OTHER SIDE
OF THE COIN

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND
COMMUNITY POLICING
The other side of the COIN:

counterinsurgency and community pol
Kristian Wi

Abstract

This essay outlines the current counterinsurgency model, with an emphasis on its
domestic application in the United States. I shows that many contemporary
counterinsurgeney practices were developed by police agencies inside the U.S.,
and illustrates the transfer of theory, strategy, and technique from domestic
police to the military - and back. The essay also examines the state’s use of non-
‘governmental or nonprojit agencics, as one element of counterinsurgency
strategy, to channel and control political opposition. The conclusion bricfly
considers the strategic implications for social movements, especially as we learn
to recognize and respond to political repression.

Introduction: expect repression

Oppositional political movements inevitably face - and therefore ought to expect -
repression at the hands of the state. But, while quick to condemn the most obvious
and violent manifestations of this repression, especially when directed against
peaceful groups, the institutionalized left has been slow to grasp the strategy
underlying the state's approach.

‘We tend to characterize repression as the state's response to crisis, rather than
secing it also as a means to preserving normalcy. Hence, it has been very difficult
to recognize it in quiet times, and when it does appear it seems like an exception,
an excess, a panicked over-reaction.

This paper gevsout o  lecture presented at the " Econvergence,” Fist Unitarian Church, Portand
Oregon; October 3, 2009, Thanks are owed to those who offerd comments on tht talk,and on my
later presentaton it the National Lavyers Guild Nortinwest Regional Conference (Lewi and Clark
LinSchoal, Portland, Oregon; Apsl 17, 2010). Also, Lum geatefl to the numerous people who,
offered dealed comments on carier drafs, in partcula: Jules Boykoff, George Cicarielo-Maher,
Emily-Jane Dawson, Colett G., Don H. Chris Knudisen, Peter Lile,Geoff MeNamars, Will
Munger, Steve Niva, Jancen . JosefSchcider, M. Treloas, Kevin Van Metor, and Lesley Wood.

“The author reserves llights.
But repression does not always come dressed up in riot gear, or breaking into
offices in the middle of the night. It also comes in the form of the friendly
“neighborhood liaison” officer, the advisory boards to local police departments, and
the social scientist hired on as a consultant, Repression i, frst and foremost, a
matter of politics: it is the means the state uses to protect itself from political
challenges, the methods it employs to preserve its authority and continue its rule.
This process does not solely rely on force, but also mobilizes ideology, material
incentives, and, in short,all of the tools and techniques of satecraft. We have to
understand repression as involving both coercion and concessions, employing
violence and building support, weeding opposition and seeding legitimacy. That is
the basis of the counterinsurgency approach.

This essay outlines the counterinsurgency model ("COIN” in the military jargon),
with an emphasis on its domestic application, especially in the criminal justice
Context, The evidence shows that, Gespite the term's association with colonialisma
and Latin American "dirty wars," many contemporary counterinsurgency practices
were developed by police agencies inside the United States and continu to be used
against the domestic population.

‘The argument proceeds through five stages. Part one describes the
counterinsurgency approach as it is presented in military documents and the
professional lterature, especially the new U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field
Manual (FM 3-24) and recent studies produced by the Rand Corporation.: The
second part illustrates the transfer of COIN theory, strategy, technique, and
personnel from the military to the police, and vice versa. The third shows
specifically how anti-gang efforts in American cities are shaping and being shaped
by military COIN operations abroad. Part Four explains the state's use of non-
‘governmental or nonprofit agencies, alongside military and police action, to
channel and control opposition. And finally, the conclusion considers some
implications for social movements, in particular those of the left, in their efforts to
overcome repression and achieve political change.

In this context, the title - "The Other Side of the COIN" - has three distinct
‘meanings, which correspond to the main themes of my argument. First, it efers to
the strategic pairing of direct coercion and subtle legitimacy-building activites.
Second, it points to the joint development of military operations overseas and
police control domestically. And third, it reminds us that when the authorities turn

* It important o recogaize the limits of the offcal documents. The practiceof COIN often
diverges from the doctrine, and sometimes diverges very sharply. Imperfectadherence to the
counterinsurgency model may indicate institutional ineetia,internal isagroements, nter- or intra-
agency rivalry imits of capacity and competence, lack of plteal will, o any mumber of other

world operationsl o organizational factors. But it may slso point 6 the deologica constrins
hapin the guiding documents. Admonishments to operte within the la and to demonstrate.a
respeetTor human rghts, fo example, ar compulsory n official publications and should be met
with skepicisn.

to counterinsurgency it is because they fear that insurgency is brewing. Wars -
especially revolutionary wars - have two sides.

‘The state understands that there is a war underway. It is time that the left learns to
seeit,

Part One: repression, counterinsurgency, and the state
Some definitions

One of my objectives in this paper is to broaden and deepen our understanding of
repression. I hope to show how repression functions in the course of the normal
operations of the liberal state, and to demonstrateits effects in contexts that are
not usually thought of as repressive, or even necessarily as political. At the same
time, however, | am not seeking to redefine "repression,” but simply to apply the
standard definitions with greater consistency; so I am employing the term in its
usual political sense, referring to the “process by which those in power try to keep
themselves in power by consciously attempting to destroy or render harmless
organizations and ideologies that threaten their power” (Wolfe 1978, 6).4

“Counterinsurgency" is not simply synonymous with "repression,” but has a
narrow, technical meaning, which of course relies on the definition of "insurgency
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, explains
A insurgency ] an organized movement amed at the overthrow of s constituted
sovernment hrough the use of subversion and armed conict. .. Stated another way, an
nsurgency s an onganized,protracted politico-miltary strugale designed to weaken the
control and legitimacy of  established government, occupying pover,or ther political
uthority whileincreasing insurgent conteol.
The definition of counterinsurgeney logically follows: *Counterinsurgency is
military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civie actions taken
by a government to defeat insurgency.” (FM 3-24, 2006, 1-2).

Ends and means

“Counterinsurgency,” then, refers to both a type of war and a style of warfare. The
term describes a kind of military operation outside of conventional army-vs.-army
war-fighting, and is sometimes called "low-intensity” or "asymmetrical” combat.
But counterinsurgency also describes a particular perspective on how such

« Hfocus here o state repression, though of couse other powerful actors engage i repressive.
actvitiesas wel. For example, The Nation reports that the mercenary frm Blackvater offred to
infitate animal Sghts groups on bebalf o the genetic-engineering behemoth Mornsanto (Scabill
2010).
operations ought to be managed. This style of warfare is characterized by an
emphasis on intelligence, security and peace-keeping operations, population
control, propaganda, and efforts to gain the trust of the people.

This last point i the crucial one. As FM 3-24 declares: “Legitimacy is the main
objective.” (FM 3-24, 2006, 1-113).

‘The primary aim of counterinsurgency is political. That's why, in the context of the
American occupation of Iraq, we heard career officers arguing that "victory in
combat s only a penultimate step in the larger task of 'winning the peace'” (Gage
2003, 1). And it the need for legitimacy that they re referring to when they say
that "Military action is necessary .... but it s not sufficient. There needs to bea
political aspect” (General David Petreaus, quoted in BBC News 2007).

‘The political ends rely in large part on political means. As David Gompert and
John Gordon (2008: 76) from Rand Corporation write:
In COIN, the outcomes are decided mainly i the kuman dimension, by the contested
population, and the capabltesof opposing armed forcesare nly one facor in determining,
those outcomes. The people will decide whether the sat or the insurgents offr a btter
fotue, and toa large extent which ofthe two will be given te chance.
‘The Rand report i ttled, appropriately, War by Other Means. War, as Clausewitz
observed, s politics by other means. And politics, as Foucault reasoned, is war by
other means (Foucault 2003, 15-6). But in counterinsurgency, the means are not
50 "other.” In COIN, war-fighting is characterized by the same clements as state-
building - establishing legitimacy, controlling territory, and monopolizing violence
(Weber 2004, 33).

Consequently, the "newness" of counterinsurgency is in some respects debatable.
Clearly there is nothing new about repression. And the combination of force and
legitimacy is a lot of what makes a state a state. But, as one participant in a 1962
Rand symposium on counterinsurgency recalled, at that time there was already a
distinctive COIN perspective emerging - and it was a minority view:

Probably ll ofus had worked ot theoriesof conterinsurgency procediures at one tme or
another, which ve thought were unique and orginal. But when we came toais them,allour
idess e essentially the same. We had another thing in common. Altough we had no
difficulty in making oar views understood to cach oher, we had mostly been unable o getour
Fespective armics o hoist inthe message.” (Frank Kitson, quoted in Hosmer, 2006, i)

Clearly, then, something was new.

