Black Fighting Formations

Russell Maroon Shoatz
Black Fighting Formations: 2
their strengths, weaknesses, and potentials
by Russell “Maroon” Shoatz
copyright 2007

A study of the various black political organizations in the United
States between the years of 1960-1994 will reveal a number of “fighting
formations.” These formations were usually subdivisions or offshoots of
larger organizations which were not primarily envisioned as fighting
groups. This lack of original dedication to a “fighting mission” will go a
fong way toward helping explain their strengths, weaknesses, and
potentials (or lack of them).

Not included in this study are the non-political black fighting
formations found amongst the street gangs or those dedicated to .
criminal activity. However, mention will be made of them in regard to the
loss of the black political fighting formations’ potential.

We must look to Sun Tzu (ca. Sth Century BC) and Karl Von
Clausewitz (19th Century AD) for the most concise writings on the
philosophy of warfare, the ultimate reasons for engaging in it, and the
main dynamics controlling its many changeable parts. The Art of War
and On War by the aforementioned authors respectively are mentioned
by military practitioners around the world as two of the best, tried and
true volumes available on the subject. There have been many
outstanding military practitioners of African descent as well: Thutmose
111 (the first imperial conqueror); Ramses II and Ramses III (consistent
subduers of the barbarian and savage hordes of Europe and Asia);
Queens Ann Nzinga and (the) Candace(s) of Ethiopia and Angola;
Hannibal Barca (of known fame); Shaka Zulu (warrior par excellent);
Toussaint L'Ouverture and Antonio Maceo (who out-generaled and out-
fought vastly superior European armies in Haiti and Cuba). Finally, we
must add to these the outstanding guerilla leaders amongst the Maroons.
and the African anti-colonial fighters. Although guerilla warfare is often
sufficient, it must be kept in mind that *guerilla warfare” is only a sub-
division and sometimes a forerunner of “total war.” Despite the
successes of these African warriors, there is very little written work
available on them; thus we must rely on that by SunTzu and Karl Von
Clausewitz.

Sun Tzu in his The Art of War (1) instructs: “War is a matter of
vital importance to the state [it is] the providence of life and death [and]
the road to survival or ruin I is mandatary that it be tharoughly
studied.” In On War (2) Karl Von Clausewitz states: *War is an
extension of politics, politics by different means.” Both of these authors
demonstrate the connection between politics and warfare and the
relative importance of both. (Politics here is simply the science and art of

governing people.) It follows that those who are involved in shaping
political affairs must recognize that they wil, at some time, be required
to pursue their political objectives “by different means” (Von Clausewitz
as “the road to survival or ruin (Tzu).” Warfare! 3

For the revolutionary, warfare cannot be a haphazard or
belated consideration, as denying these principles (non-violent
pacifism) will ultima Therefore, all of
our black political organizations should have had a military component
right from the beginning. From their inception It would have been the
mission of these military components to study and prepare for war. This
presupposes that the political and military leadership is sagacious
enough to discern both the long-range interests of their people and the
potential conflicts that they will invariably encounter by pursuing these
interests. In other words, our black political organizations should have
known, right from the beginning, that they had to build a military
component which was capable of defending our people from the attacks
they were undergoing s a result of working to free themselves from
oppression. Sadly, this was not the case.

In order to understand better what must be done now, we need to
learn from the mistakes of the past. When 1960 dawned, there were no
black fighting formations—with the exception of the Nation of Islam’s
paramilitary wing known as the “Fruit of Islam,” which was formed
largely in response to Malcolm X's tireless efforts. The Fruit of Islam,
however, was dedicated to internal security and static defense of the
Nation of Islam’s leadership and property. It was further hobbled (in
qualitative development) by the group’s unwillingness to become activel
involved in the Civil Rights struggle where most of the action was taking
place. They were not much better than department store security
guards, as they were far removed from the dictums of “total war.”
Subsequent events would expose their weaknesses.

