes them into account rather sloppily. The subjective fecling of being threatencd often determines one’s actions: “Nothing will happen’—“What could they possibly want’—“T’l be carcful’—*Afier all they don’t have my fingerprints yet’—*Why would they be interested in me?” But also: “I’m surrounded”—*Nothing works anymore’—*I¢’s better if I stop being active—*Everything is surveilled anyway"—*Orwell’s ’1984’ has been surpassed long ago.” 56
On the other hand, some people apply general principles to avoid needing to precisely evaluate a particular situation: never talk in your own home, especially not over the phone, keep no written documents,etc. “This text s intended to shed some light on the shadows of surveillance. It has two main objectives. Firstly, learning and knowing the methods of the enemy means being able to fight them! Sccondly, down with paranoia! We are aware that dealing with this topic in detail may stir up of paranoia. Those reading this text should keep in mind that e thing described here is an exceptional situation, perhaps comparable to airplanc travel: before takeoff, instructions are given on the use of life jackets, and. everyone should be familiar with how to use them, but they are only used in very few exceptional cases. And hardly anyone will think about life jackets throughout the entire flight. When we talk about surveillance in this text, we mean the targeted surveillance of specific individuals. We will not go into detail about the everyday snooping that affects a scenc in general, such as collecting scene publications and posters or hanging around in the relevant bars and public mectings. First, a Few Basic Rules When It Comes to Physical Surveillance A surveillance operation s planned and organized. It requircs some effort if it is to be useful: preparation, personnel, vehicles, technical aids, coordination. Most surveillance has no political motivation and is carried out against threats such as organized crime, burglasies, ctc There are various forms of surveillance. They can be categorized as follows (the terms are chosen by us): surveillance of a specific place, object, person, In the case of surveillance of a place, the surveillance operators it ina static location (in a house, car, etc.) and do not move from there. For example, they may be exclusively interested in who enters a certain building, or whether something is hidden in the bushes somewhere. Such surveillance s very difficult or even impossible to detect. 57
Surveillance of an object is a variation of the frst form. It involves kecping an eye on a specific object, such as a car or a parcel of money. To do this, the surveillance operators have to be mobile. In the case of surveillance of a person, the firs two forms can be combincd. For example, by monitoring the target’s home with cameras (static surveillance), and otherwise tailing the target (mobile surveillance). In some cases, tracking devices may be used, or the operators may set up at fixed locations that a target must pass. Surveillance may end in an arrest, or it may have no noticeable conscquences at all, except that the sceurity authorities hold onto everything they have recorded. The reason for the first three forms of surveillance is usually a police investigation or something similar by the intelligence agencies and the BEV. The tightening of sccurity laws cnables the cops to surveil you even outside of an ongoing investigation. Surveillance of an arca is aimed at gaining information about the move- ‘ments of various people. Against political targets, this type of surveillance operation attempts to create movement profiles for the scene. This is usually done in the run-up to important political events and may or may not be based on a specific investigation. All forms of surveillance can also be carried out overtly. The purpose of overt surveillance is cither to make the target nervous to sce how they seact,or to find someone to target in the first place by sceing how different people react. Overt surveillance is clearly recognizable as such. They’ll show up at your doorstep or even call you to say they’re there. But take note: if you detect a surveillance operation, it doesn’t necessarily mean that itis overt surveillance! The operators are not always as skilled as we might assume. I¢’s very asy to surveil someone who is oblivious. It’s very difficult to surveil somcone who expects to be surveilled. The amount of effortinvested in a surveillance operation depends on many different factors. Priorities must be set: what is more or less promising at the moment? What is politically desirable, whether for the government, the local authorities, or the different factions within the sccurity apparatus? Whatis even feasible? 58
on among agencies as to who should or can do what. If one agency fecls it is being interfered with in some way by another, this can lead to a reduction in the willingness to work. Although budget cuts and staff shortages impact police and intelligence agencies much less than other domains, it still does to some extent. It also a matter of what other important cases are in progress which should not or cannot be put on the back burner. “The surveillance apparatus is a sluggish public service system with a lot of peaple who don’t really care about their job. Success i often achieved not by brilliant ideas or particularly dedicated working methods, but by routine, i.c. by always following the same procedures. Another important factor is how dangerous and “surveillance aware” the target(s) is/ase believed to be. A thorough surveillance operation requires a certain amount of preparation time, sometimes several wecks. So if you’ve been arrested for something and you’re now worried that you might be under surveillance, don’t be surprised if the surveillance doesn’t start until quite some time later when your vigilance has alrcady started to wane. Not Everything That Can Be Done Will Be Done There are numerous zines and books about what is technically possible in surveillance today. They describe bugs the si of a grain of dust stuck in cracks that can be accessed remotely,or camera lenses the size of a pinhead lurking somewhere. There are even cameras that no longer require lenses, using camouflaged light-sensitive micro-components instead. Tracking devices ean be purchased that can be located via satellte, allowing the surveillance units to locate their target without having to leave the offic, Phones can be called without ringing or otherwise alerting their owner. Rooms can be bugged from a great distance using laser beams. Computer screens can also be tapped. Thousands of phone conversations can be intercepted using computers listening for keywords. Aweakness of these texts is that they usually don’ttell the reader anything about which capabilities arc used when, or by whom. Many of the above techniques are very expensive. Some arc technically feasible, but their 59
development is not et sufficiently mature and they are sill in the testing phase. Others arc used, but “only” by the intelligence agencics. And what the intelligence agencics have, the cops do not have—if only because the intelligence agencics value being better than the cops. There are also priorities. Today, there are still some things that are more threatening to the State and capital than the radical left and/or that are more difficult to control with conventional methods of surveillance. These primarily include State espionage, counter-espionage and industrial espionage. The elaborate, nasty technical capacities are mainly used in these domains and, of course, in the military domain. Of course, all technically possible forms of surveillance are a potential threat to us. Anything that has been used once somewhere will be used again. The cheaper it becomes and the more familiar the authorities become with it, the more widespread its use wil be. I¢’s also important to consider the relationship between the use of a technical capability and its success. Bugs are a good example of this: using a bug makes sense if the surveillance operators have a relatively clear idea of what is being discussed where, or at least assume that they know where interesting conversations are taking place. After al, they first have to install the thing properly and then continue to take care of it: power supply, transcription, analysis, and subscquent removal. If they assume that the target docsn’t talk much or at all at home,or lives in a house with 20 rooms far apart from cach other, they will think twice about doing the work that a bug requircs. When placing a camera somewhere, there are a few questions that need 1o be answered beforchand. Is a clear linc of sight guaranteed? How good is the footage quality? If the goal is to clearly identify people, a telephoto lens must be used. This rules out the tiny camouflaged lenses, so a real camera has to be hidden nearby somchow. And a camera lens that can identify a face is also more vulnerable to being deteeted. If it installed so far away that it cannot be casily detected, there’s a risk that other things such as trees, cars, ctc. will obscure its line of sight. Therefore, it sealistic to assume two likely possibilities. On the onc hand, there will be a handful of surveillance operations using sophisticated technical capabilities. In recent years, this has probably mainly been 60
directed against the RAF, the RZ and Rote Zora ™ On the other hand, the vast majority of political surveillance will use *conventional” methods, i.c. tailing the target, tapping the phonc, monitoring the mail, possibly monitoring the front door with a camera. You Can Detect a Lot of What Is Being Done An essential part of “conventional” surveillance is finding out who goes where, when, and to mect whom. But anything to do with movement is a weak point in surveillance. The surveillance operators have to move with their target while staying in contact with cach other. Even if the target docs not detect the surveillance themselves, there’s a high probability that other people who aren’t being targeted will notice it. They will see cars suddenly speeding off for no apparent reason, or peopl sitting in parked cars pushing themselves decp into their scats,or they will notice someone suddenly mumbling into the lapel of their jacket, or lingering in a doorway for a long time. These are all unavoidable behaviors in mobile surveillance. So if you have reason to expect surveillance, you have a good chance of detecting it—some of it yoursclf if you walk around with your eyes open, some of it with the help of others. You Are Not the Only One Who Could Be Targeted At least in larger cities, especially in certain neighborhoods, there are hundreds of people, maybe thousands, living around the corner from you who could potentially be the target of surveillance. People are under surveillance for all kinds of erimes: receiving stolen goods, fraud, theft, robbery, murder, drugs, ctc. In the political sphere, cverything is possible: “terrorism”, antifuscists, small autonomous groups, PKK,* DevSol,* maybe even Nazis. Then there’s cspionage, Islamic fundamentalists, auiliary SNTE note: The Rote Zora e Geeman far-left feminist miltant group active from 1974 10 1995, TR ot The Kudistan Workers’ Party (PKK) s Kuedish political organization TP not: Dewvimei Sol (DeSol) s the former name of the Revolutonary People’s Liberation Pasty/Front, Tarkish communist poliial parey: 61
services for foreign authorities, immigration police, searches for wanted people. If there is surveillance in your area and you are worried that it might be targeting you, then keep in mind that there are many other people around you who might also be the target of surveillance. Your Enemies Don’t Necessarily Know Everything You Know You may wonder why you’ve never been put under surveillance. Or you’re being tailed and wonder why they are staking out one place and not another. For example, you notice that the cops have been lingering outside your legal address for days, even though you thought they should have known by now where you actually live. But maybe only the intelligence agencies know this, and they haven’t told the cops. You have to be prepared for the fact that if you are a arget in a surveillance operation, you won’t be surveilled in the same way that you would do it yourself. They don’t know a lot of things that you know. But they also know things you don’t. Or they can be wrong and start from a completely false premisc, like associating you with someone you have nothing to do with. Another possibility is that they are working on a construct that is politically desirable, but has litle to do with reality: So you shouldn’t assume that the surveillance is based on what you know, or even based on reality Your adversarics are working on the basis of what they have in their files, and these can be quite inaccurate. I you automatically assume that they know what you know, you may then deliver this knowledge to them through your behavior. Ifyou suddenly start moving boxes out of your apartment because you’ve become nervous after detecting surveillance, you may be letting them know that you actually have something to hide. Of course, the first question during a surveillance operation is always what they are actually interested in. Don’t expect to find out! If you know that 2 “good” reason exists to target you, then assume that is the reason. But ‘you must also expect that there could be reasons you would never think of. For example, you may have unwittingly sold your car to someone who is under surveillance for organized car smuggling. Or when a person accused 62
of being a member of the RAF was arrested, they with a number on it that the BKA mistook for your phone number. Or a snitch falsely accused you of having contacts with a clandestine militant group. These are all things that no onc will probably ever tell you, so you ‘won’t be able to evaluate them. found a picce of paper Of course, there are also clues that you can use to determine how much the cops know, You can for example determine which of your friends are also being surveilled, or at what times they surveil you. If they always come in the evening, they probably aren’t watching you for organized shoplifting at the grocery store. Paranoia Feeds on ltself Once you’ve detected signs of surveillance around you, you may start trying to deduce meaning from the smallest things. Suddenly you suspect cops around every corner, everything s suspicious. This is completely normal, it comes and goes in phases, and also depends on your mood at the time. Try not to let it drive you crazy. Until you become quite “familiar” with this situation, you have to cxpect that you will not even notice the majority of the surveillance operation, simply because they are carcful to keep their distance from you. So if you arc absolutely certain that there arc cops ‘buzzing around you, it may be a sign that you aren’t the target. What You Can Do Specifically Now to the practical part, which has three sections: 1. General caution 2. How to detect physical surveillance 3. What to do if you detect physical surveillance 1. General Caution If you are part of the radical left and politically active, or if you associate with people who are, it can’t hurt to be a little vigilant in lfe. You have to establish your own limits: where does recklessness begin, and where does paranoia? Some people have a nose for cops, others don’t even notice when 63
a police radio beeps right next to them. You have to figure these things out for yourself, Your vigilance has to be integrated into your daily lfe, into the way you perceive your surroundings. I you can’t deal with repression at all, if you just want to keep it away from you, then you should first ask yourself how this fecling relates to your political activity and whether you can afford such an approach to this activity. I you can, great, if not, you need to think about how you can find a tolerable way to deal with it and 10 what extent others can help you. ‘The police and intelligence agencies are always present in one form or another, without this necessarily resulting in anything concrete, There’s a good reason that it’s common knowledge that informants should be assumed to be present at every public mecting, that phones are tapped, cte.In fact, this has never successfully prevented radical left action. Despite its rules and laws, the security apparatus is not completely predictable and certainly often a bit chaotic. They may not even know themselves what is going on at the various levels. General caution means being aware of the cops’ presence and not being. deterred by it. After al, an cssential clement of “preventive repression” is to create paralysis through a general awareness of the constant presence of the cops. This is intensified by police games designed to keep us occupied —scemingly pointless or untargeted blows of the repressive apparatus are sometimes simply meant to keep peaple busy so that they don’t have time for anything clse. When this is the dynamic, the cops have the initiativ, They’re on the offensive, and we’re chasing after cvents. This political aspect of repression has been extensively discussed in other texts. General caution means paying attention to how cops behave, Sometimes it can be uscful to imagine how and what they think: the patrol cop, the surveillance operators, the State sccurity cops,the chiefs. Surely they’re not only thinking about us and our “misdeeds,” but also about the end of the day, their mortgage payments, their boss, the political repercussions, their carcer, the union, getting something to drink later, the arrogant external authoritis. It’s important to consider that what they imagine of your daily life s shaped by the mass media, biased informant reports, difficult-to- comprehend texts from the scene, and lectures by “scene experts.What are their moral values and self-justification for their work? If you go beyond 64
the slogancering notions of cops as recipicnts of orders without agency, or as fanatical law-and-order fighters, you will no longer be surpriscd by some things that you might not otherwise be able to explain without cnormous conspiracy theories (“They didn’t intervene, so we think they don’tknow anything. .. "or “They struck now because they knew everything beforchand...”). This happens sometimes, but the reasons are usually far more mundane. So, try to get to know your adversaries. Describe not only their logic (or lack thercof), but also what they look like, how they act. The days when 95% of surveillance operators were men with short hair and mustaches are long gone. Today, there are many women among them. Both women and men wear clothes typical of the scenc, and the men often have long. hair and carrings How do they sit in the car? Why docs a surveillance operator look out the car window differently than other people? He or she is looking out for something. However, it’s casy to mistake people who are unfamiliar with the area for surveillance operators, because they are often very alert, Most people who drive tend to focus their attention inside the car, especially when they’re not alone. Surveillance operators, on the other hand, usually pay close attention to their surroundings outside the car and often hardly talk to the other passengers. In any case,it makes sense for anyone who is politically active to consider the extent to which they should prepare for repression, to become more familiar with the possible threats posed by surveillance, ete. Do not rely on the fact that from time to time, some license plates of surveillance cars are published somewhere. The lists can contain errors, the license plates are changed. The best protection is to develop a “nose”for cops and informants, and you will develop this through attention and expericnce. 2. How To Detect Physical Surveillance Let’s assume you’re up to something so you want to go scope out an arca. Or you have nothing to do at the moment and are taking an attentive walk. How can you detect whether there is a surveillance operation going on? Cars are the most noticeable element. For once we can be happy about the car society we live in. Cars are casy to identify and can be clearly deseribed 65
by their model, color, and license plate number. Almost all stakcouts involve cars, and the operators on foot arc sually passengers who have gotten out of a car, Cars have several advantages for the cops: they can hide their radios and other equipment (a camera, a change of clothes) in the car. They can speak loudly and listen to radio messages without being noticed by outsiders. They can maove between locations quickly: They can sit comfortably and maybe even take a nap if the surveillance drags on ‘without much happening. Of course, there are also operators on foot, bike, and motorcycle, who arc usually harder to spot. Surveillance vehicles are generally clean and well maintained. There are all kinds of car models in all kinds of colors, mostly high horscpower models, but no souped-up or otherwise flashy models. Don’t expect to sce any technical features ike radios, radio antenna or anything like that. Gone are the days where surveillance cars gave that away. Nowadays, the cars have “hands-free” systems where messages are picked up by a hidden interior microphone and the radio can be hidden in the glove compartment. So if you’re out for a walk, you might pass a car that catches your cyc. You take a closer look out of the corner of your eye and sec that the car is clean, it has an antenna, someone is sitting in it reading a book. Other than that, the car looks normal. Or there are two people in it with their scats partially reclined, maybe dozing off. Or someone s just sitting there looking intently in a particular direction. Or maybe you just sce a man or woman with headphones standing idly on a corner. Shortly thereafter, a car slowly rolls past you with two young men in i, looking out the window with interest. Then, two corners further on, two cars are parked next to cach other with two couples standing next to them, smoking and chating, They are probably wearing normal, sporty, casual clothes and shoes. They don’t have “cop faces,” nor do they look particularly strong. But maybe you heard a beeping sound coming from one of the cars as you passed by. You may have just noticed the two cssential elements of surveillance: firse, the “trigges” position for the target, and second, the surveillance operators that stand-by ready to tail the target. The trigger position is of central importance, which is why it must be particularly inconspicuous. If this position is occupied by people in a car, the surveillance operators may recline the seats to make themselves more 66
comfortable and less visible from a distance. Or they may do something 0 give themselves a reason to be there, such as reading the newspaper. “The trigger position can also be done on foot. In this case, someonc may sitin a cafe with a view of the target’s front door and only bricfly signal 10 the rest of the team that the target has left the house. If you see a car with one or two people sitting in it, looking intently in one dicction, you can be relatively certain that you have found the trigger position. Unless it s well camouflaged, this position will normally be at a distance that gives a good view of the target, but is out of the target’s immediate field of vision. This is usually about 40 to 80 meters. The rest of the surveillance operators are at some distance, However,they still need to be close enough to be able to start tailing quickly when necessary: So they will make sure that they are well positioned in terms of the strect layout and that they can quickly reach the target’s possible routes. They are probably around a comer or two, about 200 to 400 meters away.If they take a more relaxed approach, they may gather in several cars, perhaps even getting out to chat. However, they may also line up separately and form a box around the target. They also need to find places where they can meet and discuss undisturbed, such as dead ends or parking lots. The cars will change positions occasionally. The car that was in the trigger position joins the stand-by cars, and another car assumes the trigger position. If finding a parking space is difficult,the firs car waits until the car replacing it arrives and then leaves the parking space to its eplacement, “The following are signs that surveillance may be taking place: * Have you seen people staring at fixed location? * Have you seen people wearing earbuds? * Have you scen occupied cars parked for several minutes? * Have you scen cars (moving or parked) that you suspect are surveil- lance cars? * Have you heard radio transmissions from cars? If you think you’ve detected surveillance, the second step s to determine the surveillance target. To find out the location that is under surveillance, you can either look for it dircetly,i.c. look for an operator watching a specific location, or you can think about what s likely to be surveilled in 67
the arca and then try to deteet an operator around those locations. If you don’t find the object of your desire, therc’s not much you can do other than walk around attentively for a while. Without identifying the target, it’s not possible to draw conelusions. Accordingly, you should limit yoursclf to making sure they are not targeting you or people or locations you know. If you can detect the trigger position, the next step is to determine what the trigger is watching. Although you know the target must be a certain distance away, you don’t know if it’s a house, a car, or something clse. For example, the target could be a car that is parked 100 meters away, but which can nonetheless be seen from this distance if it drives off. You can first try to rule out possible targets. Rule out all propertics in the immediate vicinity of the trigger position, i.c. the two to three adjacent house entrances, pubs or shops. Keep in mind that it’s also possible for a trigger in a car to usc the rear-view and side mirrors. Despite these clucs, it’s very unlikely that you’ll be able to determine the exact target location. At least you can narrow it down to a certain area and, above all, you can assess whether your own front door, car or bike, o those of your comrades could be affected. If you come to the conelusion that your own front door s in the line of sight, your adrenaline level will probably skyrocket, but stay calm. So far, nothing is confirmed, and many other possibilties exist. However, if you cannot rule outsurveillance of your front door, it makes sense to take certain precautions. For example, arc there people you don’t want scen entering. your home? Do you keep things at home that you feel uncomfortable with in such a situation? Would you prefer not to be identified as someone who lives there? So you need to start thinking about what to do: ignore the danger, warn people, take countermeasurcs? That’s what the third scction is about. 3. What To Do if You Detect Physical Surveillance If you are certain that you have deteeted surveillance, you will naturally want to know whether it’s targeting you. If there is no cvidence to the contrary, you can try to find out more by conducting “counter-surveillance.” “To do this, you need a few trusted people who can be abservant, Decide on a route that you will take at a certain time. This route should be designed 68
to fitin with your daily routine so that surveillance operators don’t become suspicious. It should have a few turns to rule out coincidences, such as a car that happens to be driving the same route as you. It docsn’t have to be particularly long, It should not follow the main traffic routes all the time, but it also shouldn’t circle around itsclf too much, otherwisc the surveillance team may simply form a box around it. Short stops can be incorporated to make sudden changes of dircction plausible. For example, first you go to a copy shop and copy something, then you tum in the opposite dircction and go to a mailbox where you drop something off. Then you can change dircction again and buy a newspaper at a store. It’s best o do the route in a car, because then you will e followed by vehicles and not on foot.* It’s casicr to deseribe vehicles more precisely than people. Since you want to determine whether someone i taling you, it makes no sense to try to lose potential tails. You should also avoid checking yourself, as others will do that for you. Your pursuers should fecl as safe as possible. You must communicate your chosen route to your comrades in advance. If it sccms too risky to meet them in person, you’ll have to find another way to communicate the details. However, the casiest way is to tell the route to people you can meet without issuc or raising suspicions, and who are very unlikely to be under surveillance themselves. Your friends will then position themselves as inconspicuously as possible along the route you will take at the specified time. They record exactly when you pass by and what follows behind you: the car’s license plate, color, model. The obscrvations are then compiled. If you are really being surveilled, the fact that the same people or cars were scen in different places will serve as confirmation, Howeverit’s more likely that your friends will immediately recognize the surveillance operators, because to keep up with you they often have to race through the streets at high specd and disregard traffic laws. The most NP notes I you do the route in car and you are under physical surveillince, there s arik that the car contains a GPS tracker installed by the surveillance team to track itsLocation. This i s problem, because the surveillnce team might rly on the tracker and follow you from far away or even notat all, making it harder or imposible for you o detect them, It can be better to do the route on a bike, because compared to s car, itis casier to ensure that a bike does not contain 8 GPS tracker.For more information sbout using bikes, sce our Threat Library’s “Transportation by bike™ mitigation. *hetps://notrace how/threat-libraey/mitigations/transportations-by-bike html 69
important thing for the operators is to keep up with you without being. seen by you. This leaves litele room for consideration of other road users. OF course, there’s always an element of uncertainty. It could be that you have a tracking device on your car, and that’s why the surveillance operators kept their distance (but they’re sill taling you!). Or they were following you, but then lost you. O they finished work or took a lunch break a few minutes before you started your route. That’s why counter-surveillance can only ever reveal if they were tailing you at that particular point in time. Nevertheless,if you choose the time and place well,you have a good chance of getting enough certainty for your immediate plans.” You can also try to detect surveillance by yourself Take a carefully planned soute by car or bike that gives you the following options: you can make surprising turns—preferably with a plausible explanation. Or you follow a long, straight stretch of road with no turning options, where you can suddenly stop on the side of the road. In both cases, your pursucrs will be forced to pass you if they don’t want to attract your attention, You can then try to memorize cars, license plates, and faces, and repeat the whole process elsewhere to sce if there are any matches. In order to carry out surveillance deteetion measures, however, you must be able to behave in such a way that the cops don’t notice what you’re doing. Above all, this requires you to remain calm even in a tense situation. You must also develop a“nose” for cop cars,since it’s usually impossible to remember the license plates of all passing vehicles. Once you have confirmed that the surveillance is indeed targeting you, you need to calmly consider your next steps. You shouldn’t do this alone, but with a few people you trust. N.TP note: For more information on conducting counter-surveillance (.. detecting physical surveillince with the help ofa trusted third pasty), sce Surveillance Countermeasures.” *hitps:/fmotsace.howcesources/fsurveillance-countermeasures. 70
Who and What Is at Risk? Regardless of why they are tailing you, consider whether there are any other comrades who might be affected. They need to be told, but it may be better if this isn’t done by you personally If there are things that could be a problem in your home, car, or other places where you spend a lot of time, they should be discreetly moved el First of all,don’t tell more people than absolutcly necessary. Once rumors of surveillance begin to spread, the most likely outcome is panic, ansicty, and conspicuous behavior, as well as speculation about the possible reasons for the surveillance. All o this can do more harm than good. What Could Be the Reason for the Physical Surveillance? To get as close as possible to answering this question, collect as many observations as possible: dates, times, vehicles. Distinguish assumptions from reliable obscrvations. Then try to come to an assessment of what the surveillance operators (could) have already noticed. Think about all the possible reasons for their actvities. Don’tjust think about your real activities and struggles, but also about what is conccivable due to coinci unintended connections. For example, if you have been identified by the police when you were with someone, such as in a previous arest. What type of vehicle were you using when you detected the surveillance? When and where did you do things that could be understood as conspiratorial activity? What Could Be a Threat in the Future? Based on your working hypothesis of what the surveillance is about, you can consider how the authorities will proceed. One unknown factor, of course,is whether it’s the cops or an intelligence agency that have you in their sights. I it’s the cops, its very likely that you are the subject of an
investigation, which will usually be reated to “§129” or“§1294" It should e briefly mentioned that these two articles are primarily investigative in nature and are used to keep the repressive apparatus running smoothly. Very few §129a investigations lead to trials and convictions. They arc mostly used to legitimize surveillance in the first place. So a §129 surveillance operation will not necessarily be followed by a raid and/or arrcst. And if it is, this docs not necessarily mean that you’ll be charged. You should familiarize yoursclf with this possibility, but it’s also possible that the surveillance will end at some point and nothing conerete will result from it, except that your file with the security or intelligence agency will be a lietle thicker. “Theintelligence agencies arc not formally subject to the principle of legality, .. they can surveil you “if necessary”as they wish. Whether anything else follows from this depends on whether the intelligence agency activates the police. If the surveillance lasts for months (which can happen), you can’tlive with your bags packed the whole time, whether it’s to run away or to go to jail. You have to find a soutine for yoursclf at some point in this situation, otherwise you’lllose it. This means that you cither have to give up certain things during this time, or you have to arrange them in such a way that you can carry them out despite the ongoing surveillance Some people have lived for years under the constant threat of surveillance and have continued their political activities. But they are unlikely to publicly discuss many of their expericnces during that time, so as not to give the cops any clues as to how they managed to make the surveillance go nowhere, Thercfore, if you are affccted you will have to do a lot of escarch yourself or seck dircet contact with comrades who have experience with these matters. Most importantly, you need to work with your own people o figure out what works for you and what docsn’t. NI pote: The terms “§129” and "§ 1292 refer to pasagraphs in the German penal code that deal with the formation 2 criminal and tertorst association,respectivly. 72
What You Can Do There are various ways you can behave: you can continue to live as before and, if necessary, temporarily refrain from doing risky things. In doing so, however, you accept that the other side will learn a lot about you, your social contacts and your political connections. The advantage of this approach is that you can largely ignore the surveillance. But to protect others, you must consider where you could be taking the surveillance operators with you and who they might become aware of because of it. Another approach is to put your political ife on the back burner, so to speak by lying low and waiting until the other side gets bored or finds the surveillance pointless because they simply don’t have anything interesting. 10 sce. But keep in mind that they may have been watching you for longer than you know,and could therefore notice if your lfe suddenly changes Alternatively, you can go on the offensive and “burn” the operators who follow you by openly addressing them, taking photos, or the like. Perhaps you could turn this against them with an appropriate political campaign and publicity, but you also run the isk that this will draw real attention to you. Maybe they’ll wait a while and then send a better team against you that you won’t notice so casily.In this regard, you should consult with others before deciding to take this approach. Its tempting to show the operators that you’ve detected them and to tellthem to go fuck themselves, but you’ll probably be trading a short-term sense of accomplishment for the long-term ability to have control over the surveillance operation. Inany case, it may make sense to get a lawyer involved. Here too,you need o think about what you should and shouldn’t tell them. Of course, lowyers can’t work miracles, and they usually know a lot about legal matters, but not necessarily about cops or intelligence agencics. As a general rule, you should avoid conspicuous behavior. Don’t keep turning around on the street or pecking out the window. Don’t engage in any “conspiratorial” activitics in an arca visible through your windows, And don’t make any half-hearted attempts to shake off your pursuers. You should only do the latter if it’s absolutely necessary and you’re reasonably sure you’ll suceeed, with the support of other people. Because anything 73
the surveillance operators might find “conspiratorial” will only make you more interesting. If you politically organize in non-clandestine projects, you and your trusted people need to consider the extent to which you should inform the group. Depending on the structure of the group, not everyone may need to know. Especiallyif there are inexperienced or les resilient people in your group, you should develop a very precise approach to the situation. Unfortunately,sometimes warnings can do more harm than good, in which case a responsible and considerate response to the situation may be better than verbal warnings. You might prefer to take a “vacation” for a while, or at least withdraw from parts of the group work. If you participate in clandestine projects, the situation is completely different. You then have to discuss very carcfully to what extent these activitics could already be endangered by the surveillance that is targeting. you, and whether you should pause your involvement, cither partially or completely. Conversely, a sudden termination of certain contacts may also appear suspicious. Obviously, the others with whom you organize in this way must be informed of the situation. But clandestine organization does not automatically mean that everyone wil be able to cope with the situation. Recklessness, overconfidence (especially among men) insecurity, paranoia, gossip, inaccuracy—all of this is also present in clandestine organizing. 1f you have determined that the surveillance you have detected is NOT targeted at you, it’s unnecessary to go around telling everyone what’s going on. Doing so should only be a lat resort when you have no idea who is being surveilled and who you could tell. Otherwise, panic is often created by mixing half-knowledge or assumptions with obscrvations, and people who want to make themselves important run around spreading rumors. It’s always better to inform individual people who you can trust will stay calm and pass on the necessary information to the right people. You may be able to find out who the surveillance is targeting, If so, that should be the end of it for you. It might be interesting to stay up to date on who is being surveilled and where, but this isn’t vry nice for the people directly concerned. That’s why you should follow the same guideline that applics to 74
militant actions: only those who have something to do with the situation should be in the know. When You’re Under Physical Surveillance... Tt makes sense to follow these basic guidelines. Surveillance does not mean the end of all possibilit * Surveillance does not normally run around the clock for tended period of time because it wouldn’t be sustainable in terms of personnel. Along phase of intensive surveillance may be followed by a long pause. This means, on the one hand, that a surveillance operation doesn’t last forever, but on the other hand, that it can be resumed at some point. Such a pause may last for weeks or even months. * Or the surveillance may end with a raid, a subpocna, or even an arrest. * Stay calm. Panicking only benefis the surveillance operators. * Try to make arrangements with reliable friends who have your back and take on tasks you can’t do for the time being. Talk to them, but only to them, and not only about logistics, but also about your fears and insecurities. * Consider speaking with a lawyer so you already know who to turn to, at least in the event of a sudden arrest. + Tobe on the safe side, expect the worst. This means expecting technical surveillance of your home and car, including both camera surveillance and bugs (though this is les likely), as well as tracking devices. You can be sure that your phone and mail are being monitored! Assume that it’s not just targeting you, but other people as well. Expect to be detained or even arrested at some point. * Clean up the places that could be scarched: apartment, attic, basement, car, garage, etc. « Think about places in your home where you cannot be observed, whether it’s possible to leave the house unobscrved, or how you can. otherwise inconspicuously evade surveillance if doing so becomes necessary. + Avoid any behavior that appears “conspiratorial.” 75
* Try to develop a daily routine for yourselfin this threatening situation. * Write down your observations and evaluate them with your friends. « Develop a hypothesis about the reason for the surveillance that you can deal with. Think about perspectives for your future actions The worst-case scenario for the surveillance operators is that the target has turned the tables and is in control of the operators! “The worst-case scenario for you is being reckless and burying your head in the sand! But the second worst-case scenario is panic and paralysis! To all those who are wanted or under surveillance, we wish you all the strength you need. Let’s use knowledge against paranoia! 76
5. Documentation L Photos of Actions Just a few little tips: ‘We strongly discourage you from taking photos of actions in which people can be seen! Even if they are masked, they may be identified later. Even if you piclate, people can also be identificd by their body shape and clothing, and notall methods of pixclation are effcctive, Some image distortions,for example, can be easily reversed by police technicians. Some photo software also store a copy of the image before pixclation in its metadata, though there are programs that remove this additional information. If you post digital photos onlinc, remember that the image file may contain metadata about your camera. There are also programs that delete this information, but we don’t know how cffective they are. It s also possible for a camera 10 be scized before the photos it taok arc anonymized! T note: The majority of this chapter has not been included in this transation because we deemed it outdated. For more information sbout digita security see our Threat Library’s “Digital best practices”™ mitigation. *hecps://notrace how/threat-libraey/mitigations/digital-best-practices.html 77