‘What sets COIN apart from other theories of repression, I believe, is the self-
conscious acknowledgement that the state needs legitimacy to stabilize its rule, and
that under conditions of insurgency its legitimacy is sipping. In other words, from
the perspective of counterinsurgency, resistance is not simply a matter of the.
population (or portions of it) refusing to cooperate with the state’s agenda;
resistance comes as a consequence of the state failing to meet the needs of the
population.
Itis possible, therefore, to see COIN as representing a “liberal” or even “radical®
politics (Slim 2004, 3, and Sewall 2007, xxi). Yet such apologetics miss the larger
point. As a matter of realpolitk the authorities have to respond in some manner to
popular demands; however, COIN allows them to do so in a way that at least
preserves, and in the best case amplifies, their overall control. The purpose of
counterinsurgency is to prevent any real shift in power.

Counterinsurgency is all about preserving (o reclaiming) the states authority.
Violence and territory are inherent to the project, but it is really legitimacy —*the
consent of the governed,""societal support" - that separates the winners from the
losers (FM 3-24, 2006, i-113 and 1-115). As Gompertand Gordon put it: "The key
in COIN i not to monopolize force but to monopolize legitimate force” (Gompert
and Gordon 2008, xxwii),

The strietly military aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign are, of course,
necessary; but so are the softer, subtler efforts to bolster public support for the
‘government. Both types of activities have to be understood as elements of political
power.

Theories of repression

Because they see insurgency as primarily a crisis of legitimacy, the Rand
researchers argue that, conceptually, the "War on Terror” has been a mistake: first,
because it identified "terror” as the problem; and second, because it proposed
“war" as the solution.

‘The idea of GWOT [the Glabal War on Terror] .. has fied offcal US. attenton on
tervorists, with insuffcient regard for the hostitythat exiss among vastly larger
numbers of Muslims. . The indelibl image o jhadists scheming alone in remote
mountain caves i les the reality of samic insurgency than i forlager umbers of
jibadists moving freely among Muslim populatons. .. [Tlerror inspired by Iamic
extremism 1 part of o arer patter of Susim esistance that has Sgnificant popular
appeal... [Therefore, terrorism cannot be defeaed unlessthe nsurgencies in which it
is embedded are successfuly countered.

Thus, the solution requires, not just military might, but intelligence, political
action, civil assistance, and other nonmilitary means that might curb Islamic
militancy more effectively and at less cost and risk” than simple combat (Gompert
and Gordon 2008, 6-8)

Stages of insurgency

In its adoption of COIN theory, it seems that the U.S. s slowly re-learning the
lessons of the British colonial wars. In 1971 British brigadier Frank Kitson looked
back on his efforts at holding the empire together i places like Kenya, Cypress,
and Northern Ireland. He observed:
Looking in retrospect at any counter-subversion or counter-nsurgency campaign, it is
sy to see that the irststep should have been to prevent the cremy from gaining s
ascendancy over the civil popalation,and in particular to disrupt his effrtsat establishing.
i political rganization. In practice thi s diffcult t achieve because fora long time the
sovernment may be unware that a signifcant threat exists, and in any case ina so-called
frco country it regarded as the opposite of reedom to resrain the spread of a poltcal
iden (Ritson 1971, ).

Concerns with liberty aside, Kitson recommended that the government act to
restrict the spread of ideas, prevent radicals from achieving influence, and disrupt
their efforts to establish oppositional organizations.

War by Other Means offers a similar analysis. According to Gompert and Gordon,
revolutions (and thus counter-revolutions) go through three stages: a proto-

surgency, a small-scale insurgency, and major insurgency.s At first, in the
"proto-insurgency stage” the movement is:

small, narrowly based, vulnerable, and incapabl of widespread orlarge-scale violence.
Proo-insurgents may be barcly noticeable,not scen s having the potr

insurgency,or dismissed as criminal o inconsequential crack-pots. T
proto-insurgeney, the most important aspect of COIN is to understand the group, s
oul,ts bty 10 tap popular rievances, and it potentia. In turn, shaping he proto-
Tnsurgoney's environmont, especially by improving governance in the eyes of the
population, may deny it wider support.

In the second stage, as "a small-scale insurgency” the movement begins
“attracting followers beyond its original cadre,” and it may “commit more
daring and destructive acts against the state, not (yet) with a view toward
replacing it,but to demonstrate ts capabilities, be taken seriously by the
population, and recruit.” For the government, therefore, “shaping political and
economic conditions to head off popular support for the insurgency is
imperative.” Direct military intervention is nof recommended: "As long s the
insurgency s still small, action against it can and should remain a police and
intelligence responsibility.”

Ifthe movement survives, it may develop into a "major insurgency." While it is
still “essential” that the state gain information on the movement and intervene
to shape social conditions, at this stage, "forceful action against the insurgents
by regular military units may be unavoidable.” (Gompert and Gordon 2008, 36-
7

+The report also considers  inal possibilty  foreign miltary intervention.
‘The social science of repression

Rand advocates early, preempive action short of direct military force. The
problem i that at the first stage subversion is not obvious and the state may not
know that a threat exists. Worse, the real threat must be understood as extending
beyond the insurgents themselves - the militants, radicals, and subversives - to
include the grievances they seck to address and the social conditions that produce
those grievances.

To meet the challenges of counterinsurgency, the security forces have had to
shift their understanding of intelligence. Since the cause of the conflict is not
justa subversive conspiracy, but necessarily connects to the broader features of
society, the state’s agents cannot simply ferret out the active conspirators, but
need to aim at a broad understanding of the social system. The U.S. Army Field
Manual on Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, incorporates this perspective arguing
that strategists "require insight into cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs,
interests and decision-making processes of individuals and groups.” (FM 3-24,
2006, 3-2).

“This sort of intelligence work is concerned with questions that are primarily
sociological. And so, a great deal of FM 3-24 is concerned with explicating basic
social-science terms like "group," “coercive force,” and "social capital.” In fact, the
entirety of Appendix B is devoted to explaining "Social Network Analysis and Other
Analytie Tools" It offers this picture of how such analysis is practiced:

[A] social network s not just a deseripton of who i n theinsurgent organiztion; itis a
pictureofthe population, how i s put ogether and how members interact with one anoler

“To draw an accurate picture of a network, units need to dentfytes among ts mermbers.
Stzon bonds formed over time by fmil, fiendship, o organizational association
characteize these tis. Units gather information on these tes by analyzing historical
documents and records, nterviuing individuals, and studying photos and books (FM 324,
2006, B-47 and B-49).

The security forces can no longer focus narrowly on the hunt for subversives or
terrorists, but must also collect information on the population as a whole. This
changes, not only the type of information they re secking, but also the means they
use to collect it. A Rand report on information warfare in counterinsurgency
emphasizes:

Even duringa securit operaion,theinformation neclod for counterinsurgency i s

‘much or more sbout context, popalation, and perceptions a it i about the hostile forc.
¢ secretinformation

by seeret mesns from seert sources (1ibicki 2007, 133,

The report suggests a few specific mechanisms for collecting broad-based
information: tracking cell phone use, conducting a national registry-census,
installing vehicle- and weapon-mounted video cameras, and analyzing internet
sites (in particular, creating a "national Wiki (where citizens describe their
community)") (Libicki 2007, 0).

The U.S. government's mapping of the American Muslim population should be
viewed in this light. In 2002 and 2003, the Department of Homeland Security.
requested - and received -statistical data, sorted by zip code and nationality, on
people who identified themselves as "Arab” in the 2000 census. And in February

03, FBI director Robert Mueller ordered all 56 Bureau field offices to create
“demographic” profiles of their areas of operation, specifically including the
number of mosques. One Justice Department official explained that the
demographics would be used “to set performance goals and objectives” for anti-
terror efforts and electronic surveillance (Isikoff 2003)

Civil liberties groups compared the program to the first steps in the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War I (ACLU 2003) - a notion that seems less
than hyperbolic if we recall that, during this same period, 700 Middle Eastern
immigrants were arrested as they complied with new registration rules. More than
1200 were defained without explanation or trial followin the September 11 attacks,
and thousands more were "interviewed" under FBI orders (Heymann 2006).