To their credit, however, the Fruit of Islam had perfected a methoc
of recruiting, organizing, and training (to the extent that training was
done) unparalleled to this day. The secret of their success was that they
concentrated their main recruiting efforts among the most downtrodden
segments of the black community: drug addicts, prison Inmates,

- prostitutes, and destitute poor. Although it took a lot of effort to recruit
and organize these people, once they were fully brought into the
organization they became steadfast and loyal members of their new
(psychological) family. By the time the Nation of Islam had “fished" ther
out of the mud, they had no other family to stand by them, as they had
burnt their bridges. These recruits were kept under extremely close
supervision and were always provided with the means to acquire food,
clothing, shelter, security, and entertainment (which was usually social
fellowship in religious garb). The Fruit of Islam provided everything that

Y
3 functioning family would provide its members.

The organization itself had a nationalist-sounding program but no
Jrand strategy for achieving such ends. The first dictum of war: “war is a
Tatter of vital importance to the state . . . and it is mandatory that it be
“horoughly studied (Tzu)" was not obsrved. This statement is not just a
Tatter of opinion, as events have proven this to be so, as it does not
:ake long to build military capability. Of course, the organization has not
1ad a free ride as they continue to fight the government’s infiltration and
nanipulation in addition to the petty jealousies and rivalries existing
1mong their leaders. Nevertheless it is clear that, with a few exceptions,
hey have missed the boat when it comes to being an important black
ighting formation.

The Civil Rights movement was launched in 1955 with the
“ontgomery Alabama bus boycott, and it spread quickly throughout the -
South. In addition to the local groupings, which in some cases had
Jready been active in their communities, a number of other
srganizations began to emerge on the national scene by 1960: the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Congress of Racial
uality (CORE), the Urban League, and the Student Non-Violent
Zoordinating Committee (SNCC aka “Snick”). The National Association
‘or the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had been around since
he early 1900s. From 1955 until 1965, all of the major actions taking
Slace in the black freedom struggle occurred in the South, and the
sforementioned organizations led these struggles. Each of these
>rganizations professed non-violence as their strategy but ultimately
‘elied on someone else’s armed force to protect them, usually the U.S.
Sovernment—with disastrous results. These groups would call ahead to
“he FBI to alert them to their plans and request protection. The FBI, in
urn, would contact members of the local police force, who were often
“ard-carrying Ku Klux Klansmen, or they would contact their undercover
agents/operatives in the Kian who would subsequently organize a
shooting, burning, bombing, or killing. These organizations were .
violating every rule in the “art of war.” Instead of observing the rule
“destroy your enemy and preserve yourself” they were actually aiding
“heir enemy in their own destruction! This exact pattern was repeated, to
3ne degree or another, when the U.S. Government provided Marshals or
“ederal troops. Despite this short-sighted and disastrous strategy, and
the heroic sacrifices suffered by the rank-and-file (largely black men,
women, and children), this cowardly and ignorant strategy did force a
number of changes during this period of time. These groups gave rise,
aibeit belatedly, to a few armed fighting subdivisions and offshoots.

The Monroe County North Carolina NAACP branch was headed by a
black man named Robert F. Willliams, who saw early on that his chapter

of the NAACP would suffer countless casualties and could not survive
unless they abandoned the non-violent approach and adopted a strateg;
of armed self-defense. This brother strongly advocated that all blacks in
the U.S. adopt armed self-defense. Williams walked his talk, his Monroe
County NAACP branch was both armed and trained, and because of this
they survived a number of shootouts with the local KKK (citizens and
police). Unfortunately he was unable to effect any widespread 5
acceptance of his methods, and his chapter was isolated as a result
After a so-called "kidnapping” of some white people, he was forced to
leave the country. He continued his work while in exile by traveling
throughout Africa and visiting China in an attempt to raise support for
the struggle in the U.S. He became a nationalist and published a paper
known as The Crusader,” in which he advocated the overthrow of the
U.S. government through guerilla warfare. After a number of years, he
was able to return to the U.S. as the head of the revolutionary group.
Republic of New Africa (RNA). He avoided prison, as RNA was able to
expose and squash the trumped-up kidnappiing charge.