In our experience, we have found that it is often difficult to find an overview of different forms of action, especially militant ones, as well as practical and contextual thoughts on different aspects of security and action planning. [...] That’s why we have collected information about taking action. NoTrace Project / No trace, no case. A collection of tools to help anarchists and other rebels understand the capabilities of their cnemics, undermine survcillance eforts, and ultimately act without getting caught, Depending on your contest, possession of cestain documents may be criminalized or atract umvanted attention. Be carcful about what zines you print and where you stor thern

PRISMA

Primer
on Radical Information
for Secure Militant Actions

PRISMA: Primer on Radical Information for Secure Militant Actions

Original textin German
PRISMA: Prima Radikales Info Sammelsurium Militanter Aktionen
2010

web archive.org/web/20250611231250/https:/militanz blackblogs org/vp-
content/uploads/sites/481/2017/11/Prisma.pdf

Translation and layout
No Trace Project

noteace how/cesources/#prisma
Note from the No Trace Project:

Compared to the original PRISMA zine, this translation includes chapters
one, three, four and five, except for paragraphs and sections related to
computer or phone sccurity that we deemed outdated. It does not include
chapters two (“The Goals and Motives of Militant Politics) and six
(“Action Tactics”) because they are outside the scope of our project.
Contents

1.Let's Go...

3. Action Preparation and Exceution .

The Steps to Success .
Beforchand
Initial Reconnaissance 9
A General Plan
Sccond Reconnaissance
‘The Action Plan ..
Plan B
Immediate Preparation
..and Action! ...
After the Action
A Final Note on Security

Anti-Repression and Emergency Plans .
Communication Structurcs
Getting to Know Each Other ...
Discuss Emergency Situations Together!

4.Our Security

Traces ..
Fingerprints

DNA Traces . .

Options for Creating a Clean Room

Aificial DNA

Scent Traces
Shocprints .

Vehicle Traces

Tool Traces

Fire Traces

Witing Traces .
Material Traces
Purchases
A Few Research Tips

Technical Surveillance ..

Monitoring Enclosed Spaces
Phone Surveillance
Postal Service
Vehicles
Public Space
Databases
Biometrics

E-passport .

Surveillance Cameras ...
Where Can You Find Therm?
What Can They Do and How Can Thc) Be Recognine
What Can We Do About Them? ..

Physical Surveillance
First,a Few Basic Rules When It Comes to Physical
Surveillance ........ .
Not Everything That Can Be Done Wil Be Done ..
You Can Detect a Lot of What Is Being Done
You Are Not the Only One Who Could Be Targeted .
Your Enemies Don't Necessarily Know Everything You
Know

Paranoia Feeds on ltsclf .
What You Can Do Specifically
Who and What Is at Risk?
What Could Be the Reason for the Physical Surveillance? . 71
What Could Be a Threat in the Future? .
What You Can Do

When You're Under Physical Surveillance.

5. Documentation .
Photos of Actions .

1. Let's Go...

Hello! I¢'s nice that you're holding this booklet in your hands! We don't
want to keep you from reading for too long, but we'd ke to start by saying
what motivated us to put this booklet together (and what didn's).

We are quite a motley crew, active in struggles ranging from opposition
o the nuclear industry to opposition to racism against the Roma. In our
experience, we have found that it is often difficl to find an overview of
different forms of action, especially militant ones, as well as practical and
contextual thoughts on different aspects of security and action planning,
Sometimes it's the little things that cause headaches, ike how to il the fire
extinguisher with paint. A lot of clever writing has alrcady been published,
but where? Not everyone has an archive of radikal’ in their closet, and
rummaging through old issucs, as nice as it is, takes a lot of time and is
not possible everywhere. That's why we have collected information about
taking action.

Collected in the sense that we hope that while browsing through these
pages, you'll come across an idea that you hadn't thought of yet, or that
hasn't been concretely described anywhere yet, Collected also means that
most of the content has alrcady been published somewhere, and we have
copied or summarized it. Some of the texts were written specially for this
booklet because we couldn'tfind anything alrcady witten on the subject.

In the “Action Tactics” chapter,? we deliberately included many very
different options. We also received new and imaginative suggestions as
we were putting it together. We believe that it can only be a good thing to
constantly and creatively reflect on one's own forms of action. This includes
the question of which form best conveys what we want to communicate.

That is why this booklct also aims to look at actions in their context
There are thoughts about goals, communication, and sceurity. However,

\No Trace Projct (N.T2R) mote radikal ws 3 German magazine, frst published in
1976, which included practical information on how to carry out actons. It i banned
in Germany:

“N.TP e This chaper is ot inchuded in

H

translation

the thoughts on goals are very general. One of the reasons for this is that
the content of our actions s geared to the social conflicts at hand, which
are constantly changing. Each context scts its own priorities and needs
0 be discussed anew. We felt that this booklet should contain ideas that
can be applicd or transferred to different situations at different times. The
cmphasis is on practice because we wanted to be precise and show as many
tactics as possibl.

We haven't tested everything ourselves. However, we know some things
from experience, and we hav tried to verify and rescarch everything cse to
the best of our abilites. For the more complicated content in the chapter,
it is always necessary to do tests yourself before putting anything into
practice. But you know that.

We wanted to avoid creating a hicrarchy of different forms of action.
Admittedly some topics take more space here than others. Thisis probably
because the more complicated the preparation and the higher the health
sisks or the intensity of repression, the longer the descriptions will need
o be in order to be accurate. [..]