Years later, in 2007, the LAPD began planning its own mapping program, dressed
in the thetoric of community policing. As the L.A. Times reported, the *Los Angeles
Police Department's counter-terrorism bureau proposed using U.S. census data
and other demographic information to pinpoint various Muslim communities and
then reach out to them through social service agencies” (Winton 2007).

Deputy Police Chief Michael P. Downing, head of the counterterrorism unit,
explained:

Whilethis poject willay ot geographic locations ofmany differet Muslm populations
around Los Angeles, we alo ntend t takea deeper look at thei history, demographics,
language,culture, ethnie breakdown, socioeconomie status and social intoractions. - 1t s
alsour hope  denty communitics, within thelarger Muslim community which may be.
suscepible toviolent idealogially based extromism and then use s ull spectrum approach
puided by nteligence-led strategy (Winton 2007).

‘The FBI, meamwhile, has sent infiltrators into mosques throughout the country to
root out - or sometimes, to set up - error cells (Markon 2010).

Intelligence and coercion
“Why collect such information?” the Rand researchers ask.

‘The answer they provide is quite revealing. Properly analyzed, the information can
be used in five types of activity: (1) police and military operations "such as sweeps,
roadblocks, or arrests”; (2) assessments of progress in the counterinsurgency
campaign (*How many people have been hurt or killed in the war; what kind of
crimes are being committed; who is getting employment and where; and who s
staying put or leaving the country?"); (3) "the provision of public services, whether
security and safety services (e.5. an efficient 911 system) or social services (e.g.
health care, education, and public assistance)'; (4) ientifying insurgents
(distinguish those willing to help from those eager to hurt”); and, (5) the coercion
of individuals for purposes of winning cooperation and recruiting informants:
“information about individuals may be necessary to persuade each one to help the
‘government rather than helping the insurgents.”

This last point shows something of the recursive relationship between intelligence
and coercion. In an insurgency, both sides rely on the cooperation of the populace;
therefore they compete for it, in part through coercive means. As Rand researcher
Martin Libicki writes: "Those uncommitted to either side should weigh the
possibility that the act of informing or even interacting with one side may bring
down the wrath of the other side.” Whoever is best able to make good on this
threat will Libicki argues, receive the best information: “The balance of coercion
dictates the balance of intelligence.” (Libicki 2007, 21-3).

"Disruption mode"

Of course, the better the intelligence, the more effctive the use of force can be.
And the purpose of dentifying the insurgent networkis to disrupt it.

Consider the police efforts to frustrate protests against the 2008 Republican
National Convention: A year in advance of the demonstrations, police informants.
began attending protest planning meetings around the country, while local cops
and the FBI kept anti-RNC organizers under intense surveillance - following them,
photographing them, going through their garbage (Shulz, September 1, 2000,
"Assessing"). Among the organizations targeted were Code Pink, Students for a
Democratic Society, the Campus Anti-War Network, and most famously, "The RNC
‘Welcoming Committee” (which later produced "the RNC 8" defendants)
(Boghosian 2010).

Simultaneously, the Minnesota Joint Analysis Center invested more than 1,000
hours coordinating with other "fusion centers" around the country to collect,
analyze, and disseminate information on suspected anti-RNC activists. The fusion
center dren its information from a staggering array of sources, using law
enforcement and Defense Department databases, as well as DMV records, court
document, and information provided by private businesses (Shulz, September 1,
2000, "Assessing’; Shulz, September 1, 2009, "What").

In the days before the convention, police used this information to mount raids of
activists' homes and meeting places, seizing banners, political literature, video

" Fusion Centersare multi-agency bureaus that compile, analyze,and re-distribute nformation.
The ACLU warns that the arrangement can silestep legal restrictions on data collection and that it
monitors the everay behavior of arge mumbers of nmocent people (German and Stanley 2007;
German snd Stanley 2008).
equipment, and computers (Boghosian 2010). By the Convention's close, more than
800 people had been arrested, many rounded up en masse (Shulz, September 1,
2000, "Assessing"). The majority - 584 - were released without charges, or had
their cases dismissed. Only ten arrests resulted in felony convictions (Gornun
2010).

But the conviction rate may be beside the point. One commander stated frankly
that the police were acting in "disruption mode” (Shulz, September 2, 2009).

Part Two: military/policing exchanges
The community policing paradigm

In my book Our Enemies in Blue, the chapter titled "Your Friendly Neighborhood
Police State” s devoted to the argument that the two major developments in
American policing since the 19605 ~ militarization and community policing — are
actually two aspects of a domestic counterinsurgency program. I summed up the
idea with a simple equation: “Community Policing + Militarization =
Counterinsurgency” (Williams 2004, 255).

In the last few years, the counterinsurgency literature has made this point explicit.
For example, War by Other Means lists, among the law enforcement “capabilities .
considered to be high priority” in COIN: "well-trained and well-led commaunity
police and quick-response, light-combat-capable (constabulary) police” (Gompert
and Gordon 2008, xkv). Similarly, a Joint Special Operations University report,
Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN: The Thick Blue Line, purpors:
“The predominant waysofutlzing plice and law enforcement within a COIN stratexy
consiat of the adoption of the community-policing spprosch supportd by offensive-poicng
actons such a paramilary operatons,counterguerela patrolin, psedo operations i
which stae forces pose s nsurgent groups],and raids (Celeski 2009, 0).
The advantages the state receives from each aspect are fairly clear: Militarization
increases available force, but as important, it also provides increased discipline and
command and control. It re-orders the police agency to allow for better
coordination and teamwork, while also opening space for local initiative and officer
discretion.

Community policing, meanwhile, helps to legitimize police efforts by presenting
cops as problem-solvers. It forms police-driven partnerships that put additional
resources at their disposal and win the cooperation of community leaders. And, by
increasing daily, friendly contacts with people in the neighborhood, community
policing provides a direct supply of low-level information (Rosenau 2007). These
are not incidental features of community policing; these aspects speak to the real

purpose.
In fact, Rand goes so far as to present community policing as its paradigm for
counterinsurgency:

[Placification is best thought ofas  massivly enhanced version of the community plicng
technique that emerged in the 19705. .. Comimunity poliing i centerd on  road concept
of problem solving b law enforcement offcers working in an area that s well-defined and.
limitd inscale, with sensitvity to geographi, ethic, and other boundaries. Patrl ofcers
form a bond of trust with localresidents, who get 1o Kaow them as more than  uniform. The
police work with local groups, usinesse, churches, and the ke t0 address the concerns and
problems of the neighborhood. Pacfcationissimply an expansion of this concepl to inelude
reater development and security asistance (Long 2006, 53).

The military's use of police theory - in particular the adoption of a "community
policing” perspective - shows a cyclical exchange between the various parts of the
national security apparatus.

‘The eyele of violence: imports and exports

Domestically, the unrest of the 1960s left the police in a difficult postion. The
cops' response to the social movements of the day - the civil rights and anti-war
‘movements especially - had cost them dearly in terms of public credibility, elite
support, and officer morale. Frequent and overt recourse to violence, combined
with covert (often illegal) surveillance, infiltration, and disruption, had not only
failed to squelch the popular movements, it had also diminished trust in law
enforcement.

The police needed to re-invent themselves, and the first place they looked for
‘models was the military. The birth of the paramilitary unit - the SWAT team - was
one result (Center for Research on Criminal Justice 1975). A new, more restrained,
crowd control strategy was another (McPhail 1098). Military training, tactics,
equipment, and weaponry, made their way into domestic police departments - as
did veterans returning from Vietnam, and, more subtly, military approaches to.
organization, deployment, and command and control. Police strategists specifically
began studying counterinsurgency and counter-guerilla warfare (Gates 1992;
Lawrence 2006).

Atthe same time, and seemingly incongruously, police were also beginning to
experiment with a "softer,” more friendly type of law enforcement - foot patrols,
neighborhood meetings, police-sponsored youth activities, and attention to quality-
of-life issues quite apart from crime. A few radical criminologists saw this for what
it was - a domestic “hearts and minds” campaign. As The Iron Fist and the Velvet
Glove pointed out:

Like the simila technigues developed in th sxtis to maintain theoverseas empire (on
which many of the new police techniques were patterned), these new polce strtegics
Fepresent an attempt o streamline and mystify the epressive power of the sate,not o
minimize it or change lsdiretion. The forms of eprossion may change,but i functions
Fomain the same" (Center for Rescarch on Criminal Justice 175, 30)

Both militarization and community policing arose at the same time, and in
response to the same social pressures. And, whereas the military largely neglected
COIN in the period following defeat in Vietnam, the police kept practicing, and
developing, its techniques. Decades later, facing insurgencies in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the military turned to police for ideas (Beers 2007).