At the same time, the organization "Deacons for Defense and
Justice” was organized in Louisiana and rural Alabama and Mississippi.
Un)lke Williams’s Monroe County chapter, the Deacons were not a
subdivision. Rather they were an offshoot and thus autonomous from the
national non-violent leadership. The Deacons recruited, organized, and
trained solely from this perspective. Because of this fact, they were mor
sophisticated than any other part-time militant black organization during
the Civil Rights struggle. It was the Deacons, for instance, who provided
a tightly organized security and communications net around some of the
most important Civil Righs marches. While the Civil Rights groups
provided their posted marshals with armbands, the Deacons had roving
patrols armed with automatic rifles! After a few skirmishes and firefights
with Klan and Night Riders (part-time Klan who were afraid to show the
faces during the day), the “crackers” gave the Deacons a wide berth.
Ultimately, however, the Deacons’ potential for growth was relatively
circumscribed due to the Civil Rights movement’s overall strategy of
reliance on the U.S. Government for protection.

Rural Mississippi had also made believers out of the young SNCC
cadre. SNCC had started its "Mississippi Freedom Summer” campaign ir
1964 as non-violent activists. After experiencing the death of several of
their comrades and supporters (Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner to
name a few) and the raw terror that the police and Klan/Night Riders
inspired, all of the SNCC cadre was armed by the time they left
Mississippi. SNCC leader H. Rap Brown was arrested after a rifle and
banana clips were found in his luggage following a flight from Mississipgi
SNCC eventually changed its name to the “Student National Coordinatirg

Committee,” dropping the *Non-Violent” description. Yet it was too little
too late, as the momentum was already shifting to the cities of the North
and West. SNCC's last effort in 1965 was to organize the Lowndes {
County Freedom Organization whose emblem was a black panther (no
direct association to the Black Panther Party founded in October 1966).
The Lowndes County Freedom Organization adopted armed self-defense
from the beginning. Although they experimented with the slogan *Black
power,” they did not make any far-reaching progress, as their political
goal was still “civil rights.”

The Watts California rebellion in 1965 was the signal that the
momentum in the black struggle was shifting to the cities. Within two
years, a number of rebellions occurred in other major cities and small
towns. This was a qualitatively different situation. Rather than peaceful
demonstrators seeking to acquire “civil rights,” these events were
massive and widespread rebellions (Watts: 34 dead, New York,
Philadelphia, Birmingham, and Newark: 26 dead, Detroit, 43 dead; and
in each case hundreds were wounded and massive property damage
occurred. The keen political observer could not miss the parallels
between these rebellions and those that had preceded revolutions and
armed struggles in other countries. But what was missing from the
equation? No urban-based black political groups had armed components
(3). There were no black fighting formations to organize, cantrol, and
direct these rebellions. The Fruit of Islam was clearly not up to the job
because they had not been able to properly respond to the killings and
shootings of their members by the local police. Nor could the rural-based
roups lend any support, as they were still involved in life-and-death
Struggles with the Kian and Southern police. SNCC made a half-hearted
attempt to transfer their operations to urban areas. However, aside from
H. Rap Brown and a few others, it seemed that after their Southern
experience, SNCC was scared off.

The urban rebellions brought forth scores of new political
formations and these formations generally and in theory adhered
o the idea of armed self-defense. Along with this shift in tactics
came the new nationalist (sounding) politics, which were usually of the
separatist bent, although the rediscovery of pan-Africanism began to
‘sccur as well. Unfortunately, these new formations adopted the “high
profile” strategy of the Civil Rights movement, which brought them
excessive media coverage. In reality, these organizations were no longer

rt of the Civil Rights movement and were now involved in the "Black
liberation struggle.” The Civil Rights people needed this type of exposure
o get their message across and to. help protect themselves against the
most flagrant abuses. The Black Liberation struggle, however, demanded
amore clandestine way of handling affairs. They had to prepare for a
querilla war and to take on this preparation in secret.

This was lost on the new, younger organizations. They were
impressed by Malcolm X and the fiery orators and did not realize that
Malcolm had served as a motivator and educator. They did not
understand that they were embarking on a new phase that demanded
quiet, patient organizing and training. The tens of thousands of potentia
recruits were showing, through the massive rebellions, that they were
already sufficiently stimulated and were waiting for someone to show
them how to get the job done. ("Rattling a sword makes a lot of noise
drawing one is silent.”) There was still a good amount of agitation,
propagandizing, and education that needed to be done, but not by those
who saw their mission as forming black fighting formations. This mistak:
was usually made because these groups tried to combine the activities ¢
the military and political workers in each cadre. They did not realize that
the situation demanded specialization: political workers (motivators,
educators, marchers, etc.) on the one hand, and military workers (arme
self-defense and assault units) on the other. The Deacons had had it
right!