You may have some fundamental objections to publishing such a collection,
such as that we shouldn't unnecessarily give cops or Nazis recipes for
the forms of action used by the radical left, because that might make our
practices more transparent. But we consider it more important to spread
forms and ideas among ourselves. As we said, most of it has already been
published and will already be familiar to the cops. We figured that it can
be an advantage if many people in many places know and use many forms
of action, because then specific practices would not be so casy to attribute,
Another diffculty is that such a collection could appear to be the “ultimate
collection”. But it isn't intended to be, and it isn't; many things arc stll
missing, For example,the use of the Internet s given fr too little attention
in this booklet, It would be intercsting to think more about sceure Internet
access and claiming actions by email or about hacking. In our opinion,
ncither Internet cafes nor anonymization software are sufficient. It would
also be interesting to have morc information about copicrs and to what
extent or how copies can be traced back to specific devices, what is stored
and for how long, ctc
And this brings us to the next problem—as much as we would have liked
to continue to expand and collectively develop this booklet, this is not
immediately possible. However, we would like to sce additions, criticisms,
continuations,experiences with individual actions,responses, and anything
clse you can think of that would contribute to a discussion on these topics
within the radical left. In our opinion, the most suitable medium for
this (due to its relatively widespread distribution) is the Berlin-based
publication “Interiny”. Unil then, we wish you a lot of fun reading, all the
best,great impacts in your projects, and a completely different lie for all
of us.

lunaties for system change
3. Action Preparation and Execution

The Steps to Success

Originally published in issue 158 of the German magazine
radikal. The comments in square brackets are from the

editors of the original PRISMA zine.

This text summarizes some things to consider when planning actions. Itis
aimed at smaller groups rather than mass mobilizations. However, some
of the considerations can be applied to such larger actions. The text is
not meant to be a step-by-step guide to action, but rather a collection of
things that should be kept in mind if an action s to be successful. The
points themsclves arc based on concrete experiences, but are kept general
enough to be generally applicable...

Beforehand

A question precedes any action: what do we want to achieve, what is
the goal of the action? It makes a difference whether we want to c
propaganda, cause as much economic damage as possible, phy
something, or show solidarity with other struggles. Oft

achieve a mixture of these different goals

In any case, it makes sense to discuss goals as concretely as possible
beforchand. Then it's easier to think about what we want to do and what
we need in order to do it. No matter the action (whether you drop a banner
or vandalize an office...), for these initial discussions you should choose
secure places where you can be confident that you won't be overheard.
Depending on the composition of your group, it may also be important to
arrange to meet in a way that isn't visible to other friends, comrades and
ou may not otherwise spend time with this particular
group of people very often. We usually have a serics of concrete targets
in mind for direct action: every trip to the store, every drive through the

roommates, since

8
city or attentive reading of the newspaper ills an imaginary list. Once you
have decided what you want the action to accomplish, the next step is to
sclect a specific target where the desired impacts can best be achicved.
By narrowing down the goal, the tactic, and the specific location, you
now have an initial rough plan for your action! After answering the three
famous questions “what, how, and where?”, the concrete planning can
begin...

[In any case, when selecting a target, care must be taken to ensure that no
bystanders arc endangered.]

Initial Reconnaissance

The first step should always be to familiarize yourself with the target
location. Ideally, several people should take a look at the chosen location,
They should use photos, drawings, and maps to describe the arca to
cach other.

[We need to point out problems with this approach: you shouldn't have
photos, drawings,etc.lying around at home. If photos and drawings cannot
be avoided, they shouldn't be kept at home and should disappear as soon
as possible. If photos are stored digitally, you should carcfully consider
where you store them, and how to completely destroy them; more on this
in the lst chapter. The very latest that you should destroy everything is
right before the action.]

More things will be noticed with more pais of eyes, and some things are
only really noticed through the process of collective discussion. A small
gate, a hidden camera, a tree adjacent to a wall... I€'s often these little
things that later become central to the plan. At this carly planning phase,
i's important to develop an eye for what type of movement is typical in
the surrounding arca, the ways into and out of the target location, and.
possible escape routes. The area to take into account grows if you will be
driving to the action by car’ because then you'll also need to find a good.
parking space and well-chosen car routes. It would be really annoying

SNLTLR ot Later i the zine, secton on vhicle races concludes that “the use of
carshould [..] be avoided whenever posible”

9
to get caught when leaving because of traffic checkpoint or something
similar which could have been forescen.

AGeneral Plan

Based on the initial recon

ance, photos, maps, ctc., you can create a
general plan, This should include the routes you willtake to arrive and leave
which are free of sccurity cameras, the parking options, the location of
entrances on the target building, and multiple escape options. Part of this
general plan s also to decide whether the action should take place during
the day or at night, and how long cach part of the action will take (the
arrival route to the meeting point, the route from the mecting point to the
target, the duration of the action, the escape routes, including alternative
eseape routes). You should also determine the number of people needed
during this planning phase, which depends heavily on the tactics chosen
and the specific conditions on the ground. How many people are needed
for this specific action? How many lookouts? Is it necessary to cavesdrop
on the police radio or something similar? How many cars and drivers?

Second Reconnaissance

The second reconnaissance of the target location takes place with the
general plan in mind. Therefore, it should take place ata time of day similar
to the time you expect the action to take place. Especially if the action is
‘going to take place at night,it's important to know the lighting conditions
and typical traffc patterns. All participants should have seen the location
beforchand to get their own idea of the situation. During this second
reconnaissance, the main focus should be on possible sceurity systems and
details of the terrain. For example,if you are going to seale a fence, it's
important to know how it's constructed. Is it topped with barbed wire? Is
it made of a material that can be easily cut? How thick is it? Is it made
of individual panels that are only bolted together? Where are the screw
heads located, what size arc they?

After this sccond reconnaissance, everyone should know cnough about
the target to be able to decide together what tools and tactics will be
needed. It s also essential to test the planned escape routes. Are there

10
seally no surveillance cameras along the routes? Is our car really the only
one that parks there, or is the spot also used by others? Is the parking
location visible from a distance, or is it hidden from view? Is there enough
ro0m to turn the car around? Are any tie tracks left behind? It's often the
litle things that make the difference between success and falure. Another
important step is to preciscly measure the time it takes to get from the
target to where you can get into the car. If this escape time is not fast
enough, the car must cither be moved closer or driven towards the people
escaping so that everyone disappears quickly cnough. It can be uscful to
agrec on 2 meeting point after an action so that you can drive back from
this meeting point together, but these routes and locations also need to
be checked for suitability.

Part of this second reconnaissance should also involve thinking about
where the clothes and tools should disappear to after the action s carried
out. Its clear that we should at least get rid of our “outer layer” (shoes,
pants, jackets, gloves and hats) as well as any tools which leave behind
traces useful to the police. Otherwise, we can never know how likely it is
that these items will be found and linked to us at some point.

At this stage, the most sensible means of communication must also be
diseussed. Can everyone always have a line of sight to cach other and thus
communicate with signs? Do we need walkie-talkics or other forms of
All forms of communication need to be tested

femote communicatio
on the ground to make sure it isn't too dark to sc each other, or that a
previously unnoticed building docsn't block radio communication.

The Action Plan

To ereate a detailed plan, everyone involved in the reconnaissance first
gocs over all the new information together. In practice, it usually makes
sense to ask very specific questions about each report. Most of us aren't
trained to describe a situation in detail ke police officers and journalists.
Soit's important to ask cach other questions in order to collectively acquire
accurate descriptions of things. A detailed action plan begins with the
mecting point of the active participants and does not end until everyone

has dispersed.

1
[The individual escape routes should also be discussed together. Keep in
mind that your homes may be under surveillance.]

Every step in between must be clarified and recorded in a schedule. At
every stage of the action, everyone must know what needs to be done and
who is communicating with whom. What tools are needed when? How
will they get to where they are needed? And how will the tools be disposed
of? Al roles must be clearly described (driver, lookouts, people who will
be directly at or in the target....) An important decision at this stage is also
whether there should be some form of back-up. By this we mean a trusted
person who, in the case of failure or danger, can be contacted far away
from the action by phonc or other suitable means to organize external
support. This is not uscful or necessary for all actions.

[In our opinion, telephone communication during or shortly after an
action is a major security risk. We have no way of knowing if the contact's
phonc is being tapped. It may be possible to usc a burner phone with an
unused card, but even this should be carefully considered. It's probably
better to arrange a mecting place beforchand. ]

PlanB

I¢'s often a good idea to think of solutions to problems that may arisc.
A door that cannot be opened docs not necessarily mean the end of an
action. If you run through several alternatives in advance, you will be
able to deal with a “deviation from the plan” more quickly and casily
1It's even possible to decide on a completely different goal in case there
are insurmountable problems with the planned action. However, you
should also decide which situations should cause the action to be aborted
altogether—discuss beforchand the conditions under which it should not
be continued.

Immediate Preparation

In the lead up to the action, the detailed plan should be rehearsed until
everyone can confidently carry out their *role.” It's usually useful for all
pasticipants to be aware of cach other's tasks so that at any given moment

12
they can assess what stage the action is at. It is also important to set aside
cnough time in an carlicr preparation phase to talk about fears and feclings,
not only to find a *solution,”but also to make cach participant's actions
more predictable for everyone. It's not helpful if somcone acts super cool
during the whole preparation and then is panicked and erratie during the
action itself. The more we can collcctively open up about our supposed
weaknesses, the stronger the group can be when it gocs into action. There
is often a lot to coordinate and arrange during the preparation phase. It is
ofien a good test of how reliable and focused the individuals in the group
are. Set a clear and realistic timeline for getting everything you need.
Especially when it comes to tools that leave traces, it is always a good idea
not to get them from the storc around the corner, but to think carcfully
about how this or that can be obtained without being surveilled. It's also
important to pay attention to the combinations of things you buy—it may
be tempting to get cverything you need in one go at a hardware store, but
putting a crowbar, a jerryan and gloves in the same shopping cart can
‘backfire. Prepare a plausible cover story for your shopping, cven though
10 one will ask you most of the time. This will regulate the contents of
your “shopping cart”and give you a sense of sceuity:

[Keep in mind, however, that even with a good cover story, the cashier
‘may remember you after a conspicuous purchase.]

At this stage, it also important to consider the possibility of failure. What
could happen if things go wrong? Are we taking a health risk with this
action? What if the cops catch us? Who will give notice at work or pick
up the kids from school? The better prepared we are for bad situations,
the better we can deal with them. Depending on the tactic, there should
always be agreements about who can take care of whom if something goes
wrong. I¢s often necessary to involve friends who aren't dircetly involved
in the action. They don't need to be privy to all the details, but there should
be clear agreements about what should happen if they can't manage to
get in touch with you by an agreed time.

13
...and Action!

On the day of the action, give yourself plenty of time to go over the plan in
‘your mind beforchand and to prepare and assemble the necessary clothes,
tools, etc. in peace and quict. You should also give yoursclf more time
to get to the mecting point than you anticipate actually needing. Your
security depends on whether or not someone is following you and thus
surveilling the action. So choose paths and routes that give you as many
opportunities as possible to detect whether you are really alone. It goes
without saying that mobile phones or devices with GPS functionality
should not be taken along on the day of the action.

If you want to be even more sceure when you head out, get help from
friends and comrades. With help from two or three others, one can usually
make a fuly reliable judgment about whether someone i really traveling
alone. You need to prepare a route in advance that can be obscrved by the
helpers at specific points. You need to plan in advance how to communicate
the “results” whether the person is under surveillance, Take an hour or two
o think about these questions and you will certainly be able to develop a
suitable plan.*

It's important to pay attention to surveillance cameras and the like on the
way to the meeting point—you don't want the route you've put cffort into
securing to be reconstructed later. When it comes to clothing, you always
have to find a compromise between practicality and inconspicuousness.
For example, it is of little use if you are geared-out with quasi-military
cquipment, but are thus very suspicious in the cyes of surveillance systems.
On the other hand, a fine suit or high-hecled shoes are quite hindrance
for some actions. So, you'll have to find a compromise.

At the meeting place, try to get a quick sense of the mood. Is everyone
still committed to the action? Does everyone have a good fecling? When
you're ready to go, compare your watches again and synchronize the time.
For night-time activitics, give your eycs time to adjust to the darkness.

“NTP note The practice of detecting physical suveillance with the help ofa trusted
third party, called counter-surceillane, s described in more details in Surveillance
Countermeasues.*

*hitps:/fmotsace.howcesources/fsurveillance-countermeasures.

14
A normal human eye takes about 20 minutes to reach maximum visual
acuity in the dark. When the action begins, focus with all your senses. Try
t0 keep reminding yourself of the plan and act accordingly. Check your
communication system right at the beginning. Can everyone be scen or
reached? The most important rule during the action and later on, on the
way back—don't panic. Calm is a relisble companion, especially in difficult
situations. If you've planned the action well, not much can happen which
you're not prepared for. No matter what happens, you should always try
o be deliberate and thoughtful about cach of your actions. This i often
diffcult, especially in stressful situations

During the action itself—and this should defiitcly be a significant part of
your preparations—you must be extremely careful not to leave any traces
behind. This includes not only fingerprints, shocprints and car traces, but
also clothing fibers, wear-marks or identifiable features on the tools you
use, and any amount of genetic material that can be analyzed (from saliva
on a cigarette butt to hair that has fallen out). Dispose of the tools and your
“outer layer” (shoes, pants,jackets, gloves, and headgear) the same night
as the action, once you are a significant distance away from the target. It's
a good idea to spread out this disposal across different places, all of which
can'tbe traced back to you (so don't use your home trash can!). Ifyou can't
do without a car, then you'll need to find a solution for its tires or even
the entire car. The guiding principle is to rule out any connection between
apossible trace and yourself. Even a rental car won't provide any sccurity
if the rental process can be traced back. Whether a car has to be stolen
for every action or alltires have to be changed is ultimately your decision,
Last but not least, it also depends on how much cffort an investigation
can be expected to put into tracing the car.

After the Action

It makes sense, but is not always feasible, to have collective debrict,
prefrablyin the days following the action. This is when memories are fresh
and details can be discussed. Such a debrief should take into account the
preparation phase so you can draw conclusions for next time. What worked,
where did problems come up, what could have been better prepared? Were

15
there moments of anxiety for the participants, and how can such situations
be handled? Sharing individual coping strategics can also be helpful,

An important part of the post-action period is recovery. Since almost all
direct actions necessarily involve a period of intense concentration and
time pressure, it i important to allow yourself and your social environment
o recover. A mentality of “the fight is my life” docsn't help anyone, Apart
from the cffccts of this mentality on group dynamics, lack of breaks and
recovery phases also limits performance and concentration,

Some time after the action, you can evaluate its political and strategic
aspeets. This evaluation can include the initial public reactions and, on
this basis, you can assess whether the method and goal of the action
matched your political intentions. Was the impact as you imagined it?
‘Were there any shortcomings, and how can they be addressed next time?
In some cases, it makes sense to somehow publicly communicate about
the action at a later date. Although publishing an action claim may be part
of the initial plan, you can always publish an additional explanation later
Public communication should distinguish between at least three intended
audiences: the “gencral public,” the “dircct public” (.5. through fiyers in
the neighborhood), and the “scene public.” I important to think carcfully
about who you want to address, with what information, how, and why.

A Final Note on Security

Achieving complete sccurity simply isn't possible. Every action has a
risk. That means dealing with potential consequences and determining
the implications of a worst case scenario, if someone gets caught. Police
investigations often thrive on chance, but n almost all cases, it’s avoidable
mistakes that ultimately lead investigators on the right track. But mistakes
can be avoided. The key is to have as detailed a plan as possible that
specifies what o do and what not to do at each step of the action. This
way, you can think about what traces you might leave behind at cach
step. And, during the action, you can take appropriate countermeasures.
If you have to climb over pointy fence, be prepared for clothing fibers
to get caught. If you walk over sand or soil, be prepared for shocprints.
1 you make a phone call, the call can be traced. If you send a leteer, the

16
mailbox or post office can be traced. If you pay with a bank card, the data
is stored.... So there are always traces and they cannot be avoided. The
crucial question is whether they can be traced back to you. There are no
“one size fits all” solutions—we must thoroughly think through cach step
(even the preparatory steps) and, if possible, collectively discuss them.

Have fun and good luck!

Anti-Repression and Emergency Plans

In small autonomous groups—be prepared for emergencies together!

We believe it is important for militant groups to prepare for what needs to
happen if something goes wrong. In addition to conerete preparations for
the action, we should discuss the participants ife situations, possible fears,
communication channels, and what to do in emergencics such as an injury
or repression. Here are some thoughts, based ither on our experience or
our expectations.

The better we know each other and the more we prepare for emergencics
in suffcient detail,the better we can act or react at the crucial moment. In
difficult situations (e.g. particularly committed citizens acting as auxiliary
police, arrests, etc.), panic sets in quickly. Already having a clear plan of
how to react is very helpful, because at this point there's usually no time
to think. OF course, detailed preparation is not a cure-all. There are always
situations in which fear causes us to ignore all previous agreements. So it's
especially important for contingency plans to be part of the preparation.
Each individual, their fears, insecurities, and life situation should be taken

into account. Everyonc should feel safe and be able to rely on the others.
On the basis of such trust, we can overcome our fears together. Our limits
are certainly different, but there are usually solutions (c.g. by discussing
task distribution openly and honestly). For example, someone may not
like being the lookout because they know that they vill panic if they have
nothing to do and may give a stop signal befor
Someone else, on the other hand, may already have trouble throwing and
aiming even before taking fear into account, so when the excitement of
the action is added to the mix, nothing works. So think carefully about
who is best suited for cach role. Think also about preparation tasks, such

t s actually necessary.

17
as producing the action materials, shopping, writing an action claim,
publishing it the next day, cte. For example, it can be very helpful if the
people whoare building an incendiary device during the day (and thus may
come into contact with gasoline) are not present at the action that night
—this takes pressurc off everyone involved and, if someone is arrested, it
reduces the risk of traces being found on their body.

Communication Structures

Communication in small autonomous groups is not casy. Phone calls,
texts, emails... al of these modern communication channels can be easily
monitored and are therefore unsuitable for clandestine organizing. So
we continue to rely on face-to-face mectings, which of course are not
without risk. I¥'s not always easy to find a suitable place to meet and talk.
“The criteria should be that the place is unlikely to be bugged (i.c. not
‘your apartment or a bar you regularly frequent), there are no other people
within earshot, and ideally it isn't obvious from a distance that you're
having a clandestine meeting. For added security, during the meeting you
can avoid mentioning locations, names, and dates (and also avoid showing
them with hand gestures), writing them down instead. Be careful because
this can be very conspicuous.

It's also important to think about how to communicate in an cmergency
situation. After house raids and the like, the cops sometimes pay very
close attention to who is talking to whom or who is meeting up. It can
be helpful to arrange an emergency meeting point for this scenario, To
share information or arrange meeting detail, i's also a good idea to think
about who is already sceing cach other in everyday life (at home, work,
school or university) so that arrangements can be made inconspicuously.
“This can also be a way to create information rclays.

Getting to Know Each Other

If repression happens, what should we know about cach other in order to
feel safe and trust that the others will take care of everything? Although
this will certainly vary from person to person, here are some suggestions
of what information might be important:

18
* Names, legal and actual addresses, dates of birth,

+ Personal situation and responsibilities (c.g. job, children, carc for
parents, pets.)

* Living situation (c.g living with parents, alone, with roommates.)

* Who should be contacted in an cmergency?

* How do they relate to things ike stress, health, fears?

+ Distribution of tasks and preferences for actions.

* Wishes for lawyers (possibly powers of attorney.)

« History of repression (cascs, convictions, probation, surveillance...)

+ Sharing experiences of repression to be better preparcd.

+ Dealing with repression and the refusal to testify.