‘The lines of influence move in both directions.

Statistical control

Among the police innovations that COIN theorists recommend for military use are:
the Neighborhood Watch, embedded video, computerized intelligence files, and
statistical analysis (Celeski 2000; Libicki 2007; Calese 2004). The last pair are
particularly interesting.

In Byting Back, Martin Libicki explains the utilty of statstical analysis programs,
pointing to New York's Compstat (computerized statistics) system as an example
(Libicki 2007). By compiling crime reports, analyzing the emerging statistics, and.
presenting the information on precinct-level maps, Compstat enabled police
administrators to identify high-crime arcas, deploy their officers strategically, and
‘measure the progress of their efforts. Though ts effect on actual crime is debatable,
Compstat certainly served as the organizational keystone for the NYPD's city-wide
crackdown during the Giuliani years (Harring and Ray 1999). Since that time, other
departments around the country have adopted similar systems (Parenti 1999).

‘The Los Angeles Police Department’s system was proposed by Shannon Paulson, a
police sergeant and a Navy intelligence reservist; it was implemented under Chief
‘William Bratton, who had previously introduced Compstat in New York. In LA.,
street cops carry a checklist of 65 "suspicious activities" - behaviors such as taking
‘measurements, using binoculars, drawing dizgrams, making notes, or expressing
extremist views. Officers are required to file reports whenever they see such things,
even if no crime has been committed. The "Suspicious Activity Reports” are then
routed through the nearest fusion center, the Joint Regional Intelligence Center,
where they are compiled, analyzed, and shared with other agencies - including local
and national law enforcement agencies, the military, and private corporations. The
LAPD, along with the U.S. Directorate of National Intelligence, are hoping to
replicate this system in 62 other cities around the country, beginning with Boston,
Chicago, and Miami (Gorman 2008; Meyer 2008; German and Stanley 2007;
German and Stanley 2008).
Biometric identification
Computer networks are also being used by the military to identify and track
insurgents: "Snake Eater,” a variation of the system developed for the Chicago
Police, "has been adapted by Lockheed-Martin for the US. Marines in Anbar
province, apparently to good effect” (Libicki 2007, 25). The Snake Eater kit
includes mobile fingerprint, iris, and retina scanners,  digital camera, a GPS
system, and a laptop computer capable of linking to a database of the local
population (Gonzalez 2000). Likewise, following the siege of Fallujah, the city’s
entire population was fingerprinted, retina-scanned, and issued identity cards
required for travel or to receive government services. And since 2007, biometric
readers have been used at military checkpoints in Baghdad to control movement
between ethnic enclaves (Graham 2010). Of course, the military has been preparing
for this sort of operation for a long time: 1999's "Urban Warrior” training exercises
included the biometric scanning of resistance fighters" - in Oakland, California
(Graham 2010).

Part Three: gang wars
From California to Afghanistan

A decade after Urban Warrior, marines were still refining their skills in California's
cities. In the summer of 2010, seventy marines from Camp Pendleton spent a week
accompanying Los Angeles police in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan.
‘The marines wanted to learn the basics of anti-gang investigations, standards of
police professionalism, and techniques for building rapport with the community
(Watson 2010).

A New York Times profile of Marine Captain Scott Cuomo gives some idea of what
helearned in L.A., and how he applied it in Afghanistan:
“The same Marines patrolled in the same illges ench day, getting to recognize th residents.
“They awarded the kdersconstruction projecs and ove hotesof e drinking showed them
photographs they ad taken of vrtually very grown mae n heir batle spae. I this uy
Talban?'the Marines asked repeatecly, then poured what they leared ino a computer
database (Bumiller 2010).
After a couple months, their efforts paid off. A villager identified a suspect, and the
‘marines raided his house, arresting him and seizing weapons and opium. They
placed the man, Juma Khan, in "a holding pen the size of a large do cage” and
interrogated him for two days. The marines then tried him, and found him guilty
of working with the Taliban. But, under an agreement with local elders, once Khan
swore allegiance to the new Afghan government, he was released as a free man - or
not quite. In exchange for his freedom, and a job cleaning a nearby canal, Khan
will be supervised by a group of elders, who in turn report to the American military.

‘And he will himself become an informer, meeting regularly with the marines and
answering their questions about his neighbors and friends (Bumiller 2010).

From Afghanistan to California

These military lessons, adapted from domestic policing and battle-tested overseas,
are now being cycled back into the homeland. Since February 2009, combat
veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan have been serving as advisors to police in
Salinas, California, with the stated aim of applying counterinsurgency tools to local
anti-gang efforts. Along with their expertise, the military advisors also arrive with
software, including a computer program that maps the connections between gang
activity, individual suspects, and their social circles, family ties, and neighborhood
connections (Vick 2000).

As Salinas Chief of Police Louis Fetherolf proudly notes:

Oue work with staff from the U.S. Navy's - Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) [is] a rst-ofits-
Kind collsboraton. . Facultyai NPS are experts in cxaminiog violent groups around the
world,including trrorists, nsurgents and revolutionaries. By examining these volent
groups they have developed a counterinsurgency model, which rlics argely on social
Betwork analyss o determine how best o disrupt thir viokent actons and, more
{mportanty,address the reasons fo theis violens behavior i the s plce. NPS and SPD.
are working together to determine the applcablity of the counterinsurgency mode tovilent
domestic roups such as ur sreet gangs (Fetherolf, October 2009, ).

In Salinas, the police-military partnership is occurring simultancously with a
renewal and expansion of the SPDY's community policing philosophy (Fetherol,
July 2000). The new community focus (encouraged by the Naval advisors)
includes Spanish language training, a “Gifts for Guns” trade-in event, an
anonymous tip hotline, senior-citizen volunteer programs, a larger role for the
Police Community Advisory Council, and programs that provide ‘more youth in the
community alternatives to gang lfestyles and in the process develop a growing pool
of home-grown, future police officers" (Fetherolf, October 2009, 33-4).

Salinas police have also initiated partnerships with other local, state, and federal
law enforcement agencies, including the Marshals, the ATF (Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms), the FBI, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Fetherolf,
October 2000). The most spectacular product of these partnerships, so far, was a
set of coordinated raids on Apri 22, 2010, codenamed "Operation Knockout."

‘The raids - coming after months of investigation by Salinas Police, the Monterey
County Drug Task Force, the ATF, and the FBI - mobilized more than 200 law
enforcement agents and resulted in 100 arrests, as well as the confiscation of forty
pounds of cocaine, fourteen pounds of marijuana, and a dozen guns (Reynolds,
April 23, 2010).

Operation Knockout was intended, not only to disrupt the targeted gangs, but to
serve as a warning to others. Deputy Police Chief Kelly MeMillin said: "We're going
to follow quickly with call-ins of specific groups that we know are very active.

‘We are going to tell them that what happened on the 22nd could very well happen
to them® (Reynolds, April 24, 2010).

‘The SPD's agenda for the future remains ambitious, illustrating an emerging,
‘multi-faceted intelligence-sharing network. It includes plans to expand the city's
video surveillance and gunfire-triangulation system, to adopt Compstat, to connect
to the regional law-enforcement database COPLINK, and to create "a centralized
information center (Fusion Center) in Salinas for the purpose of gathering and
sharing information from Federal, State and local sources" (Fetherolf, October
2009, 10).

Leonard A. Ferrari, provost o the Naval Postgraduate School, is enthusiastic about
Salinas’ potential. "The $1 rillion invested so far in Iraq and Afghanistan could
pay a dividend in American streets,” he told the Washington Post. The Salinas
approach, he suggested, could become "a national model” (Vick 2009).

Ceasefire, Compstat, COIN

In fact, the Salinas collaboration, "Operation Ceasefire," is already part of national
model, following a strategy developed in Boston under the same name. In 1996,
Boston's Ceasefire began with a focus on illegal handguns, but soon broadened its
attention to include the gangs that used them. In response to ongoing gang
conflict, the Boston Police Department convened a working group consisting of L
enforcement officers, social workers, academics, and members of the Black clergy
(Kennedy 2001; Braga and Winship 2005; Braga and Kennedy 2002)

Researchers working with police created a list of 155 murders, mapping the crimes
‘geographically and demographically. They examined the criminal records of both
the victims and (where known) the assailants. Using this information, they created
amap of various gangs, their territory, and conflict points (Kennedy 2001;
Kennedy 1997).