An outstanding practitioner of this new form of resistance
was the Revolutionary Action Moveiment (RAM) which began an
intensive organizing campaign in the Northeastern states in 1966 and
1967. Much of their activity was centered in Philadelphia. RAM was
militant, nationalist, and high profile. Their cadre spray-painted the “Joi
the Black Guard” slogan on walls in the communities. (The Black Guard
was their public military arm.) RAM's leaders were in front of the
cameras on all the important issues and the Black Guard cadre could
often be seen at their "cultural centers” wearing fatigues and black
berets. The sisters and brothers in RAM's youth group, “The Liberators, "
dressed in black with black berets. These activities helped members of
the black community feel good and that revolution was right around the
corner. (Ironically, no one in Philadelphia had heard of the similar group
the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, begun in California.) RAM's
activity scared white folks, especially because some members of RAM
went out of their way to ensure this. They reasoned that they had been
kept down long enough and it was time to strike back!

But it was the white establishment that struck back in 1967
and over a period of months, H. Rap Brown and other leaders and key
cadre were arrested. While RAM advocated self-defense and owned
weapons, they did not carry them in public. Consequently they were
arrested for everything from jaywalking to conspiring to put cyanide in
the police department rations at a major holiday celebration (4).
Although RAM had not fired a shot, some alleged members and
supporters were arrested for bringing dynamite back from Canada

(allegedly to blow up the Statue of Liberty!). These arrests crippled RAM
and they never regained their former vitality as their leaders and cadres.
were forced to deal with trumped-up charges for years afterward. Nor
was RAM the only group facing this scenario, which played out in black
ommunities around the country. In fact, the FBI—the original
coordinators—relayed the attack on RAM and its results to police forces
throughout the country. The government’s success in carrying this out
was due to the fact that all these groups were inexperienced and had not
had time to get grounded after they publicly demonstrated their
militancy. These black fighting formations never had the chance to fight,
and many of their members became discouraged after such experiences
and turned to crime and/or drugs.

The situation with the Black Panther Party for Self Defense
(BPP) was somewhat different. This group, founded in 1966 in
Oakland, CA, followed the same pattern as RAM but had an advantage in
that a clause in the California State law allowed citizens to carry arms in
public as long as they were not loaded. The BPP took full advantage of
this clause in order to brandish weapons wherever they went. At the
time, this seemed to be the height of militancy, and they received more
attention than any other group by the community, media, and police.
Despite this attention, they could not be dealt with as easily as RAM,
because they always carried their weapons, which were loaded. It
became apparent, after a few confrontations with the police, that the
police could ot biuff or intimidate these young blacks. Because of this,
8PP members were provoked into gun battles with the police, and within
a year the co-founder Huey Newton had been shot and was imprisoned
for killing the cop who shot him. “Li‘l Bobby” Hutton was the first BPP
member to be killed after two carloads of Panthers were ambushed by
the police. Others were wounded and jailed. Bobby Seale, the co-
founder, had been jailed for marching into the state capital with other
Panthers to protest the new law prohibiting the carrying of guns in
public. The top three leaders: Newton, Seale, and Eidridge Cleaver (who -
was captured after the shootout with the police in which Hutton was
killed) as well as other key leaders and cadre, were all in prison.

There was a positive side to all this: membership in the BPP sky-
rocketed! Chapters were formed up and down the West Coast, in the
Midwest, Northeast, and South. The BPP became a magnet that attracted
most of the smaller local organizations of a similar mindset. The
assassination of Martin Luther King in 1968 inspired even greater
numbers to join. At this time the BPP was not carrying guns in public, yet
the police onslaught continued. BPP offices and homes of Panthers were
raided from coast to coast, police agents infiltrated their ranks, provoked
deadly confrontations with local police, and instigated rivalries with other
biack organizations. BPP members were actually hunting and killing each
other due to these “agents provocateur.” The Panthers were a potentially
strong black fighting formation, but they were forced to take to the

streets before they were ready. (*The field of battle is 2 land of standing
corpse Panthers were dying in the streets, in raids, and in prison
(Soledad, San Quentin, Attica, and Atmore-Holman, to name a few). It
was a “war to the knife"! (5)

The Panthers were not the only black fighting formation.
There were other revolutionaries and “free shooters” who were

every bit as committed, armed, and involved in the Black
Liberation struggle. Examples of these include:

*The case of Fred Ahmad Evans and his squad of black guerillas
who were able to trap the Cleveland Ohig police in a deadly ambush in
which a number of police were wounded and killed. Some guerillas were
killed as well and others were wounded. Evans was imprisoned where he
later died. In response to the ambush, the police demanded more men

. and guns and displayed a .50 caliber heavy machine gun that raked their
squad cars.