* What kind of support is desired in case of arrests (c.g. solidarity
actions)?

* How do they evaluate risks and successes?

* What to do in different emergency situations (cops, “good citizens”,
direct confrontation, prosceution.)

Discuss Emergency Situations Together!

Everyone should prepare for repression and emergency situations, prefer-
ably together. The book “Wege durch die Wiiste™ (Paths Thraugh the Desert)
can serve as a basis for discussion. A wide range of information is also
available from Rote Hilfe® and Ermittlungsausschuss.” Important topics
include arrests, house raids, pre-trial detention, prison, refusal to testify;
lawyers, and how trials work.

You should also discuss how to react if an injury happens. What to do
if someone is injured (lightly, moderately,or seriously)? Can people find
trustworthy doctors? One thing is clear: in an emergency, health comes
first! Remember that injuries can happen not only during actions, but also
during preparation.

tps/farchive.org/detils Weg durch.die Waeste
TP nte: Rote Hilf i a German prisoner support group.
INTE note: Esmitungsausschuss (Incesigation Commites)is 2 German legal
support group

19
4. Our Security

Traces

Let'sstart with something important—we don'twant this chapter to cause
panic! When dealing with the topic of traces, i’ casy to get the impression
that it's impossible not to leave trace. However, militant actions from the
last few years show that a lot i possible, and that successful investigations
are actually quite rare. So don't be put off and be carcfil! Knowing the
other side's capabilities and acting with caution are the most important
factors to avoid prosceution by the cops and courts.

A trace can be anything, no matter how small o inconspicuous. Every
change in the cnvironment leaves traces, so it's impossible to leave
absolutely no trace. What's important is to leave as few traces as possible,
and to make sure that they can't be linked back to you. To this end, no
expense or effort should be spared. Gloves and other action materials and
tools should always be bought new, for single use.

“The police will look for traces dircctly at the action site, on any suspects
and in the places they frequent (home, workplace, etc.) So it not enough
0 only pay attention to traces at the action site—you may also bring traces
from the action site home with you. An example is sand or soil
composition can be analyzed and identified quite precisely by forensic
laboratories. So if you bring home mud from a dirt road on the soles of
your shocs, this can prove that you walked on that dirt road. Such subtle
traces quickly become difficult to analyze. If unlucky, however,there may
be cnough of a trace left to reconstruct a connection to you, which can
then be interpreted as evidence of your involvement in an action. This is
even casicr with traces of glass or DNA, .. anything that doesn't degrade
quickly. If you deliberately leave something at the action site, you can be
sure that it will attract special attention. The same goes for action claims
sent in the mail, or if any remnants of the materials you used fall into the
hands of the police.

their

2
Securing and analyzing evidence is time-consuming and expensive. The
full repertoire of forensic gadgets is not always used. Most of the time,
the bigger the damage or the attention, the more they will invest in the
investigation.

It's also important to keep in mind that forensic methods are constantly
cvolving, and methods that were introduced recently are becoming
standardized and widely used. Precautions that we consider excessive today
may not be sufficient in the future. A good cxample of this cvolution is
DNA analysis. Thirty years ago, hardly anyone foresaw this relatively new
investigative method, which naturally meant that minimal precautions were
taken to avoid leaving DNA traces. As the example of federal prosecutor
Buback (who was shot dead by the RAF commando Ulrike Meinhof in
1977) demonstrates, with the right political pressure, traces found decades
carlicr can be re-cxamined. In this way, the State shows that it docsn't
forget, and perhaps also trics to deter today's militants

In addition to the problem that old traces can eventually be analyzed using.
new methods,these new methods can become increasingly widespread and
less expensive through their further development and standardization. The
threshold is lowering for sing DNA samples as evidence in increasingly
petty crimes on the basis of vague suspicion. The amount of genetic
material required for analysis has also been reduced.

Specific laws could also be overturncd, such as the ban on storing infor-
mation about certain physical characteristis or discases in the databascs
of the BKA” and LKA, since they alrcady allow storing information
about genctic sex.

OF course, we can only present the topic of traces in the context of today's
forensic methods. But we think it's important to take into account the
constant development of these methods, even if we can't foresce it. New
methods are often considered, discussed, and tested before they are actually

NP note: Red Asmy Faction, a West German far-left militant group founded
in 1970.

"N note: The Bundeskeiminalamt (BKA, Federal Criminal Poice Offc) s the
federa investigative police agency of Germany:

VN TP ot The Landesksiminalamt (LKA, State Criminal Police Ofc) i the State-
level police agency of Germany.

21
used. (The fact that they are then used before they are legalized is another
matter...) So we think if's important to keep an eye on these developments
and keep cach other informed by discussing them in our publications.

Phones and the Internet arc not discussed in this chapter. But just bricfly,
we think it goes without saying that phones should not be involved in
actions or their preparation. They can be used to ereate movement profiles
as well as turned into bugs. They arc full of information about you and
your contacts. Every click on the Internet leaves several traces on the
computer you are using, on the server you are accessing, and on all the
servers in between. Some of these traces can be avoided or controlled, but
that would be a whole other chapter.

‘We cannot provide a complete list of possible traces here. So it's important
that you think through all the steps yourself and consider where you may
leave traces.

“The fact that there is no such thing as 100% sccurity is used by the police
0 portray themselves as omnipotent. The evidence gathering process and
forensic investigations also have a psychological function. The point is to
use the gathered evidence to convince you that you're already found guilty.
“This is how they extort confessions. Even if the evidence is elear, it is
ofien only circumstantial and not proof of your involvement in the crime,
A convietion usually requires more than just cireumstantial evidence. So
even if the cops charge you and claim they have enough cvidence against
you, stay silent during all interrogations!

Fingerprints

Fingerprints arc a criminology classic. They come from the thin layer
of acid, grease, and dirt from our fingertips which is left on objects we
touch. Police also record the prints of the entire hand, including the palm,
Fingerprints are considered unique to an individual. When you are charged
with a erime, i's standard procedure to have your fingerprints taken for
comparison. They are still often taken with ink and paper, but seanners that
digitize them dircctly for storage in the relevant databases are becoming
increasingly popular. Meanwhile, the State has already turned its attention
to the new passport production process which makes it mandatory to

2
provide fingerprints in order to obtain a passport. It remains to be seen
how this will affect police practice. Fingerprints are stored in databascs
called AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems) in order to

compare prints from current and past cases.

The best remedy for fingerprints is to consistently avoid leaving them.
“This means not touching any objects that could fall into the hands of the
police with your bare hands to begin with,rather than relying on cleaning
them off. Fingerprints are on of the most durable traccs. They are often
left carelessly and can persist for years. Even on objects that have been
submerged in water for years, fingerprints can still be recovered under
certain conditions. Almost any material can bear fingerprints.

Other countermeasures cxist. To remove fingerprints, thorough cleaning.
with a degreasing agent (such as an alcohol-based cleaning agent) is
secommended. Glass and smooth plastic surfaces arc the casicst to clean;
it's cnough to thoroughly and intensively clean and wipe them with an
alcohol-based cleaning agent or,if used thoroughly, dishwashing soap.
When removing fingerprints from metal surfaces, it s imperative to use a
surface-altering agent such as steel wool. Fingerprints are slightly acidic,
s0 they etch into metal. Cops can make them visible again with the help
of a laser, depending on their motivation. Scratching the surfice with
steel wool or sandpaper is one of the best options. Unpainted wood can
be trcated like metal. Painted o coated wood can be treated like plastic
surfaces. Although fabrics are poor carriers of fingerprints, they can be
identified by their unique composition, and they also carry DNA. Be
carcfil what you leave behind at the action site!

If you have touched a piece of paper with your fingers, you should make
aclean copy then destroy the original, as it’s impossible to clean it. When
photocopying, you should make sure that you never dircetly touch the
copies with your hands. Since it can atract unnecessary attention to wear
gloves in a copy shop, you should simply make a few blank copies before
and after the pages you want to keep clean. Then touch the stack of paper
only from the outside and place it in something like a new folder Don't use
acopy shop where you are known. Use disguises because it may be possible
for the cops to trace which specific copier was used (the same applies to
laser printers, sec Writing Traces, p. 34). Copiers can store information on

23
what they've copicd, and this information is not overwritten by making a

few additional copes

Gloves are the simplest and safest way to avoid fingerprints. But there stll
are a few things to keep in mind—rubber gloves tear casily and fingerprints
remain on the inside and on the cuff, Thin latex gloves can cven allow
fingerprints to pass through them. One option is to wear two pairs on
top of cach other or to usc dishwashing gloves. In contrast, fabric gloves
have the advantage of being difficult to leave fingerprints on. But coarsely
woven fabric gloves can get holes, especially with repeated use, and thus
should be avoided. Fabric gloves also absorb much mor dust and DNA
traces than rubber gloves, and are virtually impossible to clean. Leather
gloves are relatively expensive and, as with all gloves, must be disposed
of after use. This is a significant disadvantage in our opinion. In general,
keep in mind that traces remain on the inside of gloves. In our opinion,
gloves that have been used during an action should always be disposed of.
“This is because traces that remain on the gloves which can be linked to 2
specific action. Gloves also leave traces of their individual profile or minor
irregularities at the action site (sce Material Traces, p. 36). During house
raids, cops are often particularly cager to find such equipment.

There are other ways to avoid leaving fingerprints, especially when wearing
gloves is not an option. One is to apply a thick layer of liquid bandage to
the fingers and let them dry. Another is to place regular band-aids around
or on the fingertips. We do not consider cither of these methods to be
particularly sceure, they are just a way to reduce the amount of traces.

A new method currently being tested in the U.S. makes it possible to
analyze the chemical composition of fingerprints. This analysis makes it
possible to identify and detect drugs, explosives and certain metabolic
products, and draw conclusions about possible “perpetrators.” The analysis
process s fast and can be done dircctly on site. Although it has not yet
been used as evidence, i’ only a matter of time.

24
DNA Traces

In recent years, DNA traces have become an increasingly important part
of dealing with repression. The repressive apparatus has a strong interest
in emphasizing both their inevitability and their lack of ambiguity.

1It'strue that DNA traces can often only be avoided with significant effort
and that they are almost impossible for us to detcet due to their near
invisibility. And they are often considered irrefutable evidence if found
at a erime scenc. How these traces got there is often hardly taken into
account. For example, a blanket used to cover a tool can carry the DNA
traces of someone who slept under it years ago.

DNA traces cannot be avoided, and under certain storage conditions they
simply do not degrade. Decades after the fact, cases arc being reopened
based on DNA evidence colleeted carlier. DNA traces are left behind by
blood, hair, saliva, urine, and skin cells. In other words, everything that
comes out of your body or falls off it. But not every trace is sufficient for
DNA comparison. Laboratory testing still requires a certain quantity of
DNA material, preferably one or more intact cells. But the technology is
becoming increasingly sophisticated.

DDNA analysis is expensive. This means that it's not ordered in every case.
Generally, the greater the political or cconomic damage, the greater the
technical effort. Though this may change in the near future. Cheaper tests
are being researched and DNA analysis may become the standard. DNA
databases have been flled for years.

1I¢'s relatively casy to determine genetic sex using DNA. To be able to
analyze the trace beyond that, the police need a comparison sample from
you.Such a sample i cither obtained during an 1D check or from personal
items such as a comb found at your workplace, during house raids, etc
There have also been instances of police forcing relatives of defendants to
give samples because their DNA is similar. You should never give samples
voluntarily. Protest and object, don't sign anything! In some cases,it has
been possible to prevent or at least delay the submission of DNA samples
with the help of lawyers.

25
Since it difficult to avoid leaving DNA traces, it's important to minimize
them, This starts with not taking a piss near your target or leaving
cigarette with spit on i, It's best not to smoke at all during an action.

Avoid hair traces by wearing caps and balaclavas. Long sleeves, even in
summer, reduce the amount of skin particles and small hairs that fall of:
A face mask helps aguinst saliva and nasal mucus.

1f you bring tools and bags with you that you have previously stored at
home, make sure they are free of not only fingerprints but also hair and
skin cclls. They can very much carry DNA. The same gocs for your clothes
and shoes. It's best to keep everything you bring to the action separated in
clean containers, such as unused garbage bags. You should avoid storing
important action materials at home. Hair from your pets can also be
traced back.

Action claims sent through the mail are often cxamined for DNA traces
on the paper, the envelope and the postage stamp. Saliva on the adhesive
surfuce of envelopes is particularly easy to analyze because it docsn't
degrade. When producing anything that could fall into the hands of the
policc, such as letters and the remains of your action materias, you should
always minimize the sk of leaving DNA traces.

Options for Creating a Clean Room

For cartain tasks, it makes sense to set up a “clean room?” that is more or
less free of DNA. This soom's fnction is both to minimize the traces you
‘might leave on an item and—to the greatest extent possible—to minimize
leaving traces in the room tself. This is certainly time consuming and not
inexpensive, but ultimately you have to make your own decisions about
how sceure you want to be. When weighing sccurity precautions, consider
not only the intensity of the action, the motivation of future investigators,
and your own security needs, but also the likelihood of an action item
flling into the hands of the authoritics. For example, you can be sure that
letters sent to the press will end up with the police sooner or later

‘The following description may scem extreme to many, and certainly not
all of the following precautions are necessary for every action. However,

in light of the rapidly developing ficld of DNA analysis, we think it's
26
important to be aware of the issues and risks involved. Choose the
precautions you feel are necessary for your action and don't be deterred!

To set up a clean room, you'll need to put on protective clothing before
entering the room for the first time to avoid leaving DNA traces in the
room. You can use coveralls (still in their unopened packaging!) from
the hardware store, which are relatively inexpensive. Put them on and
also put on an unworn balaclava—pull the hood of the coverall over it
Bathing caps arc also good for covering your hair, as they arc cven more
impermeable and your hair won't be able to poke through. Next, place
cach foot in a garbage bag and tape the bags to the legs of the coveralls
Then put on rubber dishwashing gloves and tape them to the sleeves. 1f
possible, put a mask over your mouth to block droplets of saliva, and put
on protective goggles that also cover your cycbrows. Always work in pairs
and make sure no skin is exposed.

Choose a place to work where your hair and skin cells are not already
fying around. It should also be frce of hair from a dog, cat, o other
animal companion that could be classified as your pet. For example, use
the basement or garage of friends (who are not politically active), or rent
a hotel room. Set up a clean work surface, preferably with tarp, or if you
want to be on the safe side, st up an unused tent in the room. This tent
will at least keep most traces of your work inside, and you can dispose of
it securely afterwards.

When you work, you should have different garbage bags ready and
scparate the waste according to how risky it is for you (e.g. waste from a
device component in a bag, the Ziploc packaging in another, ctc.) When
scparating waste, you should also consider which packaging has your
fingerprints on it and which docsn't. Obviously, none of these garbage
bags should be put in your houschold trash.

Be aware that working in these clothes is both sweaty and tiring, and
consider relicving cach other or sharing the work if necessary, as interrup-
tions will require you to change clothes again. Remember not to seratch
your head or face while wearing gloves. For cxample, a good division of
laboris to have one group prcpare the clean room and another group enter
it to work. Store finished components or items in new freezer bags or
Tupperware containcrs.

27
When you put on protective clothing, and at every step of the process,
think about what items your DNA traces may adhere to. For example,
if you bought something in packaging, you probably handled it without
gloves so it may have skin cells on it If you touch the packaging with clean
gloves, you can transfer DNA from the packaging to the gloves and from
there to the items you're working on. To avoid this, you must work with
alot of discipline and change your gloves several times, which is casier to
do i you wear a second pair of gloves over the taped gloves."

Artificial DNA

Artificial DNA is a new method of deterring and prosceuting theft. It
may be less relevant for the radical left at the moment, but who knows
what the future holds? Like human DNA, artifcial DNA is unique and
uniquely identifiable. It is placed in an adhesive carrier liquid that glows
purple under UV light, along with equally unique micro-platclets. The
substance can be applied to valuable objects with a brush, or buildings
can be cquipped with so-called DNA showers, The marking on objects is
permanent and resistant to normal cleaning. If you come into contact with
the substance, it willstick to you for about six weeks. This relatively new
process was introduced as a pilot project at the end of 2009 at schools in
Bremen, Germany in two residential arcas and in some petrol stations. It
has been used in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for some time.

Scent Traces

A more recent development s the collection of scent samples, as was done
during the raids on militants suspected of opposing the Heiligendamm
G8 summit in 2007. Although thesc are rather dubious, even according.
to the BAW," they could contribute to an “overall assessment”. Most
importantly,they are casier to obtain than DNA samples.

YN TP note: For more information on creating @ lean room, see “DNA You Say?
Bum Everything to Burn Longer: A Guide to Leaving No Traces”*
hetpse//notrace how/resources/fdna-you-say
NI note: Bundesanwalischaft (BAW) is a name given to Germany’s federal
prosecutor office.

2
According to scientific findings, every person has a unique and unmis-
takable scent. Even the most meticulous cleanliness and hygiene cannot
prevent this scent trace, known in technical jargon as a “human scent
signature.”

It is made up of various components, but mainly of decomposed skin
cells. People shed these every second, whether they are sitting, walking
or standing. The decomposition of skin cells by bacteria produces gascs
that can be detected by sniffer dogs with their highly sensitive noses. The
goal is to match body scents with scent traces that have been left at a

Shoeprints

Shocprints are an often underestimated potential danger. They are as
individual as fingerprints and can be used to draw conclusions about the
height, weight, gait, ctc. of the person who left them. If the shoe that
left the shocprints is found during a house raid, it can be identified with
relative certainty, depending on the quality of the prints. Traces of soil or
plant residuc left on the shoe will do the rest. It i therefore advisable to
dispose of your shoes after an action, especially if you have walked over
snow,soil .

However, shocprints don't depend only on the shoe's model, but also on
the way it's worn. All shoes worn by the same person will show the same
type of wear. If shoceprints are left in soil or snow, the police can make a
plaster cast from it. Using this cast, they can often not only identify the
shoc that left the print, but also match other shoes worn by the suspect to
the cast based on the specific wear patterns found on the cast. So don't use
old, worn shoes of yours, especially i you have to walk on soft surfaces.

If you really want to be sure, buy cheap shoes just before an action and
throw them away afterwards. However, there are bound to be DNA traces
on shoes you used, so never dispose of them near the action site.

Another way to make the cops' job more difficult is to wear socks over
your shocs. This disguises the model and profile of the shoc and can also
protect against video surveillance. But before doing this, try walking and
running with the socks on.

29
Vehicle Traces

You should think carefully about the type of vehicle used during an action.
Think about whether a car is really necessary, because it brings many risks

Cars leave behind tire tracks and, in the event of an accident, traces from
the car's paint. Traces (especially paint) from an accident can be found
both on the car and at the scene of the accident. Tire tracks and paint
chips can be used to determine the car's model, and if the car is found, to
determine whether the traces were left by this car specifically. Changing.
the tires,if possible both before and after the action, can make it more
difficult to identify the tire tracks. Simply changing the tires after the
action is not cnough, as the police may be able to compare the tire tracks
found at the action site with tire tracks outside your home or in your
garage. Also, when using a car, watch for leaking oil or fluids.

But by far the most important identifying feature of a car is its license
plate. In order to pass at least one license plate check without being pulled.
over, the car's license plate can be swapped with another. Since most of
us aren't able to manufacture license plates, you can steal them just before
the action. It's important that the car from which you steal the plate is the
same model and color as the one used in the action, because, s a standard
procedure, cops check the license plates of cars and know whether they
have been reported stolen, their color and model. If the car hasn't been
reported stolen and has the correct model and color, the ikelihood of being
pulled over is somewhat reduced. Stolen license plates will however not
pass a proper vehicle inspection.