Prioritiing the likely trouble-spots, police officers then sat down with gang
‘members and gave them a clear choice: If there was gang violence in their area,
both the cops and the district attorney were going to hit with everything they had:

“They could distupt steeet drug activiy, focus police attention on ow-level steet crimes such
as trospassing and public drinking, serve outstanding warrants, culvate confidential
informantsfor medium-and lon:term investigations of gan ctivities, deliver trict
probation and parole enforcement, size drug proceeds and other asets, ensure stifer plea
bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention, request stronger bailtems (and enforce them),
and even focus potentially severe Federalinvestgativ and prosecutorial attention on, for
example, gang-related drug actviy (Kennedy 1998, 5.

On the other hand, if the gang members wanted to clean up their act, the police
would help them do so. Because of their coalition work, the cops came with offers
of job training, drug counseling, and other services (Braga and Winship 2005;
Kennedy 2001; Braga and Kennedy 2002). In this respect, Operation Ceasefire
grew directly from the Boston Police Department's pre-existing community
policing programs.

Over time, ceasefire developed four levels of intervention:

Level One was  warning, through forums o other mears, 10 a paricular group or groups o
stopthe vilenee.

Level Two was near-termstreet enforcomen(] . heavy police prsence, drug masket
disruption, warrant service, misdemcanor enforcerment, and simiar ations.

Level Three was alarge,interagency, heavily coordinated operation ... that was readly
apparent tothe target group.

Level Four . was for those roups that were both vilent and deemed esentilly
unslvageabi: undercouer, ganguide investigations making heavy useof Federal anctions
and designed - - o permanentlydismanile the group (Kenneds 200%, 42:3, emphasi
added)

‘The strategy worked through direct deterrence, denying the benefits of violence.

and raising the costs. As importantly, “Those costs were bone by the whole gang,

not just the shooter” (Kennedy 1998, 6). So the cops could begin applying
meaningful pressure before identifying a suspect, and the gang had an incentive to
keep their members under control and maintain the peace.

‘The key elements of Operation Ceasefire - social network analysis, commaunity
partnerships, inter-agency cooperation, and a direct approach to deterrence - were
quickly replicated and taken further in other citis, intersecting trends like zero-
tolerance policing and the Compstat program. A report from the Justice
Department's Office of Community Oriented Policing Service, Street Gangs and
Interventions: Innovative Problem Solving with Network Analysis, provides a
case study illustrating the result:
Inthe mid-1990's Newask'splic were being remelded according 1o the patern set by
Ginliai' New York. The direcor of the Newark Police Departmeni, Joe Sntiago
introduced a Compsat sysem and, i 1996, proposed a partnership with Kutgers University
professor George Kelina — famos s one of the authors ofthe “Broken Windovs" theory
nderying polce zeo-torance campaigns (Wilon and Kelling 1982). This parnership
coalesced i the Greater Newark Safer Chies Initiatve (GNSCE) (MeGloin 2005).
Slowly, Santiago built a working group including cops, scholars, social workers, the
clergy, and even public defense attorneys. It began by focusing on a small number
of repeat offenders, using the same deterrence model developed in Ceasefire. Then,
in 2003, GNSCI turned its attention to gangs, leading it o look beyond the city.
limits. The North Jersey Gang Task Force was bon.

Coordinating with law enforcement agencies statewide, the Rutgers researchers
began o collect a wide array of data on gang membership, recent crimes,
recruitment practices, family ties, and 50 on - as well as "information on the
criminal histories of all identified gang members.” Once the data was assembled,
the researchers, following Boston's example, use it to map gang territory and
perform a social network analysis, llustrating rivalries and alliances, and
identifying likely sites for conflict. They then took the analysis to the individual
level charting the connections between gang members and others who associate
with them. By diagramming these relationships, researchers were able to
distinguish between core members and those only marginally involved (McGloin
2005, 14-18).

Such information was erucial for making both tactical and strategic decisions,
Police could approach individual members differently, based on their role in the
gang and their level of commitment. They could also identify the pressure points
and know where to strike for maximum effect.
Networkanatysis s allows one {0 dentiy people who hok strcturally important
positions within the gang etworks. Cut points, people who are the only comnection
‘amon peopl or aroupsof people, may be des] slections forspreading a detereence
‘messugeor forafectingthe structore and organization ofth sreet gangs (MeGloin
2005, 18)
Unlike Boston, where the focus was strctly on stopping gang violence, in New
Jersey the aim was to disrupt the gangs themselves.

Carrots and sticks, hearts and minds

Operation Ceasefire and its progeny work chiefly through a "Cost/Benefit”
approach to counterinsurgency: The government provides an admixture of
incentives and deterrents to shape the choices of the rebels, their supporters, and
the population as a whole. Simply put, the state creates a strategy to raise the costs
associated with continued resistance and to reward cooperation. If the government
can bring more force to bear and offer better rewards than the insurgents, rational
self-interest should (in theory) lead people to side with the state rather than the
rebels (Gompert and Gordon 2008). Ceasefire applied this same thinking to urban
gangs.

Atthe same time, in developing Ceasefire, the police madle sure to align other
sources of legitimacy - social services, community organizations, the clergy - with
its efforts, thus simultancously increasing its leverage and heading off potential
resistance. For example, in Boston, the Ceasefire coalition included Black
‘ministers who had been vocal ritics of the police. These men of the cloth began
advising the cops in their anti-gang work, and eventually "sheltered the police from
broad public criticism” (Braga and Winship 2005, 6).

‘The other major approach to COIN - the older and more famous "hearts and
minds" strategy - operates by a somewhat different logic, focusing on “the problems
of modernization and the insurgent need for popular support.” As Rand explains,
the aim was to rebuild public confidence in the government by instituting reforms,
reducing corruption, and improving the population’s standard of living (Gompert
and Gordon, 2008, 25).

‘We can see the "Hearts and Minds" approach employed in a separate domestic
experiment - the federally-funded "Weed and Seed” program.

Weed and Seed: Clear-Hold-Build

‘Weed and Seed was conceived in 1991, and gained prominence a year later as part
Of the federal response to widespread rioting after the acquittal of four Los Angeles
cops who had been videotaped beating Black motorist Rodney King, Since that
time, it has been implemented in over 300 neighborhoods nationwide.
‘The Department of Justice deseribes the project:

“The Weesd and Seed strateay i based on  bwo-pronged approach:

. Law enforcement agencies and eriminal jusice officals cooperate with
local wsidents to weed out riminal ctivity n the designsted ara.

2. Social service providers and economie revitalztion effrts a
introduced o seed" the area, ensuring long-term positve hange
quality of e for residents” (Community Capacity Development

In terms of strategy, Weed and Seed closely resembles the military’s "Clear-Hold-
Build." As FM 3-24 elaborates: "Create a secure physical and psychological
environment. Establish firm government control of the populace and area. Gain
the populace’s support” (FM 3-24, 2006, 5

Clearing and holding refer to the removal and exclusion of hostile elements.
Building, on the other hand, means both, literall, repairing infrastructure
and, more metaphorically, gaining trust and winning support. However, even
building includes an element of force:

Progeess in building support for the HX [Host Naton] government requiresprotecing the
local populac. .. To proteet he populace, HN securty fores continuously conduct patrols
and e measured force against insurgent targets of opportuniy. - Actions to liminate the
remaining covert nsurgen politcal nfrastruture must b continaed...(FM 3-24, 2006, 5-
7o)

‘The domestic analogy is pretty straightforward. One police chief described the role

of paramilitary units in his community policing stratey:

[Thelonly people that ar soing tobe abl to deal it these probleens are gk
trained tactcal teams vith proper equipment to g intoa neighborhood and clear the
neighborhod snd hold it;allowing community policng officers to come in and start
torning the neighborhood around (Kraska and Kappeler 1999, 473)

In such campaigns, the relationship between community policing and
militarization s especially clear. They're not competing or contradictory
approaches. They work together, simultancously or in series. One does the
weeding; the other, the seeding. The implications are not lost on those subject to
this sort of campaign. "They're gunning for us,” Omari Salisbury, a Seattle
teemager, said when he heard about Weed and Seed. "They're gunning for Black
youth" (Lilly 1992).