*Mark Essex, a “freeshooter,” held off an army of police from atop

- a high-rise hotel in Louisiana and inflicted many casualties. A helicopter
gunship had to be called in to kill him.

*Jonathan Jackson walked into a courtroom in San Rafael, CA and
pulled out a sub-machine gun from his duffel bag, disarmed all the
sheriffs, and gave pistols and shotguns to James McClain, William
Christmas, and Ruchell Cinque Magee, who were comrades of his brother
George Jackson. They rounded up the white judge, district attorney, and
a number of jurors as hostages. After forcing their way past the rest of
the sheriffs and other police, their getaway van was riddled with bullets,
killing Jackson, McClain and Christmas. Magee was wounded but
survived, Before they died, they shot the judge in the head with the
shotgun they had taped under his chin. The DA and a juror were also
shot, but survived. Jonathan Jackson's brother George was a Field
Marshal in the BPP and was killed the following year in San Quentin,
although not before he was able to kill three prison guards and two
inmate snitches. As it turned out, all of these brothers were set-up by
agent provocateur Louis Tackwood, who had married one of their sisters.
)

*The Revolutionary Republic of New Africa (RNA) that Robert F.
Williams once headed, gunned down a number of Detroit police after
they tried to storm a meeting that RNA's leaders were holding in a
church. A few years later they killed a sheriff after their headquarters
was raided in Jackson, Mississippi. That raid sent their entire leadership
to prison. (7)

*“Free-shooters” killed police in sniper attacks in projects in
Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, and New Orleans.

*H. Rap Brown became a fugitive after a bomb went off outside a
court building in his comrade’s car, and a year or so later he was

wounded and captured after a gun battle between his “liberators" from
Fast St. Louis and the police in New York City. A number of the liberators
were captured. 1o
Police were being raided while they sat in their cars and while they
directed traffic. It was war. There were sisters and brothers hijacking
{assenger Jets to Cuba and to Algeria where the BPP had a branch of

ugitives headed by Cleaver. (Cleaver had left the country to avoid going
ack to prison for the Li'l Bobby Hutton shootout.) All this was very
sobering for the BPP members. The early flash and profile was giving
way to a desperate search to find a way to regain the initiative and plug
the security gaps. Finally it was decided that what was needed was an
‘autonomous strike force that would handle all of the armed actions while
the rest of the BPP would keep up and expand the Community Programs,

such as free breakfast, education, sickle-cell testing, clothing drives, etc. _

in reality it was, again, too lttle too late.

Most of the mistrust had been instigated by the actions of the
agents and their handlers (FBI, police) and this was only possible
because the youthful leadership had no firm understanding of
ntelligence and counterintelligence activities, or how to combat them.
Hore importantly, they did not have a firm grip on the “art of war” which
included instructions on how to deal with all that troubled them.
Unfortunately there was no turning back. Orders went out to the field
marshals to begin organizing the separate guerilla group known as the
Black Liberation Army.

A very important piece was missed at this point, and that was the
recruitment of the street gangs. The BPP had made a half-hearted
attempt to reach them, but their lack of experience hindered their
efforts. The fact of the matter is that the street gangs were susceptible
only to a program where fighting was the main component. The street
gangs told the old BPP, who wanted cadres which were both political and
military workers, “Come back when you're ready to fight.” Now the time
for fighting had come, but in their haste to begin this new phase, they
ignored the gangs again. It must be recognized that events were
happening at such a rapid and desperate pace that it was hard to do
anything but proceed full steam ahead. Nevertheless, a little foresight
would have indicated that there were benefits to thinking out their
strategy in a more developmental manner.