To prepare for the risk of a vehicle inspection, you should hide your action
materials well and, if possible, not in the obvious location of the trunk.
Make sure the vehicle meets all legal standards. In Germany, don't forget
your legally required warning triangle and first aid kit

To remove a license plate, a serewdriver will usually do the trick. Try

this for the first time in a quict place where you can work without stress.
After unserewing it, you can use double-sided tape to attach the license

VN TP e I you steal a license plate from a cas, you can replace it with another,
randorm lcense plate (¢hat cannot be traced back to you). This wa, it might take longer
for the ear owner to notce the theft and report the lcense plat as solen.

30
plate to your car (watch out for rain) so it's casy to remove after the
action.* Alternatively, you can smudge or mask license plates, especially
on motorcycles, but this is conspicuous. Dealing with the license plate is
also important for countering the increasing surveillance by toll and traffic
management systems. Toll systems are sometimes used for Automatic
License Plate Recognition.

Be aware of the risk of leaving traces in the car and try to avoid this, e.g. by
packing the action materials well. In our opinion, it is almost impossible
t0 avoid leaving DNA traces in the car. Not only is a car a good carrier
of traces, but it is also casy to track if a covert location tracker has been
installed on it. The use of a car should therefore be avoided whenever
possible.

Bikes can be a good alternative. They also leav tirc tracks behind, which is
often overlooked. We therefore recommend that you do not park the bike
in the immediate vicinity of the action site. Depending on the surfices,
it may be a good idea to change the tires before and after the action,
Individual features such as brand stickers can be casily covered with tape.®
A brightly colored bike can easily be an eye-catcher. As with cars, it is
important to meet the legal requirements for bikes, cspecially when you
are out and about at night.

Tool Traces

There are many ways that tools can leave traces, and each tool i different.
Thercfore, we can only write a few basic things about the topic here. By
ool traces, we mean identifying traces on both the tool and the object the
ool i used on.

Each tool s unique and can be identified through both smallirregulasities
from its production process, and normal wear and tear. Each tool leaves

N TR note:Rather than tape, e reco
o attach the license plate to the car.

BN.T not: Covering features with tape s not ideal, a a taped up bike can look
conspicuous. In addition, many bike features (c.g.the model and shape) cannot be
concealed with tape. One solution is to steal s new bike for each setion and dispose of
it afterwards.

nd using a “magneticlicense plate holder”

31
unique traces on the object itis used on. For example, a cut sheet of paper
can be matched to a specific pair of scissors (only if the cops have the
scissors, of course). If the cops do not have the tool in their possession,
typically only the type of tool can be determined, at least for mechanical
tools which come into direct contact with the object the tool is used on.

Therefore, you should dispose of bolt cutters,screwdrivers, or whatever clse
is used in an action—get rid of any tool that came in dircet contact with
an object it was used on. Unfortunately, getting rid of the tool afterwards
s not cnough by itself. To stay with the scissors and paper example, the
cops can not only match the cut paper to a particular pair of scissors, but
also determine if separate picces of paper were cut by the same scissors. So
if you open a fence with the same bolt cutters you used to build your loft
bed, the cops will be able to determine this, cven if the tool is long gone.

“This is why it's necessary to acquire new tools for an action in order to
worlk sccurely. They don't always have to be the best and most expensive.

Consumables such as tape, ope, cable (and their remnants) can be matched
0 cach other. A small picce of cable in your home that matches a cable
in the cops' possession can be a strong piece of evidence.

‘When working with cither tape o glue, you need to be especially careful
about cleanlincss, as both collect dust and DNA traces.

Identifying traces can also be found on tools you make yourself, such as an
incendiary device, Such traces are not imited to DNA or fingerprints. For
example to determine whether the same person made separate incendiary
devices, it's often sufficient to cxamine identifying characteristics of the
way the devices were constructed. Everyone interprets and implements
a general, simple st of instructions differently. For cxample, everyone
ties knots in a particular way, tapes something differently, uses a different
construction method, and so on. The lst does not end there and identifying
characteristics cannot be completely avoided, but they can be reduced
if you are aware of them. Even taking turns within the group to build
materials for the action makes it harder for cops to attribute them to
a specific group o person—this is cven more relevant if an incendiary

VNP note: And i therefore secovered intact by the police.

32
device fils to ignite.'* Additionally, sharing the task of building materials
prevents unnceessary specialization within your group.

In the self-critical dissolution statement of the K.OM.LTEE." published
in 1995, they wrote that the cops were only able to easily attribute some
actions to them because they always used the same type of igniter for
their incendiary devices. So the decision for or against variation in device
construction has to be made consciously and contextually. This also applies
to possible variations in the chemicals used for an action and, as far as
possible, their mixing ratios. Similarly, you should not always use the
same brands or component types. In general, the simpler the igniter, the
less evidence it will leave behind. A Molotov s the casiest to keep clean,
and a chemical delay mechanism leaves fewer traces than a mechanical
or cleetrical one. Serial numbers on components can also be a problem,
especially with clectrical delays. In the mid-19805,an alarm clock used ina
RZ* action was attributed to Ingrid Strobl due to a large-scale operation
by the BKA in hardware stores. Since, according to the BKA, the RZ
always used the same model of alarm clock, the stock of this model was
given a unique serial number and everyone who bought it was filmed.
This operation resulted in two people being jailed for a long time, and the
radical left movement was thoroughly investigated in a “§1292” case."”

W therefore recommend varying the selection of means and materials,
such as alarm clocks. It is difficult to remove serial numbers from alarm
clocks because they are often located underneath fixed components.
Embossing marks in metal can be milled out, but can nonetheless be
restored by the cops because an embossing dic also deforms the metal
underneath. Embossing marks can only be permancntly removed by
embossing o chiseling over them, as this changes the structure of the
entire pice, just like the initial embossing process

VNTE note: The K.OMITE . was a German far-left m
1994 and 1995,

"N.T:P note The Revolutionie Zellen (RZ, Revolutionary Cell) were a German
far-left militant group acive from 1973 to 1995,

NT note: The term *§1294”refers o & pasagraph in the German penal code that
deals with the formation 4 terrorst association.

at group active in

33
Fire Traces

Even though you must always be prepared for the risk of an incendiary
device fling toignite and thus leaving traces, it should be noted that even
after a successful fire some traces can be analyzed. A fire leaves precise
clues about what materials were used, the type of igniter and the place
where the fire started. The police can reconstruct a lot from traces of soot,
the gases in the air at the scene of a irc,as well s how and to what extent
something was burned. Again, it is important to vary and use the simplest
possible means. Always using the same mixture of accelerant or the same
type of igniter is like leaving an autograph.

Writing Traces

Handswriting is very individual and casy to attribute on the basis of the
lincs, the dots when the pen is picked up or put down, and the amount
of pressurc applicd to the pen. Calendars, diaries, handwritten letters and
even shopping lists can be used as comparison samples. The color and ink
of the writing instrument or the composition of the pencil lcad can also
provide clucs.

Block letters are usually less identifying than cursive because many
lin characteristics are missing. Felt-tip and fiber-tip pens leave behind
identifying writing characteristics (c.g. depending on the position of the
hand o the pressure exerted when writing), but less so than, for example,
‘ballpoint or fountain pens.

Remember to always write on a firm surface, Witing presscs through the

‘material underneath. If you write on a pad of paper, you will leave leave
marks not only on the next sheet, but also on the following sheets. The

best writing surfaces are glass or metal. Of course, nothing handwritten
should be Ieft behind or published—these handwriting tips are meant to
be helpful for writing messages to cach other.

Grammar,spelling, vocabulary, regional diosyncrasies and dialect can now
be compared using computer progeams. This analysis is not as conclusive

as handwriting analysis, but it's becoming increasingly sophisticated. The
BKA has a database of extortion letters and action claims that the police

34
use for comparison. In one blackmail case, the perpetrators tried to disguise
the fact that they were native German speakers by making grammatical
mistakes, but the cops were able to detect this because the authors correctly

spelled difficult words.

‘Wiite simple sentences, avoiding unnecessary use of foreign words or jargon
from your professional feld. Vary the spelling of dates, abbreviations, and
similarly distinctive references. An investigation into the alleged members
of the “militante gruppe”™ demonstrated that the police substantially cross-
compare the content of action claims. Keywords and even slogans that
appearin other texts—even publicly signed ones—are used by investigators
to sniff in certain directions.

Proofiead your texts collectively and take turns writing them. This not only
prevents specialization, but also protects you because everyone has their
own individual writing style. In the best case scenario, the texts cannot
be directly attributed to one person. Write only the bare minimum. The
shorter the text, the less material you give the cops.

L

It's becoming more popular to use a Linux computer with a “live system”
that runs in memory. But we should briefly discuss problems with printing.
Printers leave traces, so your home printer is not suitable for anything
sensitive. At least color laser printers are known to hide their serial number
in the printed sheet. We do not know if this problem also applies to
copiers, but it should be assumed. Keep this in mind when printing
anything! The same problem exists with CD and DVD burners. They burn
the unique serial number of the device onto the CD.

SNTP noe: The militante gruppe (g, militant graup) was 3 Gers et
militant group active from 2001 to 2009

NP ote: The original PRISMA ine included several paragraphs about sendingg
action claim through the Internet is almost always a better approach. On his topic,

see the zine “How to submit an anonymous communiqué and get away with it"

*hitps:/fmotsace.how/zesousces/fhow-submit
N2 note: For more information on how printers hide information in printed
sheets, sce “Printer Tracking: Is Your Printer Spying On You?">

*hitps://notrace.howzesources/Fprinter-tracking
35

Material Traces

By material traces (also known as “trace evidence”), we mean all traces
that are unintentionally left behind on you, on your clothes or in places
you have used. Again, there is no such thing as 100% security, but we can
at least make the cops’ job more difficult.

Let's start with traces on your clothes. Though invisible to the naked cye,
there are many traces on your clothes that can't necessarily be removed by
washing them. Depending on the type of action, these traces can be used
by the cops in different ways. If you use spray paint, you can be sure that
even though you can't see it ine particles of paint will be on your clothes,
especially on your pants and shoes. The police can make these particles
glow with a special lamp which is available in every police station. These
traces of paint cannot be removed.

It'salso impossible to remove the fine glass particles that are created when
a pane of glass is broken. Unfortunately, these particles can be attributed
10 a specific pane based on the type of breakage. Again, washing clothes
is of litele help. Blood stains are also impossible to remove,

Disposing of your action clothing is often the only way to be as free of
traces as possible. A simple, inexpensive coverall from the hardware store
can help. You can take it off soon after the action and wear inconspicuous
clothing underncath. However,be sure to practice taking it off beforchand
and, if necessary, cut the bottom of the pant legs a lttle so you can get it
over your shocs. Under no circumstances should you dispose of it near the
action site,as it is sure to contain at least some traces of your DNA. We
have already covered the topic of shoes and shocprints.

Any clothing you wear will leave traces on your body. This is especially
important if you are wearing gloves, as the cops will be able to tell that
you were wearing gloves, and which ones, by looking for traces of fibers
under your ingernail, for example. Disguises such as beards and wigs also
leave traces. Although it's almost impossible to prevent this, you should be
avare that even after changing clothes and putting some distance between
yourself and the action site, you will not be completely free of traces, and
You may have left traces of fabric behind.

36
Itis important to not wear anything with buttons that could get lost, and
to avoid long scarves or clothing with fringes. Not only will they hinder
your escape, but fabric can easily be left behind at the action site.

If you come into contact with gasoline during the action or while building
adevice, you should be aware that the scent is almost impossible to remove,
which may be a problem if you are stopped by the police. Be careful not
to spill accelerant on your skin or clothing when throwing a Molotov: The
problem here is your own sense of smell—your nose develops a certain
tolerance to a smell after being exposed to i for a long time, and you will
1o longer be able to tell if you smell like a small gas station.

1 this is the case, and for example if they are investigating an arson, the
police may put your hands in plastic bags so that they can later analyze
whatever traces were on them. This i especially true for traces of gunshot
residue that are eftafter firing a gun. Smoke residue tests are now also used
to determine if an arrested demonstrator shot a fircwork or if someone
set fire to a car with firlighter cubes. Traces of smoke often remain even
after washing, which is another reason to dispose of your gloves.

Making action materials can also leave traces. I you work with powdered
substances, you must assume that both your workspace and your clothes
will be full of them. As far as we know, it's impossible to completely clean
aworkspace such that nothing is found by chemical forensic methods. So
if you want to be on the safe side, your home should not be used for this
type of work. Instead, use places which scem safe and cannot be traced
back to you (i.c. not places linked to the radical left), such as abandoned
buildings. Wherever you end up working, you should be careful to avoid
leaving behind any fingerprints, DNA traces, or picces of wire, no matter
how small

Purchases

You should be especially carefil when shopping. Buy only one item at a
time in a store. Pay with cash, not a eredit o debit card. Destroy your
seceipts. Think carcfully beforchand about what you are going to buy and
where, and perhaps test the store with something inconspicuous to fecl
it out.

37
Large stores with lots of customers allow for some anonymity; but usually
have surveillance cameras. Sometimes the footage is deleted after 48
hours. Take advantage of this and plan ahead, but don't rely on it. Its
always better to shop a reasonable amount of time before an action. This
way, you won't be in a hurry and get carcless if something isn't available.
Small stores have the advantage that they often don't have surveillance
cameras, but cashiers can be very good at remembering who they sold
what and when,

Small disguises can go a long way to make you unrecognizable. From non-
prescription glasses to fake beards, wigs, colored contact lenses and hair
dyes, from suits to jogging outits, there are no limits to the imagination,
Even theatrical makeup or latex masks can be uscful. However, you should
feel comfortable in your disguise and appear normal and inconspicuous

If possible, always buy everything in packaging. Ask for a bag, the cashier
will often pack your purchases for you. In winter, it can be inconspicuous to
shop with (unused!) gloves. If gloves are too conspicuous you can use liquid
bandage to somewhat reduce fingerprints (sce Fingerprints, p. 22), but
this docsn't completely prevent them, and you will still leave DNA traces.

Do not go shopping with your car o motoreyele. Of course, you should
also leave your mobile phone at home. The same precautions apply when
shopping as when doing reconnaissance at the action site. I you do actions
frequently,vary which storcs and brands you usc,as wellas the time periods
and days of the wek you buy certain items. Sometimes it's worth traveling
a bt further away or even to the next town. Make sure it isn't possible to
determine where you live based on your purchases.

For specialty parts, come up with a story that explains why you need them
for legal reasons. Do your rescarch beforchand. Also prepare a story for
small talk with other shoppers,just in casc. Some chemicals require your
signature. Practice fake signature and use block letters for forms. Bring
a felt-tip pen (sce Witing Traces, p. 34).

38
A Few Research Tips

When you prepare for an action, you leave behind not only material traces,
‘but digital ones as well. Here arc a few basic procedures for doing rescarch
in preparation for an action.”

“The books you order or borrow from a library can be traced back to you,
and the cops check the library accounts of suspects. Avoid libraries at all
costs. Some libraries are also under video surveillance. [..] Leave your
mobile phone at home when doing reseasch.

Remember that Internet cafes often have surveillance cameras, so try to
avoid them.[...] You should be aware that even in cafes without cameras,
staff may still be able to remember you. Try to wear disguises and be as
inconspicuous as possible. Remember that your fingerprints can also be
found on cash you handled, at least for a short time.

Technical Surveillance

Originally published in Repression und Widerstand
(Repression and Resistance). With small additions from
the editors of the original PRISMA zine.

What technical capacities are used for surveillance? And how can we counter
them?

TP note: Tn the original PRISMA zine, this section assumed that you would
do reseasch for an action using a public computer at an Internet cafe or a similsr
location. We advise against this, and therefore omitted most of the original section
i this ranslation. From “How to submit an anonymous communiqué and get away
with i€

“The geners recommendation for most people is o use s pessonsl computer
thati only for Tail,on public WAFi. ...] Public computers themselves could
be compromised at the hardhware level or through intention collsboration
betuween their owner-operatorsand aw enforcement,and this could be almost
mpossible to detect.”

*hitps//motrace.how/resousces/fhow-submit

39
‘We've all seen it in spy movies: bugs in lamps and cameras behind one-
way mirrors in 1960s thrillers. Or the modern operations centers in more
recent movies that can lsten in on every phone call within seconds and
track everyone via satellte surveillance.

“The reality is somewhere between these two portrayals. Not every police
force has access to the same technical equipment (and trained personnl),
and will only request it if the associated costs can be justificd with
an appropriate threat scenario or scrious “crime” that has already been
committed.

Nevertheless,the State’s intercst in prosecution and eriminalization should
not be underestimated. Police and intelligence agencies will ry to justify
the purchase and maintenance of expensive cquipment by using it as
frequently as possible.

This text explains the current technical capacities of police and intelligence
agencies (as of 2006). The most effective countermeasures are very simple
and can be implemented without detailed technical knowledge: meet
in places where surveillance is highly unlikely and do not use risky
communication channels (phone, mail) for political purposes.

Monitoring Enclosed Spaces

All of the instruments available for monitoring enclosed spaces have
two major disadvantages: they require advance preparation and they are
relatvely expensive.

Bugs

Of all the lstening methods described here, bugs provide the best sound
quality. Depending on what they are used for, they can be very small
(2-3 millimeters thick), but can also be the size of a sugar cube or even
a matchbox. They are almost indistinguishable from other clectronic
components and are sometimes camouflaged, i.c. permanently installed
in other objects, rooms or vehicls.

Preferred places to install bugs are electrical outlets, light switches, indline
phones and other clectrical devices that are continuously supplied with

40
power. If necessary, holes are drilled in furniture to place microphones as
close as possible to the people speaking.

Bugs can eavesdrop on conversations within a radius of about 10 meters.
One bug is enough to monitor a room of about 100 square meters
Depending on it battery, bug can operate between several weeks (button
cell) and several months (9 volt battery). Of course, bugs thatare connected
to an electrical source or a phone cable will “live” longer.

Bugs with built-in radio transmitters arc among the larger variants and.
can reach radio ranges of several hundred meters or up to two kilometers,
depending on the building.2* Electrical and phone lines can also be used

to transmit the intercepted conversations.

Special microphones hidden in landline phones or their jacks can be
remotely activated and listencd to,

Countermeasures against bugs:

Of course, anyone can search for bugs themselves. Special bug detectors
are available for purchase at different price ranges, and services can also be
hired. Professional bug hunters charge lot of money. And they usually
have a history as intelligence agents, military personnel, or police officers,
and will therefore be wary of fouling their nests.

If you find bugs it's proof that a bugging operation took place, but there's
no guarantce that there aren't more hidden microphones which haven't
been found.

Playing music, tapes of other conversations, or the radio docs not help
prevent bugging. Modern technology can casily ilter out individual voices.

Special audio jammers can help. The noise they produce is barely audible
to the human car, but prevents the recording of conversations. They also
help against the other cavesdropping capabilities described below and are
available from around 500 euros.

NP moter As of 2025, it appeass that the majority of bugs used by police
and intellgence agencics that remotely transmit theie recordings do so throvugh the
mobile phone netveork. Those bugs can transmit theie recordings as long as they can
communicate with cell towes.

a1
If you really want to be on the safe side, you should generally refrain from
mentioning important dates, places and actions and instcad use pen and
paper and then destroy what you've written.