Gang politics

Gang suppression has to be viewed, not only in terms of erime, but also in terms of
politics.

This is true in two respects. First, police are not only (or even mainly) fighting
crime, enforcing the law, or preventing violence - they are also disrupting and dis-
organizing an incipient political force, triking against it before it can become a real
nexus of resistance. A growing body of iterature now specifically argues that gang
violence should be treated as a type of insurgency (Manwaring 2005; Long 2010;
Sullivan 2009; JP 3-24, Appendix A). And, by applying the techniques and analysis
of counterinsurgency o counter-gang campaigns, the state tacitly admits that there
i poltinldmeusion o i oy presented 2 pors riminality
Insurgency and counterinsurgency are, together, a struggle over legitimacy. By
e he COTR amewor domeiests theovemens concties e
legitimacy is being challenged and that the challengers (however localized and
weak) are rivals, or potential rivals, with independent claims to legitimacy and
distinet spheres of influence.

Second, the gangs are sometimes self-consciously engaged in political action. As
John Sullivan, an L.A. County Sheriff’s Deputy, writes in one Rand report:

[SJome [gangs] have begun to adopt vasying degreesof olitical activity. At the low end,
his activity may include dominating neighborhood i and creating virtual Tawless
zones, application oftreet taxes, o txes on other criminal sctors. Gangs .
Sophisticated paliical attributes ypically c-opt polic and govermment off
nterforence with ther acivites. AL the high end, some gangs b

‘agendas, usingthe political rocess t further ther ends and desabilze governments
(Sullvan 2001, 102)

Among the examples Sullivan cites are the Gangster Disciples, a gang with 30,000
members in 35 states. In addition to employing themselves in the drug trade, "GD
‘members infiltrate police and private security agencies, sponsor political
candidates, register voters, and sponsor protest marches" (Sullivan 2001, 113-4).
Other gangs have been active in resistance against gentrification, loan sharks, slum
lords, price gouging, and police brutality (Jankowski 1991).

Historically, the Black Panther Party recognized the political potential of gangs. In
Philadelphia, in the late 60s, the Panthers organized a series of gang conferences
and tried to use negotiations to quell neighborhood violence. The Panthers also
directed some of their public education and recruitment efforts toward gang,
members. Some gangsters did enlist to help in the Panthers'free breakfast
program, and a few went on to become full Party members (Dyson 2007). Most
strikingly, the Los Angeles chapter was formed by a former gang leader, Alprentice
“Bunchy” Carter of the Slauson Renegades (Jeffries and Foley 2007).

Anti-gang polities
Facing these challenges, police anti-gang campaigns typically combine a variety of
elements analogous to those in counterinsurgency: the creation of databases listing
suspected gang members; the mapping of the social environment, llustrating
connections between gang members, associates, families,etc.; the development of
community contacts, especially with local leaders. These intelligence efforts are
then paired with a campaign of persistent low-level harassment - stops, searches,
petty citations, and the like. Each instance of harassment offers police the
opportunity to collect additional information on the gang network while at the
same time creating an inhospitable environment for those associated with gang;
activity.

For example, the main group responsible for such work in Salinas is the Monterey
County Gang Task Force, called "The Black Snake" by youths in the community.
The Task Force has 17 members, drawn from local police and sheriffs departments,
the California Highway Patrol, and the state Department of Corrections. Wearing
distinctive black uniforms and driving black cars, Task Force members conduct
mass-arrest "round-ups" (Salinas Police Department 2010, 4), make random traffic
stops, and regularly search the homes of gang members on parole or probation
(Kraft 2010). The sheer volume of such activity is astonishing: Since it was formed
in 2005, the Task Force has been responsible for 21,000 vehicle or pedestrian
stops, 5,000 parole and probation "compliance” searches, and 2,800 arrests (Long

Such anti-gang efforts are ahways implicitly political, especially as they become
permanent features of lie in poor Black and Latino communities. Though
ostensibly aimed at preventing gang violence, counter-gang campaigns nvitably
lead police to monitor the community as a whole. A Fresno cop explains the
intended scope of his department's gang files: “If you're twenty-one, male, living in
one of these neighborhoods, been in Fresno for ten years and you're not in our
computer—then there's definitely a problem.” (Parenti 1999, 111, emphasis added).
Disproportionate attention, especially when paired with lower - or "zero"

tolerance for disorder, then contributes to higher rates of arrest and incarceration
(Greene and Pranis 2007).

Rogardies,the rate of vilent crime has not appreciably decreased (Long 2010).
Sometimes officials extend enforcement by securing gang injunctions, special court
orders prohibiting activities that would otherwise be legal - barring alleged gang
‘members from appearing together in public, restricting the clothing they can wear,
and subjecting them to a nighttime curfew (Critical Resistance 2015; Barajas 2007).
Ata broader level, the police will often engage in efforts disruptive of ordinary
social lfe in gang-affected areas, such as cordoning, saturating, or sweeping select
locations (e.g. parks, streets, or bars) or targeted events (ballgames, parties, car
shows) (Padilla 1992; Sheldon 2001)

In the most advanced campaigns, police sometimes take the further step of
strategically causing gang conflict. Following the 1992 Los Angeles riots, for
example, police did what they could to wreck a city-wide truce between the Bloods
and the Crips. The cops did not only attack negotiating meetings and inter-gang
social events, but also engaged in some underhanded tactics to create friction:
covering one gang's graffit with another's, or arresting a Blood only to release him
deep in Crip territory. This occurred, not only in a context of widespread anger and
recent unrest, but also at a point in which the gangs themselves were becoming
increasingly politicized (Davis 1992; Klein 1995; Sperzel 1995).

Mike Davis described the government's response to the riots in military terms:

I Los Angeles 1 think we are beginning to s a reprossive contextthat s lterally
comparable to Belfstor the West Bank.where policing has been transformed int0 ful-scale
Counterinsargency . againstan entire socil Srbum or ethaic group (Davis 1092).

Part Four: preserving order, preventing change
Hard and soft

Ibegan this paper by outlining, in some detail, the basic principles of
counterinsurgency theory, the intelligence needs that accompany it, and its direct
application in both (foreign) military and (domestic) policing contexts. I've
explained the basics of Social Network Analysis, and the process by which its
insights into both insurgent organizations and the surrounding population are
translated into direct coercion and bids to win popular support. 1 have suggested
that f the left wants to understand the repression it faces, it should study the ways
the U.S. government responds to forces as varied as the Taliban, the Gangster
Disciples, and the RNC 8. And I have stated, emphatically, that it i the political
dimension of insurgency and counterinsurgency that really counts.

And yet, thus far,  have focused chiefly on the "hard” side of repression - the direct
coercion, the forceful disruptions, the eriminalization and incarceration, the
violence. Now we need to look at the "soft” sde - the strategic use of concessions,
the promise of representation and access, the co-optation of leadership, and,

comprising all of these, the institutionalization of dissent.* These elements
represent,at this point, the state's most typical response to opposition from the
left. And, by these means, the state does not only achieve control and exercise:
power over the organizations of the left, but through them.

Stages and strategies

Iniits earlier stages, repression may be hard to recognize for exactly the same
reasons that a proto-insurgency is - because everything seems normal. We should
remember, however, that the authorities aren't just preparing for unrest, they're
actively preempting opposition. They do that by broadly monitoring the
community, building alliances, channeling political efforts into projects they can
control, and disrupting networks and social ties that might otherwise form the
basis for resistance.

Of course, as COIN moves into its later stages it will become increasingly military
in character. Both the overt use of force and covert surveillance, infiltration, and

disruption will increase. Emergency powers may be granted, civil liberties
suspended, and the lfe of the overall population increasingly restricted. (FM 31-

But as the crisis progresses to higher levels, the work of lower stages continues.
Smart revolutionaries don'tstop organizing as they escalate their tactics; they use
their actions to help build their organizations. Likewise, the security forces do not
cease their efforts at intelligence gathering or alliance building, but use those
efforts in support of their more bellicose activities.

Of course, the aim of any counterinsurgency campaign is a return to normal - that
is, to the lowest level of manageable conflict (Galula 1965). In effect, this is a return
to'the proto-insurgency stage: Opposition is either channeled into safe,
institutional forms, or suppressed through normal police and intelligence activity
(Celeski 2000).