A major stumbling block in the launching of this new phase was the
Jrowing unrest among the rank-and-file because of the leaders’ belated
>ffort to deal with these problems. Despite this, the “new phase” was
aunched with the BPP cadres studying texts on guerilla warfare, refusing
0 be arrested for any reason, and launching planned attacks on various
:argets. In New York City a gun battle broke out between the police and
3PP memebers after they tried to arrest them for carrying concealed
weapons. When the smoke had cleared, a cop was dead, along with 8PP
member Harold Russell. Two other BPP memeers, Robert Ra'uf Vickers
and Anthony Kimu White, were wounded, and Kimu was arrested. Ra'uf
escaped and went underground where doctors helped him heal his
wounds and he was then able to return to the field. In California, |/
Geroimo Ji Jaga Pratt was out on bail in connection with the 1969 gun
battle that resulted from a police raid on their LA headquarters. He weni
underground and formed a guerilla group. In Philadelphia, a guerilla
group raided a police station killing one cop and wounding another. BPP
querilla groups wre raiding banks for funds, hijacking food to give to the
‘community, and acquiring sophisticated military weapons.

This intensified activity was bringing the pressure down on
the BPP political workers, and after the raid on the Philadelphia
police station, the police raided every BPP office in the city. The
BPP, however, was ready for them.

After gun battles at two of the offices, the Panthers were forced to
surrender. This activity also provoked gun battles between the police an
other blacks. In a 48-hour period the score was: 6 cops in the hospital
with gunshot wounds and one cop in the morgue. Panthers and guerillas
in prison and other guerillas on the run. They were learning! All the
Panthers were released because the police could not officially justify the
raids in the face of massive protest from the black community.

It is unfortunate that groups in the Black Liberation struggle had
not operated in this way from the beginning. The growing awareness of
how to attack their problems was not being digested by the larger
movement, and a split developed between those who advocated the new
phase of resistance and other leaders who advocated taking armed
struggle out of the movement altogether. The latter group was moving
backwards, failing to learn the lessons from Philadelphia which were
crystal clear: Police were killed and wounded while the Panthers were
released from prison, and there'were no Panther casualties. There was

also heightened community support and participation. A few weeks after
. the Philadelphia incident, BPP members held a major convention in the
city without any police interference. Also the convention was held in spit
of the police Intelligence sources within the BPP informing them,
correctly, that the guerillas accused of the raids had been regularly seen
at the BPP offices, and that one of them, Robert Saeed Joyner, was then
every day. The Black community could clearly see a tenuous separation
between those who were participating in planned assaults (the guerillas}
and the BPP political workers. It was also clear that there was no reason
to suspend armed action, and that it was probably too late to do so.
Beyond the disagreements and splits over the issue of arms in the
struggle, numerous complaints arose about the new “opulent” lifestyle
that some of the leaders of the BPP had adopted. After his release from

orison in 1970, Huey Newton hung out with Hollywood stars and rented
expensive apartments. Despite disgust and anger over these situations,
the real beef was over the poor strategy that continued to get members
cilled or sent to prison. Newton, still the top leader, advocated no guns
in the program, and for those who wanted to fight or who were |2,
underground, he sent an open communique to the North Vietnamese
goverrnent that he would make 1000 BPP members available to fight in
Vietnam against U.S. forces. This was odd to say the least. Of course the
Panthers were highly supportive of the Viet Cong’s fight, but very few
could see any reason not to show their support by stepping up armed
action within the United States rather than on foreign ground. The
Vietnamese government was of a similar opinion. They openly declined
the offer, suggesting that the BPP could better help by supporting them
from within the U.S." At this point, other leaders started speaking
against Newton more strongly. Cleaver (who had been feuding with
Newton from Algeria) stated emphatically that it was time to stop
bullshitting and that the armed struggle needed to be fully supported. He
made arrangements with the Algerian government for Panthers and
others to come to Algeria for military training. Similarly, Field Marshall
George Jackson continued to advocate and write about the necessity for
this type of change in the struggle, and how it needed to be carried out.
He, unquestionably, would have been the most effective leader to
implement this new phase strategy because of his superior theories, his
desire to implement them, his desperation (at the time he was
preparinag to go to trial for the killing of a prison guard) and finally and
importantly, because of the widespread respect and admiration he
received from others. It would not have been difficult to “liberate” him
from prison, had the BPP put their full resources behind the effort. There
was no lack of BPP members, male and female, who would have
volunteered for such an honored mission. Sadly, the West Coast
leadership of Newton and Company, and the police and prison
establishments, had cut him off from direct contact with those who were
ready, willing, and able to carry out such a mission. Consequently he
was set up by these establishments and was assassinated, although not
before Jackson and his prison “Black Guerilla Family” killed five of the
enemy. Magee, having recovered from his courthouse wounds, was in
the battle as well (8). The date of Jackson's death—August 21, 1971—
was a day of mourning. After a memorial for him, Attica exploded, with
43 guards and prisoners dead. Black guerillas walked into a California
oolice station, killed a sergeant, and shot up the station. The George L.
Jackson Assault Team of the BLA took credit for the act.