8]

Stethoscapes

Rooms can be listened to from the outside using electronic stethoscopes.*
These devices can amplify the smallest sound waves that pass through
‘walls, doors, and water pipes up to 40,000 times to make them audible.
“This can be prevented by audio jammers cquipped with special contact
resonators.

Window Panes Vibrations

‘The noise generated in a room causes the window panes to vibrate slighly.
Using an invisible infrarcd laser, these vibrations can be measured at
a distance of up to 200 meters and converted back into sound waves,
Complete systems (ransmitters and receivers disguised as cameras,
amplifiers, and noise filtrs) are available for less than 10,000 euros and
are therefore likely to be used relatively frequently

The drawbacks of this technology are that there must be a line of sight
103 window in the room being monitorcd, and that the results are rather
poor for double-panc windows.

Video Surveillance

Cameras with built-in radio transmitters can be as small as a matchbox,
And the lenses of such cameras are barely larger than pinheads and can
be camouflaged very effectively. For example, they can be hidden behind
sickers or disguised as Phillips-head screws. Completely camouflaged
systems are also available in the form of smoke detectors, desk lumps, and
other everyday objects

These special cameras can capture footage of very high quality. Their
operating time and radio range are comparable to those of acoustic bugs.

SN.TR not: Contact microphones* can also be used for the same purpose

*hitps:/fen.vwikipedia.org/iki/Contact_microphone.
42
Cameras can be found with bug detectors i they are equipped with radio
transmitters.

Phane Surveillance

In 2004, more than 30,000 phone surveillance orders were issued in
Germany to investigate criminal offenscs. In more than 60 percent of
the cases, the conversations of uninvolved people were tapped, while
the conversations of suspects accounted for just under 40 percent. These
figures do not include wiretaps by intelligence agencics or preventive police

Internationally, Germany is considered the world champion in wirctapping,
and the numbers are increasing every year. In December 2005, the new
federal government announced that it would revise the related legal
regulations by mid-2007 (under pressure from the Federal Constitutional
Court).

According to the law, anyone whose phone has been tapped must be
informed after the investigation is completed, but this rarcly happens.

“The high rate of cases of phone surveillance comes from the fact that it is
one of the easicst surveillance measures to carry out—they simply obtain
a court order and notify the relevant phone company. All calls to the
targeted phones are then redirccted to another number or voicemail for
‘monitoring. Because all the equipment used is digital, there s no telltale
crackling or hissing.

‘The phone companies do not record calls without a court order. However,
all call metadata is recorded—the exact details of when and for how long
the call was made and to which number This metadata can be crucial to
police investigating crimes that have alrcady been committed. For example,
it can provide a basis for identifying social connections in a scenc, or help
prove the existence of an alleged criminal association.

The BEV* and forcign intelligence agencies are constantly listening to
as many phone lines as possible for tellale keywords. This surveillance is

T note: The Bundesamt fir Verfassungsschutz (BEV, Federal Ofice fr the
Protection o the Consitution)is Germany's federal domestic inteligence agency.

3
fully automated with the help of sophisticated voice recognition software.
“This software is capable of linking information together to create patterns
of meaning. Conspicuous conversations are stored and then manually
analyzed. Itis highly likely that voice recognition will also make it possible
to identify somebody with a recording of their voice.

All international calls are intercepted. Intelligence agencies will almost
certainly intercept all satellite calls

The most advanced interception system of this kind is operated by the
English-speaking intelligence agencies under the name *Echelon”. The US
National Sccurity Agency (NSA) alone employs about 28,000 people for
this purpose and is able to record and analyze a large portion of Internet
communications.

There is relatively close cooperation between intelligence agencics, cspe-
cially when laws make it difficult to surveil onc’s own country.

Landline Phones and Fax Machines

Landline phones can also be tapped dircctly without the help of phone
companies. Bugs in the phone, in the wall socket, in the house switch box
or in the distribution box on the street are relatively easy to install.

Fax connections are intercepted in the same way. “Dumb” phones make
their job even casier—their signals can be intercepted and decoded from
just outside the home.

Publc Payphones and Phone Cards

It also possible to monitor all phone calls made with a phone card from
public payphones. To do this, the cops make the operator transmit all
connection data for this specific phone card number.

Mobile phones

Mobile phones can be tapped with the help of phone companics. And
they offer additional attack vectors for investigators: they can be used to
determine the user's location, their communications can be intercepted
by IMSI-catchers, and they can be infected with malware.

44
L7

Countermeasures

“There is not much that can be done to prevent landline and mobile phone
calls from being tapped.2* At best, it would be possible to use coded
language when making calls But s safer o avoid phone communications
altogether when dealing with sensitive content, .. to avoid scheduling
mectings and demonstrations by phone.

It's best not to bring a mobile phone to demonstrations and other political
events. If you still need a phone, it's best to get a second device with an
empty contact list, call log, and SIM card, used only in such “insecure”
situations.

Mobile phones should be left at home before anyone leaves for a mecting
or event. Especially if it takes place in a location you don't normally

frequent

By the way,caller ID suppression i ineffective when the police are involved.

Postal Service

Letters can be scanned with X-rays, which makes it casier for the snoopers
to decide whether the mail is worth opening. Wrapping the mail contents
in aluminum foil prevents cffective scanning, which probably makes the
package really eyc-catching. Letters can also be opened with steam.

7N TR o The original PRISMA zine ncluded a longer section on mobile phones,
For more information sbout mobile phones, see AnarSec’s guide *Kill the cop in
your pocket”*
“hetpse//anarsec guide/posts/nophones
T note: To prevent phone communications from being tapped, you can use
smaephones with end-to-end encrypted messaging applications. For more information,
see AnarSec's guide *Encryped Messaging for Anarchists”»

*hitps:/fanassec guide/posts/edee
45
Vehicles

The Global Positioning System (GPS) makes it possible to determine
position with a precision of a few meters. The system has been operated.
by the U.S. military since the carly 1990s and currently consists of 28
satelltes, 4 of which are accessible at any given time. In 2000, the artificial
inaccuracy introduced for civilian GPS devices was removed. Since then,
GPS has been used in applications like car navigation systems, and by
police and intelligence agencies for monitoring vehicles.

GPS trackers can be smaller than a matchbox and determine their position
about every 10 seconds. Depending on the model, this data is stored
ocally or sent by radio (usually through the mobile phone network) to
the monitoring agency where it can be displayed over city maps.

GPS trackers can be easily attached to the underside of cars using magnets
or glue. In rare cases, they can be noticed by a buzzing or humming sound
when the car radio i tumed on.

In addition to GPS trackers, smaller radio trackers (15 x 35 mm with 2 15
cm antenna) are also used, and require significantly less power, Thanks to
their small size, these transmitters can be installed in bicycles and smaller
portable objects. However, they do not transmit position data. A recciver
can only determine the dircction the signal is coming from. This makes it
casicr to tail someonc, for example.

OF course, all bugs that can be used in buildings can also be used in
vehicles. Preferred locations for the installation of such devices are the
interior side panels and the roof of the car. The lights built into the roof
can provide a power supply.

In Germany, there are growing calls for the mandatory installation of
so-called accident data recorders (ADR). These “black boxes” store all
important data, especially speeds and distances, which are intended to
be used to reconstruct accidents, but are of particular value to the police
during investigations. They are standard in U, cars. In Europe they are
used in rental cars and in some car modcls.

46
Public Space

With the help of modern surveillance technology, police and intelligence
agencics arc often closer to what is happening in public than their targets
would like them to be. Binoculars, night vision devices, and dircetional
microphones can be used to listen to, photograph and film conversations
from a significant distance. Therefore, outdoor meetings should be planned
and conducted with at least as much care as indoor meetings

Directional Microphones

Small and handy, they can pick up conversations from 50 to 200 meters
away, depending on the model and the line of sight. They amplify only
the frequency range of the human voice and can therefore also be used in
noisy environments such as pubs.

It's not possible to listen into closed rooms (through windows or walls)
with directional microphones (although this is possible with other tools
such as stethoscopes),

Binoculars

Portable binoculars can elearly identify faces up to a distance of about
one kilometer, Cameras attached to these binoeulars can be used to take
photos and videos.

Night Vision Devices

Residual light amplifiers make it possible to sce in partial darkness by
amplifying the existing weak light.

“True” night vision devices work in total darkness by illuminating the
surrounding environment with infrared radiation. This light s invisible to

ye. The night vision device displays it in black and white. Since
infrared radiation penctrates fog better than light, these devices can be
used in poor weather conditions. More advanced night vision devices use
millimeter wave radiation instead of infrarcd radiation and can therefore
also sce through thin walls.

Thermal imaging devices operate without the need for residual light or
an astificial source of infrarcd radiation. They graphically display the heat

a7
given off by the objects they observe and are used, for example, to check
the insulation of houses. During the Castor rail blockades, these camerss
were used from the air to locate people hidden in open arcas and forests.
They can also be used to detect recent changes to the ground. However,
heavy rain, fog, or blowing snow can limit their effectiveness.

Fixed Surveillance Cameras

An increasingly dense network of fixed surveillance cameras is being
installed in Germany, with the aim of increasing security in strcets, squares,
and public transport. In train stations and airports in particular, almost
every square meter is covered by video surveillance. The number of cameras
installed in subways and buses is also growing.

The footage from surveillance cameras i usually displayed live on monitors
(eg-in control centers) and also stored for later review. Both color and
black-and-white cameras are used, but black-and-white cameras are more
sensitive to light and can be easily combined with infrared systems.

“There are two trends in video surveillance:

+ Automatic License Plate Recognition works virtually fawlessly and
is already used in truck tolling systems. These systems also record the
Ticense plates of cars that arc not subject to tolls. Both the license
plate and the driver arc photographed. So i it's not possible to avoid
toll cameras, you should make sure that at least the passengers are
not recognizable in the photos. For example, you can fold down the
sun visors and tilt them to obstruct the view from the cameras.

+ Several major German cities plan to go much further. They want
to sctup systems that specifically scarch for wanted license plates.
Hamburg has already adapted is police law to use mobile surveillance
cameras for this purposc.

RFID Chips.

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) chips are used in applications
like car keys,ibrary books,tickets for the World Cup,and to track animals,

N TP nte: From the mid-1990s onwasds, many anti-nucleas protests in Germany,
luding rail blockades, were dirccted against transports of radioactive waste called
“Castor”

48
‘The integration of these chips into credit cards and new passports is
concerning. Another application being discussed is car license plates with

RFID chips.

In supermarkets, RFID chips are intended to eventually replace today's
barcode price tags. At the checkout,all items will be automatically identified
by radio. The RFID chips arc then marked as *paid” but can stillbe read.

To read RFID chips, a “reader” interacts with them wirclessly via radio
waves, and the chips send back the requested data. RFID chips can be

rewritten several times with different data,

The commonly used “passive” RFID chips do not require their own power
supply: They draw their power from the radio waves they reccive and are
connected to long, usually helical antennas. The range of most of these
chips is from a few centimeters to several meters.

“The main problem with RFID chips s that the owner has no control over
what information s requested and retricved via these chips, when, and by
which “reader.”

Depending on the design of the chips, the police could determine a
person's identity by radio at any time without them noticing or being able
to prevent it. It would be possible to sce which debit card they have and
that they have just purchased certain products (or are carrying products
that are not marked as “paid for”). Horror scenarios such as “scanning”
entire demonstrations or “sensitive” locations arc also conceivable

Fortunately, there are simple and effective countermeasurcs against this
type of spying: RFID chips wrapped in aluminum foil completely stop
working. Separating the millimeter-sized chips from their larger antennas
also renders them uscless.

Databases

Virtually all companies want to collect as much data as possible about
their customers. Customers have only limited control over this collection,
and even when very strict legal regulations exist, in practice they are not
enforced. And the data protection regulations can be overridden by a
customer signature.

49
These databases don't just store data on all transactions (purchascs,
orders), complaints, information requests, etc. With the help of appro-
priate software, reasonably aceurate customer profiles are also ereated, by
“residential area’, “number of phone conncctions per house” and similar
publicly available data. The next time someone calls a company, this can
determine whether they arc put through immediately or put on hold.

In addition, various “data brokers” offer data for sale that they could not
have obained legally.

Even if very few of these corporate data collections are direetly “tapped”
by surveillance authorities, they can be stolen by hackers,for example, and
possibly end up with the police as part of an investigation.

Typically, police and intelligence agencies have a much greater interest in
the following types of customer data:

* Bank and credit card accounts: They provide information about moncy
movements. Using debit and eredit cards also generates information
about transactions, including their cxact time and place.

+ Libraries and mail-order bookstores: This can reveal the political
interests of individuals and is therefore highly relevant to mass
surveillance. Amazon has already been forced by ULS. authorities to
hand over its user data.

- Of similar importance arc the semi-legal file-sharing networks that
allow downloading movies and music. The only difference here s that
users of those networks usually do not leave any personal information
other than their IP address.

* Membership lsts of political and religious commaunities, and martial
arts schools and clubs,

+ Air and rail travel: The names of all passengers on flights to the US.
are submitted to ULS. authoritics. Depending on the potential threat
posed by such passengers, several airplanes have been forced to turn
back or land in Canada. Depending on the “threat situation’ and the
government, such surveillance can also be implemented in Germany
and other European countrics

Security countermeasures are not straightforward when it comes to data
collection. OF course, we all have bank accounts and need to withdraw

50
money from ATMs from time to time. But if you don't want to leave
too much of a trail, you should be extremely carcful about giving out
personal information and as much as possible avoid ordering things online
or paying by card. Cash payments leave the fewest traces.

Biometrics

Biometricsis a branch of science concerned with the collection and analysis
of physical and behavioral characteristics of living beings. When applicd
to humans, the focus is on computer-aided identification (“Who is this
person?”) and authentication (“Is this person who they say they arc?”). In
practice, this is intended to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining
access to rooms or systems to which they shouldn't have access, even if they
have stolen or otherwise acquired PIN or passwords. The characteristics
used include an individual's body size, iris and retina, fingerprints, facial
geometry, handwriting, DNA, voice, git, o even typing behavior on

keyboards

Most o these methods are tilin the testing phase; heir results are cither
100 inaccurate or too complicated to use in practice. Currentlyiris, retina,
fingerprint, and facial recognition systems are the most common. There
are currently very few such systems in the public sector. Examples include
the Hannover 200, where visitors with an annul pass are admitted using
a facial recognition system, or the Frankfurt airport, where travelers can
pass through border control with an irs scan (in conjunction with their
passport).

Facial recognition systems measure the relative distances between the cyes,
nose and mouth, usually stasting from the eyes. To be correctly identified,
a person must be facing forward, still, and very close to a camera (and
their face must have been previously filmed or photographed from the
front, measured, and then storcd in the relevant system). There are already
attempts at 3D recognition, i.c. the ability to recognize faces from any
angle,but these are not yet ready for practical use.”

N TR te: As of 2025, fcil rcogition systemscan recognize fces from diffrent
angles.

51
In addition to access control, the automatic identification of wanted
persons with the help of publicly installed surveillance cameras is an
aspirational and advertised goal.

Allattempts to do so have failed due to the high frequency of alse positives.
It's not possible to cstimate how long it will take before these systems can
automatically identify wanted suspects in real time. I¢'s also possible, for
cxample, to manually “eut out” faces from photos of demonstrations and
have them identificd automatically.

A relatively simple trick to prevent this (or unwanted facial recognition
in general) is to wear sunglasses or a low-cut baseball cap.”*

E-passport

Following an EU decision, since November 2007 German passports
contain biometric data. As of November 2007, this involves two finger-
prints. This data (as well as most other passport data) is stored enerypted.
on a newly introduced RFID chip. You can find out what data is stored.
from the passport authorities.

The new passport is touted as being extremely forgery-proof. As with
all RFID chips, there i a risk of unnoticed reading. To prevent this, the
chip only transmits after the “standard” passport data have been read. The
seader tels the chip that it knows this data, and the chip then makes itsclf
readable.

Docsn't sound bad at first, at least if you trust the technology created
by the State and its compliance with the law. If this trust is lacking, you
can shield the chip (with aluminum foil or a protective cover that can be
purchased). In principle, the chip can also be destroyed, e.g.in a microwave:
Put the passport in, sct the microwave at its lowest level, and switch it on
very briefly (shorter than briefly). The passport remains valid even if the
chip is not working (but only the chip—burned holes in the cover are bad,
of course).

TP note: As of 2025, weasing sunglasses or & low-cat bascball ap does not
nccessrlly prevent fcial ecogaition. On this topc, sce the text “How To Prevent
Facial Recognition Technology From Identifying You'.*

*hitps://notsace.how/cesources/ Fprevent-fucial-recogition

52
Surveillance Cameras

Imagine: the cops end up arresting Anna™ near a smashed police station,
Anna is found not guilty because she was wearing a mask (of coursel),

For our own security, when we do reconnaissance, carry out a clandestine
action, and leave the action site, we must make sure that no surveillance
cameras are recording us. Sometimes they are very small and hidden,
sometimes they are large and obvious or installed as a deterrent. The
latter is unfortunately not always the case, especially when police and
intelligence agencies have installed them for surveillance purposes. Their
number has increased in recent years and will continue to do so. However,
we shouldn't let this deter us from doing what needs to be done, but
rather we should increase our knowledge—about their proliferation, their
technical capabilities, and how we can render them harmless.

Where Can You Find Them?

(Almost) always in places considered sensitive to the State, such as banks,
cmbassies, ministrics, warchouses, the homes of high-ranking individuals,
and corporate headquarters. Often and increasingly at train stations, on
trains and buses, in front of garages, driveways, parking lots, and st
entrances, where they sometimes also record the sidewalks. Internet cafe

and sometimes even copy shops are often monitored by cameras. Targeted
camera surveillance of public places is still very controversial and therefore
exists only in isolated cases and with media attention. Entrances to well-
known places of the radical left, autonomous social centers or squats are
monitored as inconspicuously as possible and usually not continuously, if
they are monitored at all. However, individual cases of continuous camera
surveillance over many years have been revealed during political trial. Its
certainly worth obscrving the windows opposite the entrances of such
places (even at a very oblique angle). The BfV sometimes rents apartments
for this purpose. Normal tenants have also been asked to make their

“N.TB nte: The name “Anna”is 3 eference to a slogan of the German radical lef
encouraging people to not give statements to the police, “Anna und Arthu haltens
Maul® Gna and Arthu keep their mouths shut)

53
windows available for a surveillance camera. A secondary entrance and
exit, via courtyards or rooftops, may therefore be useful. Of course, cumeras
can be installed there as well

Recordings made with mobile phones arc increasingly becoming another
source of danger. They can be used to ilm or photograph people in locations
that are far away from any buildings. We also shouldn't forget the police
who are constantly recording at demonstrations. Journalist footage or
private recordings can also be scized by the police.

What Can They Do and How Can They Be Recagnized?

Several books could be filled with information on camera types and
applications, but a rough overview will suffice here. Surveillance cameras
record in different ways depending on the application. As a deterrent,
sometimes only fake cameras or “You are being recorded”signs arc installed
without a device actually being present. If the recordings arc meant to be
used toinvestigate possible crimes,they are not only displayed on monitors
but also saved. Saved recordings can later be viewed remotely or accessed
via the Internet. All of these variants can be wireless or wired.