The British strategist Frank Kitson summarizes the overall process:

In procical term the most promising line of approach [in COIN] e n separating the
massof those engaged in tho [revolutionary] campaign from the leadership by the
Sudicious promise of concessions,a the same time imposing  period ofcalm by the use
of government forces. .. Having once succeeded in providing  breathing space by these.

institutionsliztion . is composed of thece main components: First,the routinzation of
collective action. ... Sccond, nclusion and marginalization, whereby challengers who are willing
1o adhere o established routines il be granted access to political exchanges in mainstream
institutions, whik those who efuse t accept them can be shut out of conversations theough cther
repression or neglct. Third, cooptation whih means that challengers alter ther claims and tacties
10 0nes that can be pursued vithout disruptng the normal practice ofpolites” (Meyer and Tarrow
1998, 21, emphasis in original).
means, it is most important to do three further things quickdy. The firstis to implement
the promised concessions. ... The second i o discorer and neutralze the genuine
subversive clement, The third s to ssociate a8 many prominent mersbers of the
population,especialy those who have been engaged in non-volent action, with the
sovernment. This last technique is known in America s co-optation. . (Ktson 1971, 7).

Byman argues similarly:

“The deal alles for  government implemmenting contmlare, in fact,nonviolent mermbers of
the communitythe would-be insurgentssec o mabilize. . I egimes can infirat -or,
better et cooperate vith - mainstream groups hey re cfen ablo o i iformation o
raicalacivities and turn potental militants away rom volence (Byman 2007, 24)

Broadly speaking, counterinsurgeney offers two approaches to dealing with

opposition, and they must be used selectively. Some adversaries, especially

‘moderates, may be co-opted, bought off, and appeased. Others, the more

recalcitrant portion, must be forcefuly dis-organized, disrupted, deterred, or

destroyed. The balance of concessions and coercion will be apportioned
accordingly. Some adversaries win new posts - offices in a "reformed
administration, or jobs in "responsible" nonprofits, labor unions, or progressive
think tanks. They gain access, inclusion, or representation in exchange for working
within the existing institutional framework. The others will face harsher outcomes

- including, for example, imprisonment, exile or assassination. Whatever the

approach in a particular case, the important thing is that the opposition is

neutralized - rendered harmless, made controllable, and exploited as cither the
abject or the tool of state power.

"Force multipliers": the military-NGO complex

Counterinsurgency theory places a heavy emphasis on shaping the social

environment in which the population lives and resistance develops. One way

‘governments exercise this influence is with their money. As FM 3-24 explains
Some ofthe Best Weapons for Counteinsurgents Do Not Shoot.... Counterinsurgents ofin
acievethe most meaningful succes n gamering public support and legitimacy or the HN
overnment wit activitesthat do not involve Killing insurgents. __ 1 atin vilory comes
from a vbrant economs, political prticipaton, and estored hope. Pariculary fer ecurity
as been achieved, dollarsand balots will ave more important efcts than bombs and
bullts.. money is ammuniton. (FM.3-24, 2006, 153, emphass inorgial).

Foreign aid has thus often been criticized as an instrument of imperialism, even
when the funds are distributed indirectly through nongovernmental or
nongovernmental humanitarian organizations (NGOs or NGHO) (Roy 2004;
Ungpakorn 2004; Engler 2010; Petras 1999).

Asthe U.S. began its war against Afghanistan in October 2001, Colin Powell - the
former General, the founding Chairman of the nonprofit America’s Promise:
Alliance, and, at the time, the Secretary of State - managed to embarrass NGO
leaders with his praise for their work. Speaking at the National Forcign Policy
Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations, he said: "[J]ust as
surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and
sacrificing on the front lines of freedom. ... [NGOs] are such a force multiplier for
us, such an important part of our combat team” (Powell 2001).

Later, guidelines negotiated by representatives of the military and the major
humanitarian groups discouraged any repetition of Powell’s gaffe, specifying that
"U.S. Armed Forces should not describe NGHOs as ‘force maultiplirs' or partners’
of the military” (U.S. Institute of Peace, no date). FM 3-24 managed to retain
Powell's meaning while avoiding the offensive language: "Many such agencies
resist being overtly involved with military forces,” it cautions; but then: "some kind
of liaison [is] needed. .. to ensure that, as much as possible, objectives are shared
and actions and messages synchronized.” (FM 3-24, 1-122).

‘The Rand study Networks and Netwars outlines "a range of possibilities” for the
military's use of international nonprofits:
from encouraging thecary involvement o appropriate NGO networks n helping o detect
and head offa looming cii, 1o workin closely with then n the atermath o conflcs to
improve theefectiveness o {13, force il deployed, o reee the resual hazards they
face, and t srengthen the oten fragle pesce (Arquilia and Ronfed 2001, ).
One result of this perspective is that aid money, and thus NGO attention,
increasingly follows the state's priorities - and its military's priorities in particular
(Grain 2000). For instance, in 2010 the U.S. awarded $114 million to aid groups
working in Yemen, with the stated goal of “improving the livelihood of citizens in
targeted communities and improving governance capabiliies” (Rieff 2010). This
supposedly humanitarian assistance came alongside $1.2 billion in military aid,
clandestine military and intelligence activity, and a CLA assessment that the Al
Qaedaaffiliate in Yemen represents the largest threat to United States' global
security (Miller and Finn 2010; Zelin 2010).

Meanwhile, the Defense Department now controls 20% of the US. government's
budset for Official Development Assistance (Grain 2000). *[Dlevelopment
priorities follow the battle space,” David Rieff writes in The New Republic.
“[Dlevelopment is a continuation of war by other means” (Rieff 2010).

‘The Marshal Plan

‘The domestic counterpart to the nongovernmental *force multiplier” is the
community policing "partnership.” We've seen nonprofit funding tied to the
criminal justice agenda in the Weed and Seed program; the use of social services
and Black Churches to create “the ‘network of capacity’ necessary to legitimize,
fund, equip, and carry out” Boston's Operation Ceasefire (Braga and Winship,
2005, 4-5); the collaboration of social workers, the clergy, and public defense
attorneys for similar ends in Newark; police-sponsored youth and elders programs
in Salinas; and, in Los Angeles, the government’s use of social service agencies to
gain access to Muslim communities suspected of breeding terrorists

But sometimes police-led partnerships go further, using progressive nonprofits to
channel and control political opposition, moving it in safe, institutional, and
reformist directions, rather than toward more radical or militant action. For
example, consider the efforts of liberal nonprofits to contain community anger after
transit police shot and killed an unarmed Black man in Oakland, California:

Oscar Grant was killed on January 1, 2009. A week later, on January 7, a protest
against the police turned into a small rot (Ciccariello-Maher, January 9-11, 2000)
Organizers with the Coalition Against Police Executions (CAPE) —a group largely
composed oflocal progressive nonprofits and Black churches -- denounced the
violence. One CAPE leader said that he wept watehing the riots on television,
feeling that years of hard work were being "destroyed by anarchists” (Ciccaricllo-
Maher, January 16-18, 2000).

But - likely because of the revolt - the cop in the case, Johannes Mehserle, was
arrested and charged with murder. Before the riots there had been no statement of
concern from the mayor's office, no Justice Department investigation, and no
arrests. In fact, the transit agency - for whom Mehserle worked - had not even
interviewed him about the incident. “The rebellion was really about the fact that
nothing was being done,” George Ciccariello-Maher explains. "If there's one lesson
to take from this, it's that the only reason Mehserle was arrested is because people
tore up the city. It was the riot - and the threat of future riots” (Ciccariello-Maher,
October 23, 2010).

Inan effort to re-assert ts leadership, CAPE organized another demonstration for
January 14. Speakers included Mayor Ron Dellums, the rapper Too Short, and.
representatives of various nonprofits - all of whom urged the crowd to remain
peaceful. Furthermore, CAPEs designated marshals, operating under the
supervision of a private security guard, surrounded the demonstration while
unidentified informants mingled in the crowd to look for troublemakers
(Ciccariello-Maher, January 16-18, 2000).

Despite the tight control, things did not go as planned. When the speeches were
over, much of the crowd refused to leave. Organizers announced that police would
intervene if the group would not disperse; but rather than wait, CAPE's own
‘marshals formed a line and began pushing people off the streets. The crowd - now
very angry - started breaking windows. The security team, after consulting with
police, withdrew from the area and left it to the cops to handle the crowd. The
police fired teargas and made arrests (Ciccariello-Maher, January 16-18, 2000;
Advance the Struggle 2000).