The question of the split on policy and strategy was solved when a
‘orce dispatched by Newton shot and killed a Panther after he had given
anfavorable details about the inner workings of the West Coast

leadership clique. Robert Webb was a top Panther leader and bodyguard

of Newton. It was his words at a New York meeting, attended by |3

disgruntled Panthers from all over the country, that were the most
damaging to the West Coast leadership. Allegations of opulence

(penthouses, limousines, etc.), pimping BPP female members, and

cocaine addiction were raised. Not long after that, the main West Coast

representative, Central Committee member Samuel Napier, was found
dead in a burnt-out office. He had been tied to a chair and riddled with
bullets. Shortly thereafter, the West Coast delegation placed themselves
under police protection until they could make arrangements to return to

California! The word went out that the police were looking for a number

of people in connection with the shooting and the previously held

meeting, and this forced many people to go underground. Although a

situation like this should have been prepared for, unfortunately this was

not the case. Once again, the dictums of The Art of War were ignored.

While some tried to adhere to them, too many others were still running

their operations and actions in a haphazard and shortsighted manner.

‘This unfortunate situation did swell the ranks of the guerillas
considerably, however. Intensive training was undertaken by these new
querillas, and they raided banks for funds and gun stores for arms and
ammunition. Once again, this should have been a new beginning, but
because the situation was forced upon them as a result of the actions of
older BPP members, above-ground political work and activity was all but
destroyed. The same mistake that the Civil Rights movement had made
was visited upon the BPP. Each group put too much stock in one facet of
the resistance. With the Civil Rights movement there was too much focu
on poliitical work and not nearly enough on military components, while
with the guerilla groups it was just the opposite. It was not clear to
either of these groups that professionals must lead revolutions if
destruction is to be avoided. One may not be professional from the start
but it's imperative that professionalism be acquired as soon as possible.

The hallmarks of the professional are the ability to proceed from point A

to point B without wasting energy, learning from the mistakes of others.

and one's own and not repeating them, and emulating the successes of
others whenever possible.

: This new phase was not solidly launched—rather it was launched i
an unprofessional manner. Adequate time was not taken to evaluate
where they had been, where they were at, and where they were going.
After finally adopting the right style, they lost contact with the substance
of the struggle: what it was all about: “war is an extension of politics;” i
is "politics by different means.” It follows that they had to take their cue
from whatever was happening in the political arena as the Deacons had
done, but it was not so. The BLA groups were busy acquiring and
consolidating their logistical base (raiding banks, gun stores, acquiring

transportation, safe houses, etc.) and this was understandable and
proper. Yet at the same time they were launching deadly attacks on the
police and since these were planned assaults, they were much more
successful than the old BPP shootouts. Usually these attacks were carried
5ut 50 swiftly that when the smoke had cleared, the cops were either
dead or wounded and the guerillas had disappeared. They had learned
how to reverse the ratio of killed and wounded. Once again, they should
have been operating this way from the beginning. They still suffered
casualties from the rare operations that resulted from a running /Y
gunfight, when they were subjected to car stops, and when they were
forced into confrontations. The casualties in these situations were
devastating because the BLA did not have an adequate political
apparatus to replenish their forces, nor did they understand the
necessity to integrate local street gangs into their activities.