Interms of camera types, there are large, highly visible cameras that are
prefrrcd for deterrence. These are the traditional box cameras, box-shaped
long-range infrared cameras or the large versions of dome cameras. Small
to medium-sized pen cameras (round, pen-shaped), small dome cameras
or mini cameras are used as recognizable but more inconspicuous, discreet
cameras. And, of course, there arc hidden cameras: very small mini cameras
(e.g-integrated almost unnoticeably in doorbells, on front doors or gates),
and cameras that arc completely disguised in clocks, behind one-way
windows, in motion detectors or smoke detectors.

All camera types can be cquipped with various functions: zoom, pan and
rotate, extra wide radius, night vision. They vary in their sensitivity to ight,
type of focus (variable or fixed), and image resolution. With high resolu-
tions, people or license plates can be recognized and identified. So-called
“intelligent cameras,” which recognize previously stored characteristics

of people, such as eye-mouth-nose distance,iris or gait, and then sound
an alarm, are not yet in use in Germany. In general, the latest technology

54
is not used everywhere, but it tends to get better and cheaper. The type
of camera and its capabilities cannot be identified at strcet level, o only
roughly So your asscssment of a camera type can be based on the location
and the level of surveillance you think is likely there.

What Can We Do About Them?

We can choose our routes and targets so that no surveillance cameras
record us. But we can also try to outwit them: hold something in front of
the camera if it isn't mounted too high (e.g. an umbrella, cardboard, or
even just a bag placed over the lens). Spray paint the lens or apply paint
with paint sprayers or eggs flled with paint, apply stickers o cut the cables
(be carefl, always use insulated tools!). Stones or hammer blows will also
help if you are well masked or not positioned in the camera's field of view.
Though it's easy to make mistakes in this regard as some cameras have a
wider range than is appaent from the outside. Sometimes i’s enough to
wear clothing that conceals your body shape, such as a garbage bag, or to
puta rain cover over your bike to obscure it (when the camera is far away).
Afterwards, you should dispose of your clothes and, of course, not use your
everyday clothes in which you may have already been photographed. We
recommend reversible jackets, masks, umbrellas, or placing cushions and
pillows under your clothes that change the shape of your body. Beards,
wigs, paint on your face, or picces of apple in your checks can also change
your face. However, aways consider whether the circumstances allow you
to be a little sloppy with the (possible) cameras! If in doubt, don't do it,
rather than put yourself at unnecessary risk!

Physical Surveillance

Originally published as Tausend Augen (d Thousand Eyes)
in part 2 of issuc 153 of the German magazine radikal.
‘The comment in square brackets is from the editors of

the original PRISMA zine.

55
[This text is a bit old, but still quite relevant. It will be clear to anyone
who has walked down a busy street that mobile phone technology has
evolved...]

Eyes starc out of windows everywhere you go... A car rolls slowly past
you, two young guys sitting in it, watching you out of the corner of their
eyes.... Another car has been parked in front of your door for days.... The
phone suddenly crackles in a way it didn't before... A satellite antenna
has recently been installed on the house across the street, pointing dircctly
at you... A helicopter has been fiying over your strect a lot latcly..
Someone has asked for you.... Beyond the blue summer sky; a spy satellite
orbits and photographs you fifty times per second as you walk through
deserted strects....

“The scason is called PARANOIA.

All of us who are close to anti-authoritarian ideas (nd hopefully actions)
are familiar with this time of year. Many of us have experienced various
forms of repression in our years of political activity: the police baton at
demonstrations,investigations, rial,raids,prison. Although these dircetly
experienced patterns and forms of repression can be somewhat demystified
over the years itis abways frightening how little we collectively learn from
these experiences. New campaigns for refusing to testify in police stations
and during trial continue to be necessary,and people stillfeel helpless when
caught in the thorns of the court and prison apparatus, often repeating
the same old mistakes. There are piles of texts on all kinds of repression,
but it makes a big difference whether you experience something yoursclf
or just read about it.

What is truc of dircct, overt experiences of repression is all the more true
of the more covert forms. The radical left knows a lot about the apparatuses
of s enemics, or at least has theorctical knowledge, but in practice takes
them into account rather sloppily.

The subjective fecling of being threatencd often determines one's actions:
“Nothing will happen’—“What could they possibly want’—“T'l be
carcful’—*Afier all they don't have my fingerprints yet’—*Why would
they be interested in me?” But also: “I'm surrounded”—*Nothing works
anymore’—*I¢'s better if I stop being active—*Everything is surveilled
anyway"—*Orwell's '1984' has been surpassed long ago.”

56
On the other hand, some people apply general principles to avoid needing
to precisely evaluate a particular situation: never talk in your own home,
especially not over the phone, keep no written documents,etc.

“This text s intended to shed some light on the shadows of surveillance. It
has two main objectives. Firstly, learning and knowing the methods of the
enemy means being able to fight them! Sccondly, down with paranoia!

We are aware that dealing with this topic in detail may stir up
of paranoia. Those reading this text should keep in mind that e

thing
described here is an exceptional situation, perhaps comparable to airplanc
travel: before takeoff, instructions are given on the use of life jackets, and.
everyone should be familiar with how to use them, but they are only used
in very few exceptional cases. And hardly anyone will think about life
jackets throughout the entire flight.

When we talk about surveillance in this text, we mean the targeted
surveillance of specific individuals. We will not go into detail about the
everyday snooping that affects a scenc in general, such as collecting scene
publications and posters or hanging around in the relevant bars and public

mectings.

First, a Few Basic Rules When It Comes to Physical
Surveillance

A surveillance operation s planned and organized. It requircs some
effort if it is to be useful: preparation, personnel, vehicles, technical aids,
coordination. Most surveillance has no political motivation and is carried
out against threats such as organized crime, burglasies, ctc

There are various forms of surveillance. They can be categorized as follows
(the terms are chosen by us): surveillance of a specific place, object, person,

In the case of surveillance of a place, the surveillance operators it ina static
location (in a house, car, etc.) and do not move from there. For example,
they may be exclusively interested in who enters a certain building, or
whether something is hidden in the bushes somewhere. Such surveillance
s very difficult or even impossible to detect.

57
Surveillance of an object is a variation of the frst form. It involves kecping
an eye on a specific object, such as a car or a parcel of money. To do this,
the surveillance operators have to be mobile.

In the case of surveillance of a person, the firs two forms can be combincd.
For example, by monitoring the target's home with cameras (static
surveillance), and otherwise tailing the target (mobile surveillance). In
some cases, tracking devices may be used, or the operators may set up at
fixed locations that a target must pass. Surveillance may end in an arrest,
or it may have no noticeable conscquences at all, except that the sceurity
authorities hold onto everything they have recorded.

The reason for the first three forms of surveillance is usually a police
investigation or something similar by the intelligence agencies and the
BEV. The tightening of sccurity laws cnables the cops to surveil you even
outside of an ongoing investigation.

Surveillance of an arca is aimed at gaining information about the move-
‘ments of various people. Against political targets, this type of surveillance
operation attempts to create movement profiles for the scene. This is
usually done in the run-up to important political events and may or may
not be based on a specific investigation.

All forms of surveillance can also be carried out overtly. The purpose of
overt surveillance is cither to make the target nervous to sce how they
seact,or to find someone to target in the first place by sceing how different
people react. Overt surveillance is clearly recognizable as such. They'll
show up at your doorstep or even call you to say they're there. But take
note: if you detect a surveillance operation, it doesn't necessarily mean
that itis overt surveillance! The operators are not always as skilled as we
might assume.

I¢'s very asy to surveil someone who is oblivious. It's very difficult to
surveil somcone who expects to be surveilled.

The amount of effortinvested in a surveillance operation depends on many
different factors. Priorities must be set: what is more or less promising at
the moment? What is politically desirable, whether for the government,
the local authorities, or the different factions within the sccurity apparatus?
Whatis even feasible?

58
on among agencies as to who should or can do what. If
one agency fecls it is being interfered with in some way by another, this
can lead to a reduction in the willingness to work. Although budget cuts

and staff shortages impact police and intelligence agencies much less than
other domains, it still does to some extent. It also a matter of what other
important cases are in progress which should not or cannot be put on the
back burner.

“The surveillance apparatus is a sluggish public service system with a lot
of peaple who don't really care about their job. Success i often achieved
not by brilliant ideas or particularly dedicated working methods, but by
routine, i.c. by always following the same procedures.

Another important factor is how dangerous and “surveillance aware” the
target(s) is/ase believed to be.

A thorough surveillance operation requires a certain amount of preparation
time, sometimes several wecks. So if you've been arrested for something
and you're now worried that you might be under surveillance, don't be
surprised if the surveillance doesn't start until quite some time later when
your vigilance has alrcady started to wane.

Not Everything That Can Be Done Will Be Done

There are numerous zines and books about what is technically possible in
surveillance today. They describe bugs the si

of a grain of dust stuck in
cracks that can be accessed remotely,or camera lenses the size of a pinhead
lurking somewhere. There are even cameras that no longer require lenses,
using camouflaged light-sensitive micro-components instead. Tracking
devices ean be purchased that can be located via satellte, allowing the
surveillance units to locate their target without having to leave the offic,
Phones can be called without ringing or otherwise alerting their owner.
Rooms can be bugged from a great distance using laser beams. Computer
screens can also be tapped. Thousands of phone conversations can be
intercepted using computers listening for keywords.

Aweakness of these texts is that they usually don'ttell the reader anything
about which capabilities arc used when, or by whom. Many of the above
techniques are very expensive. Some arc technically feasible, but their

59
development is not et sufficiently mature and they are sill in the testing
phase. Others arc used, but “only” by the intelligence agencics. And what
the intelligence agencics have, the cops do not have—if only because the
intelligence agencics value being better than the cops.

There are also priorities. Today, there are still some things that are more
threatening to the State and capital than the radical left and/or that
are more difficult to control with conventional methods of surveillance.

These primarily include State espionage, counter-espionage and industrial
espionage. The elaborate, nasty technical capacities are mainly used in
these domains and, of course, in the military domain.

Of course, all technically possible forms of surveillance are a potential
threat to us. Anything that has been used once somewhere will be used
again. The cheaper it becomes and the more familiar the authorities become
with it, the more widespread its use wil be.

I¢'s also important to consider the relationship between the use of a
technical capability and its success. Bugs are a good example of this: using
a bug makes sense if the surveillance operators have a relatively clear
idea of what is being discussed where, or at least assume that they know
where interesting conversations are taking place. After al, they first have
to install the thing properly and then continue to take care of it: power
supply, transcription, analysis, and subscquent removal. If they assume
that the target docsn't talk much or at all at home,or lives in a house with
20 rooms far apart from cach other, they will think twice about doing the
work that a bug requircs.

When placing a camera somewhere, there are a few questions that need
1o be answered beforchand. Is a clear linc of sight guaranteed? How good
is the footage quality? If the goal is to clearly identify people, a telephoto
lens must be used. This rules out the tiny camouflaged lenses, so a real
camera has to be hidden nearby somchow. And a camera lens that can
identify a face is also more vulnerable to being deteeted. If it installed so
far away that it cannot be casily detected, there's a risk that other things
such as trees, cars, ctc. will obscure its line of sight.

Therefore, it sealistic to assume two likely possibilities. On the onc hand,
there will be a handful of surveillance operations using sophisticated
technical capabilities. In recent years, this has probably mainly been

60
directed against the RAF, the RZ and Rote Zora ™ On the other hand,
the vast majority of political surveillance will use *conventional” methods,
i.c. tailing the target, tapping the phonc, monitoring the mail, possibly
monitoring the front door with a camera.

You Can Detect a Lot of What Is Being Done

An essential part of “conventional” surveillance is finding out who goes
where, when, and to mect whom. But anything to do with movement is a
weak point in surveillance. The surveillance operators have to move with
their target while staying in contact with cach other. Even if the target
docs not detect the surveillance themselves, there's a high probability that
other people who aren't being targeted will notice it. They will see cars
suddenly speeding off for no apparent reason, or peopl sitting in parked
cars pushing themselves decp into their scats,or they will notice someone
suddenly mumbling into the lapel of their jacket, or lingering in a doorway
for a long time. These are all unavoidable behaviors in mobile surveillance.

So if you have reason to expect surveillance, you have a good chance of
detecting it—some of it yoursclf if you walk around with your eyes open,
some of it with the help of others.

You Are Not the Only One Who Could Be Targeted

At least in larger cities, especially in certain neighborhoods, there are
hundreds of people, maybe thousands, living around the corner from
you who could potentially be the target of surveillance. People are under
surveillance for all kinds of erimes: receiving stolen goods, fraud, theft,
robbery, murder, drugs, ctc. In the political sphere, cverything is possible:
“terrorism”, antifuscists, small autonomous groups, PKK,* DevSol,* maybe
even Nazis. Then there's cspionage, Islamic fundamentalists, auiliary

SNTE note: The Rote Zora e Geeman far-left feminist miltant group active
from 1974 10 1995,
TR ot The Kudistan Workers' Party (PKK) s Kuedish political organization
TP not: Dewvimei Sol (DeSol) s the former name of the Revolutonary
People’s Liberation Pasty/Front, Tarkish communist poliial parey:

61

services for foreign authorities, immigration police, searches for wanted
people.

If there is surveillance in your area and you are worried that it might be
targeting you, then keep in mind that there are many other people around
you who might also be the target of surveillance.

Your Enemies Don't Necessarily Know Everything You Know

You may wonder why you've never been put under surveillance. Or you're
being tailed and wonder why they are staking out one place and not
another. For example, you notice that the cops have been lingering outside
your legal address for days, even though you thought they should have
known by now where you actually live. But maybe only the intelligence
agencies know this, and they haven't told the cops.

You have to be prepared for the fact that if you are a arget in a surveillance
operation, you won't be surveilled in the same way that you would do it
yourself. They don't know a lot of things that you know. But they also
know things you don't. Or they can be wrong and start from a completely
false premisc, like associating you with someone you have nothing to do
with. Another possibility is that they are working on a construct that
is politically desirable, but has litle to do with reality: So you shouldn't
assume that the surveillance is based on what you know, or even based
on reality Your adversarics are working on the basis of what they have in
their files, and these can be quite inaccurate.

I you automatically assume that they know what you know, you may then
deliver this knowledge to them through your behavior. Ifyou suddenly start
moving boxes out of your apartment because you've become nervous after
detecting surveillance, you may be letting them know that you actually
have something to hide.

Of course, the first question during a surveillance operation is always what
they are actually interested in. Don't expect to find out! If you know that
2 “good” reason exists to target you, then assume that is the reason. But
‘you must also expect that there could be reasons you would never think of.
For example, you may have unwittingly sold your car to someone who is
under surveillance for organized car smuggling. Or when a person accused

62
of being a member of the RAF was arrested, they
with a number on it that the BKA mistook for your phone number. Or a
snitch falsely accused you of having contacts with a clandestine militant
group. These are all things that no onc will probably ever tell you, so you
‘won't be able to evaluate them.

found a picce of paper

Of course, there are also clues that you can use to determine how much the
cops know, You can for example determine which of your friends are also
being surveilled, or at what times they surveil you. If they always come in
the evening, they probably aren't watching you for organized shoplifting
at the grocery store.

Paranoia Feeds on ltself

Once you've detected signs of surveillance around you, you may start trying
to deduce meaning from the smallest things. Suddenly you suspect cops
around every corner, everything s suspicious. This is completely normal, it
comes and goes in phases, and also depends on your mood at the time. Try
not to let it drive you crazy. Until you become quite “familiar” with this
situation, you have to cxpect that you will not even notice the majority of
the surveillance operation, simply because they are carcful to keep their
distance from you. So if you arc absolutely certain that there arc cops
‘buzzing around you, it may be a sign that you aren't the target.

What You Can Do Specifically

Now to the practical part, which has three sections:
1. General caution
2. How to detect physical surveillance
3. What to do if you detect physical surveillance

1. General Caution

If you are part of the radical left and politically active, or if you associate
with people who are, it can't hurt to be a little vigilant in lfe. You have to
establish your own limits: where does recklessness begin, and where does
paranoia? Some people have a nose for cops, others don't even notice when

63
a police radio beeps right next to them. You have to figure these things out
for yourself, Your vigilance has to be integrated into your daily lfe, into
the way you perceive your surroundings. I you can't deal with repression
at all, if you just want to keep it away from you, then you should first ask
yourself how this fecling relates to your political activity and whether you
can afford such an approach to this activity. I you can, great, if not, you
need to think about how you can find a tolerable way to deal with it and
10 what extent others can help you.

‘The police and intelligence agencies are always present in one form or
another, without this necessarily resulting in anything concrete, There's
a good reason that it's common knowledge that informants should be
assumed to be present at every public mecting, that phones are tapped,
cte.In fact, this has never successfully prevented radical left action.

Despite its rules and laws, the security apparatus is not completely
predictable and certainly often a bit chaotic. They may not even know
themselves what is going on at the various levels.

General caution means being aware of the cops' presence and not being.
deterred by it. After al, an cssential clement of “preventive repression” is
to create paralysis through a general awareness of the constant presence of
the cops. This is intensified by police games designed to keep us occupied
—scemingly pointless or untargeted blows of the repressive apparatus are
sometimes simply meant to keep peaple busy so that they don't have time
for anything clse. When this is the dynamic, the cops have the initiativ,
They're on the offensive, and we're chasing after cvents. This political
aspect of repression has been extensively discussed in other texts.

General caution means paying attention to how cops behave, Sometimes
it can be uscful to imagine how and what they think: the patrol cop, the
surveillance operators, the State sccurity cops,the chiefs. Surely they're not
only thinking about us and our “misdeeds,” but also about the end of the
day, their mortgage payments, their boss, the political repercussions, their
carcer, the union, getting something to drink later, the arrogant external
authoritis. It's important to consider that what they imagine of your daily
life s shaped by the mass media, biased informant reports, difficult-to-
comprehend texts from the scene, and lectures by “scene experts.What are
their moral values and self-justification for their work? If you go beyond

64
the slogancering notions of cops as recipicnts of orders without agency,
or as fanatical law-and-order fighters, you will no longer be surpriscd
by some things that you might not otherwise be able to explain without
cnormous conspiracy theories (“They didn't intervene, so we think they
don'tknow anything. .. "or “They struck now because they knew everything
beforchand...”). This happens sometimes, but the reasons are usually far
more mundane.

So, try to get to know your adversaries. Describe not only their logic (or
lack thercof), but also what they look like, how they act. The days when
95% of surveillance operators were men with short hair and mustaches
are long gone. Today, there are many women among them. Both women
and men wear clothes typical of the scenc, and the men often have long.
hair and carrings

How do they sit in the car? Why docs a surveillance operator look out the
car window differently than other people? He or she is looking out for
something. However, it's casy to mistake people who are unfamiliar with
the area for surveillance operators, because they are often very alert, Most
people who drive tend to focus their attention inside the car, especially
when they're not alone. Surveillance operators, on the other hand, usually
pay close attention to their surroundings outside the car and often hardly
talk to the other passengers.

In any case,it makes sense for anyone who is politically active to consider
the extent to which they should prepare for repression, to become more
familiar with the possible threats posed by surveillance, ete. Do not rely
on the fact that from time to time, some license plates of surveillance
cars are published somewhere. The lists can contain errors, the license
plates are changed. The best protection is to develop a “nose”for cops and
informants, and you will develop this through attention and expericnce.