Future demonstrations, beginning on January 30, were likewise handled with
threats, arrests, and violence (Raider Nation Collective, May 2010; Ciccariello-
Maher, February 3,2000). At the same time, and in keeping with the COIN model,
local, state, and federal agencies all undertook extensive intelligence operations
targeting protest organizers - monitoring websites, videotaping crowds, sending
plainclothes officers into the demonstrations, and infiltrating planning meetings
(Winston, December 15, 2010; Winston, December 16, 2010; Winston, January 6,
2011; Winston, January 7, 2011; Winston, January 27, 2011).

“If we learned on January seventh that our power was in the streets,” Ciccariello-
Maher concludes, "what we learned on the fourteenth is that the state was going to
counter-attack. ... The state didn't counterattack by force at first; the state
counter-attacked through these institutions, the nonprofits” (Ciccariello-Maher,
October 23, 2010).

No justice, Urban Peace

Ayear later, the process repeated itself. As Johannes Mehserle's trial approached,
Nicole Lee, director of the nonprofit "Urban Peace Movement," circulated an email
focused, not on winning justice, but on preventing violence should justice be
denied. Titled “Bracing for Mehserle Verdict: Community Engagement Plan,” the
June 23, 2010 memo offered two sets of instructions:
9 Organizations, CBO's [Community-Based Organizaions], and Pubic Ageniesshould be
hinkingof ways o create organised eventsor averuesfor young peopl and commnity
members to expressther rustrations with he system in constructve and pesceful ways. 16
ol bave gt hen sy e casier ok o b peled ovard o st
Topalses.

2)We need o begin inoculating’our bases and the community at-large so that when the
verdict comes dowun, peaple are prepared for it, and so that the ‘outside agiators who vere
actve during theinial Oscar Grant protestsaré not able t incite the crow so cas

2010, emphasis in origoal).

‘The memo listed several talking points, which served the state's interests so well
that the City of Oakland ran an edited version on its webpage (Raider Nation
Collective, July 2010).

Around the same time, another organization, ironically named "Youth Uprising,"
sponsored a public service announcement centered on the slogan, "Violence is Not
Justice.” The video includes local rappers, civil rights attorneys, school
administrators, representatives from nonprofits, a police captain, and the District
Attorney of San Francisco - all urging a peaceful response to the verdict (Youth
Uprising 2010).

Religious leaders also got into the act, using the pulpit to ask people to remain
~The organiation's vebsite, VouthUprising or, presenty quotes Attoney General Exic Hokler,

saying the group s a“porfect examplo of what we necd to be doing around the country” (viowed
Octaber 14,2010,
safely at home when the verdict was announced (Ciceariello-Maher, June 29,
2010).

‘The pacifying efforts, though broadly distributed, were centrally coordinated.
Shortly before the trial, the mayor and police held a meeting with several Bay Area
nonprofits. The topic, of course, was the prevention of iots (Ciccariello-Maher,
June 29, 2010),

In practice, avoiding unrest became the primary focus of the institutionalized left;
CAPEs stated goal, the prevention of police brutality, receded into the background.
Ifanything, by condemning the rioters and cooperating with the cops, liberal
leaders helped to legitimize the police counter-attack and made further brutality
more, not less,likely.

In the end, Officer Mehserle was convicted, but of a lesser charge - manslaughter,
rather than murder. And, when the verdict was announced, rioting did ensue
(Ciccariello-Maher, July 12, 2010). Hundreds of people, mostly young people of
color, braved not only the clubs and the tear gas of the police, but also the
condemnation of their purported community leaders

Advance the Struggle

In their published analysis of the Oscar Grant erisis, the revolutionary group
‘Advance the Struggle argued that, by trying to de-fuse popular anger, "Bay Area
nonprofits effectively acted as an extension of the state” (Advance the Struggle,
2009, 8-0)4

Had the rage over Grant's murder not been channeled into ritualized protest, had
the leaders not been more concerned with controlling the community responise
than in confronting injustice, had the organizing not been, in a word,
institutionalized - it is hard to know what might have been possible.

Advance the Struggle contrasted the trajectory of events in Oakland with those of
Greece, just a few weeks before the Grant kiling:
“There, th police murder of  15-year.okd Alexandros Grigoropoulos riggered eactions
which,very quickly, evolved rom protess t rots o  eneralstrike in which 2.5 millon
workers wer on strke in December 2008, Witin daya the killer cop and police accomplices
were amestd, bt even this concession 't rick the movement o subsiding.

“The police munder se off the uprising, but the pasticipants connected the murler it the
{ssues of unemployment, neo-libersl cconomsc measures,polticalcorruption, and a faling
education system. Aren't we facing simlar problems in Oakland..? (Advance the Struggle

A fow months lter, radicals i Seattle reported  simila dynamie, co-opted communiy leaders
suppressing unest it polie killd a Native Amercan man. (Nightvwol and Mamos 2010.)

 For similar critiques of the rol non-profits playin managing political strugel,see ncite 2007.

2009, 22. Paragraph break added for emphasis )

Of course there are differences between Oakland and Athens - ifferences of
‘geography, history, and political culture. The type of insurrection unleashed in
Greece may not, at present, be possible in California. But that is not an objection to
the radical analysis; it is, instead, the premise. The political environment in
Oakland has been shaped in such a way so as to sharply limit the possibilities of
struggle. And the institutionalization of conflictin professionalized nonprofits is
an important part of that restrictive context. There is no guarantee that things
would have gone further had the nonprofits not intervened, or that greater conflict
would have won greater gains. But their intervention certainly helped to contain
the rebellion, and closed off untold possibilities for further action. Thatis, quite
clearly, what it was intended to do.

Conclusion: resisting repression

Ibegan this essay by suggesting that a great deal of political repression goes
unrecognized, and that the left needs to revise its understanding of repression i it
s to resist it effectively. This need has developed alongside - in some respects it is
a reflection of - similar changes in the thinking of our adversaries.

‘With the emergence of the counterinsurgency model, the state has ceased to view
subversives in isolation from the society surrounding them. Increasingly, it has
directed its attention - ts intelligence gathering, its coercive force, and its alliance
building - toward the population as a whole. Repression, in other words, s not
something that happens solely, or even mainly, to activists; and it not just the
province of red squads, but of gang enforcement teams, neighborhood liaison
officers, and even police advisory boards. It comprises all those methods - routine
and extraordinary, coercive and collaborative - used to regulate the conflict
inherent in a stratified society. Our task is to decipher the politics implicit in these
efforts,to discern the ways tht they preserve state power, neutralize resistance,
and maintain social inequality.

Our further task i to respond. As repression is primarily a political process, any
adequate response must take - at least in part - a political form. It will not be
enough, as is usual, to put the case before a jury, or adopt strict secrecy in the name
of some cloak-and-dagger notion of security culture.” Such things must be done at
times, but both these responses, though in very different ways, treat repression
chiefly as alegal, and thus technical, problem. They are also entirely defensive.
‘While such devices may protect the individual or small group with greater or lesser

= The cop who shot Grigoropaulos was convicted and sentened t ife in prison. (Associated Press
2010)
efficacy, they do not generally touch - or even attempt to touch - the overall system
of repression, to say nothing of the social iniquities that system maintains.

‘Whatever defensive measures may be necessary, an effective response to repression
must also involve an offensive component - an attack against the apparatus of
repression, which will (i successful) leave the state weaker and the social
‘movement stronger. This outcome, of course, should be the aim from the start.

Itis, in a sense, misleading to speak solely in terms of responding to repression.
Repression exists already. It intervenes preemptively. It forms part of the context
in which we act. Oppositional movements cannot avoid repression; the challenge,
instead, must be to overcome it

‘When facing counterinsurgency, we need to learn to think like insurgents: The
antidote to repression is, simply put, more resistance. But this cannot just be a
matter of escalating tactics or increasing militancy. Crucially,it has to involve
broadening the movement's base of support. We have to remember that an
insurgency is not just a series of tactical exchanges with the state. It is, instead, a
contest for the allegiance of the population. For the rebels, no less than for the
authorities, “Legitimacy s the main objective.”

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About the author

Kristian Williams is the author of Our Enemies in Blue: Police and Power
in America and American Methods: Torture and the Logic of Domination. He
volunteers with Rose City Copwateh, in Portland, Oregon.