2. How To Detect Physical Surveillance

Let's assume you're up to something so you want to go scope out an arca.
Or you have nothing to do at the moment and are taking an attentive walk.
How can you detect whether there is a surveillance operation going on?

Cars are the most noticeable element. For once we can be happy about the
car society we live in. Cars are casy to identify and can be clearly deseribed

65
by their model, color, and license plate number. Almost all stakcouts
involve cars, and the operators on foot arc sually passengers who have
gotten out of a car, Cars have several advantages for the cops: they can
hide their radios and other equipment (a camera, a change of clothes) in
the car. They can speak loudly and listen to radio messages without being
noticed by outsiders. They can maove between locations quickly: They can
sit comfortably and maybe even take a nap if the surveillance drags on
‘without much happening. Of course, there are also operators on foot, bike,
and motorcycle, who arc usually harder to spot.

Surveillance vehicles are generally clean and well maintained. There are all
kinds of car models in all kinds of colors, mostly high horscpower models,
but no souped-up or otherwise flashy models. Don't expect to sce any
technical features ike radios, radio antenna or anything like that. Gone are
the days where surveillance cars gave that away. Nowadays, the cars have
“hands-free” systems where messages are picked up by a hidden interior
microphone and the radio can be hidden in the glove compartment.

So if you're out for a walk, you might pass a car that catches your cyc.
You take a closer look out of the corner of your eye and sec that the car
is clean, it has an antenna, someone is sitting in it reading a book. Other
than that, the car looks normal. Or there are two people in it with their
scats partially reclined, maybe dozing off. Or someone s just sitting there
looking intently in a particular direction. Or maybe you just sce a man or
woman with headphones standing idly on a corner. Shortly thereafter, a
car slowly rolls past you with two young men in i, looking out the window
with interest. Then, two corners further on, two cars are parked next to
cach other with two couples standing next to them, smoking and chating,
They are probably wearing normal, sporty, casual clothes and shoes. They
don't have “cop faces,” nor do they look particularly strong. But maybe
you heard a beeping sound coming from one of the cars as you passed by.

You may have just noticed the two cssential elements of surveillance: firse,
the “trigges” position for the target, and second, the surveillance operators
that stand-by ready to tail the target.

The trigger position is of central importance, which is why it must be
particularly inconspicuous. If this position is occupied by people in a car,
the surveillance operators may recline the seats to make themselves more

66
comfortable and less visible from a distance. Or they may do something
0 give themselves a reason to be there, such as reading the newspaper.
“The trigger position can also be done on foot. In this case, someonc may
sitin a cafe with a view of the target's front door and only bricfly signal
10 the rest of the team that the target has left the house.

If you see a car with one or two people sitting in it, looking intently in
one dicction, you can be relatively certain that you have found the trigger
position. Unless it s well camouflaged, this position will normally be at
a distance that gives a good view of the target, but is out of the target's
immediate field of vision. This is usually about 40 to 80 meters.

The rest of the surveillance operators are at some distance, However,they
still need to be close enough to be able to start tailing quickly when
necessary: So they will make sure that they are well positioned in terms
of the strect layout and that they can quickly reach the target's possible
routes. They are probably around a comer or two, about 200 to 400 meters
away.If they take a more relaxed approach, they may gather in several cars,
perhaps even getting out to chat. However, they may also line up separately
and form a box around the target. They also need to find places where they
can meet and discuss undisturbed, such as dead ends or parking lots.

The cars will change positions occasionally. The car that was in the trigger
position joins the stand-by cars, and another car assumes the trigger
position. If finding a parking space is difficult,the firs car waits until the
car replacing it arrives and then leaves the parking space to its eplacement,
“The following are signs that surveillance may be taking place:

* Have you seen people staring at fixed location?

* Have you seen people wearing earbuds?

* Have you scen occupied cars parked for several minutes?

* Have you scen cars (moving or parked) that you suspect are surveil-

lance cars?

* Have you heard radio transmissions from cars?
If you think you've detected surveillance, the second step s to determine
the surveillance target. To find out the location that is under surveillance,
you can either look for it dircetly,i.c. look for an operator watching a
specific location, or you can think about what s likely to be surveilled in

67
the arca and then try to deteet an operator around those locations. If you
don't find the object of your desire, therc's not much you can do other than
walk around attentively for a while. Without identifying the target, it's
not possible to draw conelusions. Accordingly, you should limit yoursclf
to making sure they are not targeting you or people or locations you know.

If you can detect the trigger position, the next step is to determine what
the trigger is watching. Although you know the target must be a certain
distance away, you don't know if it's a house, a car, or something clse.
For example, the target could be a car that is parked 100 meters away,
but which can nonetheless be seen from this distance if it drives off. You
can first try to rule out possible targets. Rule out all propertics in the
immediate vicinity of the trigger position, i.c. the two to three adjacent
house entrances, pubs or shops. Keep in mind that it's also possible for a
trigger in a car to usc the rear-view and side mirrors. Despite these clucs,
it's very unlikely that you'll be able to determine the exact target location.
At least you can narrow it down to a certain area and, above all, you can
assess whether your own front door, car or bike, o those of your comrades

could be affected.

If you come to the conelusion that your own front door s in the line of
sight, your adrenaline level will probably skyrocket, but stay calm. So far,
nothing is confirmed, and many other possibilties exist. However, if you
cannot rule outsurveillance of your front door, it makes sense to take certain
precautions. For example, arc there people you don't want scen entering.
your home? Do you keep things at home that you feel uncomfortable with
in such a situation? Would you prefer not to be identified as someone who
lives there? So you need to start thinking about what to do: ignore the
danger, warn people, take countermeasurcs? That's what the third scction
is about.

3. What To Do if You Detect Physical Surveillance

If you are certain that you have deteeted surveillance, you will naturally
want to know whether it's targeting you. If there is no cvidence to the
contrary, you can try to find out more by conducting “counter-surveillance.”
“To do this, you need a few trusted people who can be abservant, Decide on
a route that you will take at a certain time. This route should be designed

68
to fitin with your daily routine so that surveillance operators don't become
suspicious. It should have a few turns to rule out coincidences, such as a
car that happens to be driving the same route as you. It docsn't have to
be particularly long, It should not follow the main traffic routes all the
time, but it also shouldn't circle around itsclf too much, otherwisc the
surveillance team may simply form a box around it. Short stops can be
incorporated to make sudden changes of dircction plausible. For example,
first you go to a copy shop and copy something, then you tum in the
opposite dircction and go to a mailbox where you drop something off. Then
you can change dircction again and buy a newspaper at a store. It's best
o do the route in a car, because then you will e followed by vehicles and
not on foot.* It's casicr to deseribe vehicles more precisely than people.
Since you want to determine whether someone i taling you, it makes no
sense to try to lose potential tails. You should also avoid checking yourself,
as others will do that for you. Your pursuers should fecl as safe as possible.

You must communicate your chosen route to your comrades in advance. If
it sccms too risky to meet them in person, you'll have to find another way
to communicate the details. However, the casiest way is to tell the route
to people you can meet without issuc or raising suspicions, and who are
very unlikely to be under surveillance themselves. Your friends will then
position themselves as inconspicuously as possible along the route you will
take at the specified time. They record exactly when you pass by and what
follows behind you: the car’s license plate, color, model. The obscrvations
are then compiled. If you are really being surveilled, the fact that the same
people or cars were scen in different places will serve as confirmation,
Howeverit's more likely that your friends will immediately recognize the
surveillance operators, because to keep up with you they often have to
race through the streets at high specd and disregard traffic laws. The most

NP notes I you do the route in car and you are under physical surveillince, there
s arik that the car contains a GPS tracker installed by the surveillance team to track
itsLocation. This i s problem, because the surveillnce team might rly on the tracker
and follow you from far away or even notat all, making it harder or imposible for you
o detect them, It can be better to do the route on a bike, because compared to s car,
itis casier to ensure that a bike does not contain 8 GPS tracker.For more information
sbout using bikes, sce our Threat Library's “Transportation by bike™ mitigation.

*hetps://notrace how/threat-libraey/mitigations/transportations-by-bike html

69
important thing for the operators is to keep up with you without being.
seen by you. This leaves litele room for consideration of other road users.

OF course, there's always an element of uncertainty. It could be that you
have a tracking device on your car, and that's why the surveillance operators
kept their distance (but they're sill taling you!). Or they were following
you, but then lost you. O they finished work or took a lunch break a few
minutes before you started your route. That's why counter-surveillance
can only ever reveal if they were tailing you at that particular point in
time. Nevertheless,if you choose the time and place well,you have a good
chance of getting enough certainty for your immediate plans.”

You can also try to detect surveillance by yourself Take a carefully planned
soute by car or bike that gives you the following options: you can make
surprising turns—preferably with a plausible explanation. Or you follow
a long, straight stretch of road with no turning options, where you can
suddenly stop on the side of the road. In both cases, your pursucrs will
be forced to pass you if they don't want to attract your attention, You
can then try to memorize cars, license plates, and faces, and repeat the
whole process elsewhere to sce if there are any matches. In order to carry
out surveillance deteetion measures, however, you must be able to behave
in such a way that the cops don't notice what you're doing. Above all,
this requires you to remain calm even in a tense situation. You must also
develop a“nose” for cop cars,since it's usually impossible to remember the
license plates of all passing vehicles.

Once you have confirmed that the surveillance is indeed targeting you,
you need to calmly consider your next steps. You shouldn't do this alone,
but with a few people you trust.

N.TP note: For more information on conducting counter-surveillance (..
detecting physical surveillince with the help ofa trusted third pasty), sce Surveillance
Countermeasures.”

*hitps:/fmotsace.howcesources/fsurveillance-countermeasures.

70
Who and What Is at Risk?

Regardless of why they are tailing you, consider whether there are any
other comrades who might be affected. They need to be told, but it may
be better if this isn't done by you personally

If there are things that could be a problem in your home, car, or other
places where you spend a lot of time, they should be discreetly moved
el

First of all,don't tell more people than absolutcly necessary. Once rumors
of surveillance begin to spread, the most likely outcome is panic, ansicty,
and conspicuous behavior, as well as speculation about the possible reasons
for the surveillance. All o this can do more harm than good.

What Could Be the Reason for the Physical Surveillance?

To get as close as possible to answering this question, collect as many
observations as possible: dates, times, vehicles. Distinguish assumptions
from reliable obscrvations. Then try to come to an assessment of what the
surveillance operators (could) have already noticed. Think about all the
possible reasons for their actvities. Don'tjust think about your real activities
and struggles, but also about what is conccivable due to coinci
unintended connections. For example, if you have been identified by the
police when you were with someone, such as in a previous arest. What
type of vehicle were you using when you detected the surveillance? When
and where did you do things that could be understood as conspiratorial
activity?

What Could Be a Threat in the Future?

Based on your working hypothesis of what the surveillance is about, you
can consider how the authorities will proceed. One unknown factor, of
course,is whether it's the cops or an intelligence agency that have you in
their sights. I it’s the cops, its very likely that you are the subject of an
investigation, which will usually be reated to “§129” or“§1294" It should
e briefly mentioned that these two articles are primarily investigative in
nature and are used to keep the repressive apparatus running smoothly. Very
few §129a investigations lead to trials and convictions. They arc mostly
used to legitimize surveillance in the first place. So a §129 surveillance
operation will not necessarily be followed by a raid and/or arrcst. And
if it is, this docs not necessarily mean that you'll be charged. You should
familiarize yoursclf with this possibility, but it's also possible that the
surveillance will end at some point and nothing conerete will result from
it, except that your file with the security or intelligence agency will be a

lietle thicker.

“Theintelligence agencies arc not formally subject to the principle of legality,
.. they can surveil you “if necessary”as they wish. Whether anything else
follows from this depends on whether the intelligence agency activates
the police.

If the surveillance lasts for months (which can happen), you can'tlive with
your bags packed the whole time, whether it's to run away or to go to
jail. You have to find a soutine for yoursclf at some point in this situation,
otherwise you'lllose it. This means that you cither have to give up certain
things during this time, or you have to arrange them in such a way that
you can carry them out despite the ongoing surveillance

Some people have lived for years under the constant threat of surveillance
and have continued their political activities. But they are unlikely to
publicly discuss many of their expericnces during that time, so as not to
give the cops any clues as to how they managed to make the surveillance go
nowhere, Thercfore, if you are affccted you will have to do a lot of escarch
yourself or seck dircet contact with comrades who have experience with
these matters. Most importantly, you need to work with your own people
o figure out what works for you and what docsn't.

NI pote: The terms “§129” and "§ 1292 refer to pasagraphs in the German penal
code that deal with the formation 2 criminal and tertorst association,respectivly.

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What You Can Do

There are various ways you can behave: you can continue to live as before
and, if necessary, temporarily refrain from doing risky things. In doing so,
however, you accept that the other side will learn a lot about you, your social
contacts and your political connections. The advantage of this approach
is that you can largely ignore the surveillance. But to protect others, you
must consider where you could be taking the surveillance operators with
you and who they might become aware of because of it.

Another approach is to put your political ife on the back burner, so to
speak by lying low and waiting until the other side gets bored or finds the
surveillance pointless because they simply don't have anything interesting.
10 sce. But keep in mind that they may have been watching you for longer
than you know,and could therefore notice if your lfe suddenly changes

Alternatively, you can go on the offensive and “burn” the operators who
follow you by openly addressing them, taking photos, or the like. Perhaps
you could turn this against them with an appropriate political campaign
and publicity, but you also run the isk that this will draw real attention
to you. Maybe they'll wait a while and then send a better team against
you that you won't notice so casily.In this regard, you should consult with
others before deciding to take this approach. Its tempting to show the
operators that you've detected them and to tellthem to go fuck themselves,
but you'll probably be trading a short-term sense of accomplishment for
the long-term ability to have control over the surveillance operation.

Inany case, it may make sense to get a lawyer involved. Here too,you need
o think about what you should and shouldn't tell them. Of course, lowyers
can't work miracles, and they usually know a lot about legal matters, but
not necessarily about cops or intelligence agencics.

As a general rule, you should avoid conspicuous behavior. Don't keep
turning around on the street or pecking out the window. Don't engage
in any “conspiratorial” activitics in an arca visible through your windows,
And don't make any half-hearted attempts to shake off your pursuers. You
should only do the latter if it's absolutely necessary and you're reasonably
sure you'll suceeed, with the support of other people. Because anything

73
the surveillance operators might find “conspiratorial” will only make you
more interesting.

If you politically organize in non-clandestine projects, you and your
trusted people need to consider the extent to which you should inform
the group. Depending on the structure of the group, not everyone may
need to know. Especiallyif there are inexperienced or les resilient people
in your group, you should develop a very precise approach to the situation.
Unfortunately,sometimes warnings can do more harm than good, in which
case a responsible and considerate response to the situation may be better
than verbal warnings. You might prefer to take a “vacation” for a while, or
at least withdraw from parts of the group work.

If you participate in clandestine projects, the situation is completely
different. You then have to discuss very carcfully to what extent these
activitics could already be endangered by the surveillance that is targeting.
you, and whether you should pause your involvement, cither partially
or completely. Conversely, a sudden termination of certain contacts may
also appear suspicious. Obviously, the others with whom you organize in
this way must be informed of the situation. But clandestine organization
does not automatically mean that everyone wil be able to cope with the
situation. Recklessness, overconfidence (especially among men) insecurity,
paranoia, gossip, inaccuracy—all of this is also present in clandestine
organizing.

1f you have determined that the surveillance you have detected is NOT
targeted at you, it's unnecessary to go around telling everyone what's going
on. Doing so should only be a lat resort when you have no idea who is
being surveilled and who you could tell. Otherwise, panic is often created
by mixing half-knowledge or assumptions with obscrvations, and people
who want to make themselves important run around spreading rumors.
It's always better to inform individual people who you can trust will stay
calm and pass on the necessary information to the right people. You may
be able to find out who the surveillance is targeting, If so, that should be
the end of it for you. It might be interesting to stay up to date on who is
being surveilled and where, but this isn't vry nice for the people directly
concerned. That's why you should follow the same guideline that applics to

74
militant actions: only those who have something to do with the situation

should be in the know.

When You're Under Physical Surveillance...

Tt makes sense to follow these basic guidelines. Surveillance does not mean
the end of all possibilit

* Surveillance does not normally run around the clock for

tended

period of time because it wouldn't be sustainable in terms of personnel.

Along phase of intensive surveillance may be followed by a long
pause. This means, on the one hand, that a surveillance operation
doesn't last forever, but on the other hand, that it can be resumed at
some point. Such a pause may last for weeks or even months.

* Or the surveillance may end with a raid, a subpocna, or even an arrest.

* Stay calm. Panicking only benefis the surveillance operators.

* Try to make arrangements with reliable friends who have your back
and take on tasks you can't do for the time being. Talk to them, but
only to them, and not only about logistics, but also about your fears
and insecurities.

* Consider speaking with a lawyer so you already know who to turn to,
at least in the event of a sudden arrest.

+ Tobe on the safe side, expect the worst. This means expecting technical
surveillance of your home and car, including both camera surveillance
and bugs (though this is les likely), as well as tracking devices. You
can be sure that your phone and mail are being monitored! Assume
that it's not just targeting you, but other people as well. Expect to be
detained or even arrested at some point.

* Clean up the places that could be scarched: apartment, attic, basement,
car, garage, etc.

« Think about places in your home where you cannot be observed,
whether it's possible to leave the house unobscrved, or how you can.
otherwise inconspicuously evade surveillance if doing so becomes
necessary.

+ Avoid any behavior that appears “conspiratorial.”

75
* Try to develop a daily routine for yourselfin this threatening situation.
* Write down your observations and evaluate them with your friends.
« Develop a hypothesis about the reason for the surveillance that you

can deal with. Think about perspectives for your future actions

The worst-case scenario for the surveillance operators is that the target
has turned the tables and is in control of the operators!

“The worst-case scenario for you is being reckless and burying your head
in the sand! But the second worst-case scenario is panic and paralysis!

To all those who are wanted or under surveillance, we wish you all the
strength you need. Let's use knowledge against paranoia!

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5. Documentation

L

Photos of Actions

Just a few little tips:
‘We strongly discourage you from taking photos of actions in which people
can be seen! Even if they are masked, they may be identified later. Even if

you piclate, people can also be identificd by their body shape and clothing,
and notall methods of pixclation are effcctive, Some image distortions,for

example, can be easily reversed by police technicians. Some photo software
also store a copy of the image before pixclation in its metadata, though
there are programs that remove this additional information. If you post

digital photos onlinc, remember that the image file may contain metadata

about your camera. There are also programs that delete this information,
but we don't know how cffective they are. It s also possible for a camera

10 be scized before the photos it taok arc anonymized!

T note: The majority of this chapter has not been included in this transation
because we deemed it outdated. For more information sbout digita security see our

Threat Library's “Digital best practices”™ mitigation.

*hecps://notrace how/threat-libraey/mitigations/digital-best-practices.html

77
In our experience, we have found that
it is often difficult to find an overview
of different forms of action, especially
militant ones, as well as practical and
contextual thoughts on different aspects of
security and action planning. [...] That's
why we have collected information about
taking action.

NoTrace Project / No trace, no case. A collection of tools to help
anarchists and other rebels understand the capabilities of their
cnemics, undermine survcillance eforts, and ultimately act without
getting caught,

Depending on your contest, possession of cestain documents may be criminalized or atract
umvanted attention. Be carcful about what zines you print and where you stor thern