The BLA became the top priority of the special FB1/local
police task forces. To a great degree, BLA guerilla groups did not fall
victim to being infiltrated by agents, and therefore if they were not
caught off balance, they had to make some other mistake to give these
task fores an advantage, such as surveillance. The BLA fielded the most
effective black assault units since the Maroons! Their primary weakness,
and the situation which caused them the most harm, was their failure to
properly integrate themselves with the black masses and their inability
to interact with an above-ground revolutionary political group. The BLA
did attempt to re-integrate with political workers who had left or been
expelled from the BPP. Since most of these workers were located on the
East Coast, they were known as the East Coast Panthers. This group did
not, however, have any of the vitality, stature, resources, or connections
that they had previously enjoyed, although they did have the know-how
to put together a new political organization that could eclipse even the
BPP—by using above-ground cadres, recruiting from former Panthers and
other political blacks. In order to o this, they would have to channel
their energies and resources away from their armed activities while they
rebuit the political apparatus. Before the BLA guerillas would come to
this conclusion, however, they were imprisoned, killed, or exiled.

The BLA continued their revolutionary commitment after being
imprisoned, and several were able to escape or attempt escape: -

*In 1976, BLA member John Andalewa Clark was killed at Trenton,
N State Prison after BLA members fought a battle against armed
guards. The prisoners were armed with home-made weapons and
bombs. The State Police discovered a van parked a few blocks from the
prison, loaded with weapons and camping supplies.

A BLA member was killed in a fall from a high-rise prison in New
York, after another prisoner had descended on the same rope.
“BLA member Herman Bell was overpowered after holding a guard

hostage in order to escape from Rikers Island prison in New York. A
rubber raft and other gear were discovered outside his building. /§”

*In 1977, Russell Maroon Shoatz and three other BLA members
escaped from the State Prison at Huntingdon, PA. Two of these brothers
were recaptured and BLA member Wayne Musa Henderson was killed.
Maroon was recaptured after a 27-day hunt.

In 1979, a BLA task force walked into the Clinton Prison in New
Jersey and, after commandeering the visiting area, liberated BLA
member Assata Shakur. She later resurfaced in Cuba.

BLA member Kweisi Balagoon escaped from a New Jersey state
prison. He was part of the BLA task force that liberated Assata Shakur.

Also in 1979, Arthur Cetawayo Johnson and Robert Saeed Joyner,
two BLA members, took over a cellblock at the State Prison at
Pittsburgh, PA in an attempt to escape They and a few of the brothers
who had helped were overpowered.

In 1980, BLA members Russell Maroon Shoatz and Cliff Lumumba
Futch escaped from a maximum-security state mental hospital in PA.
They and Phyliis Oshun Hill, who had smuggled them the escape
weapons, were captured three days later after a gun battle with the
police and FBI.

In 1980-81 BLA member Sundiata Acoli and a number of other
prisoners were almost killed when guards at the Federal prison at Marion
Iiinois opened fire when they learned that they were trying to cut
through the security fence.

In 1981, BLA member Joseph Joe-Joe Bowen and three other
brothers held guards at gunpoint for six days after a failed escape from
the State Prison at Graterford, PA. Joe-Joe and the BLA member Fred
Muhammad Kafi Burton had assassinated the warden and deputy warder
at the Holmesburg, Philadelphia prison in 1973.

There were many more incidents, and the prison authorities dealt
with them by keeping BLA members in the “hole” for 5, 10, even 25
years. BLA member Ruchell Cinque Magee (courthouse shootout and Sar
Quentin rebellion when Jackson was killed) has spent most of his 30 plu¢
years in the hole. The prison authorities had them cut out, just like they
had done to Field Marshal George Jackson. Most of them have sentences
that make it unlikely that they will be released back into society. A
campaign for deportation to a foreign (African) country holds real
possibilities that can serve as an organizing tool. There is much more to
be said about the lessons that the black fighting formations learned on a
tactical level. However, that is another paper.

—Russell "Maroon” Shoatz

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press,
1984).

2. Karl Von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Viking Press, 1983).

3. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the
VACCD, Washington, DC., US Gowt. Printing Office (1968) pp. 19-21

4. Maxwell C. Stanford (Akbar Muhammad Ahmad), “Revolutionary
Action Movement (RAM): A case Study of an Urban Revolutionary
Movement,” Master’s Thesis, Atlanta U., Atlanta, GA 1986

5. George Jackson, Blood in My Eye (Baltimore, MD: Black Classic
press) 1990

6. Gregory Armstrong, The Dragon Has Come (New York: Harper
1nd Row, 1974) and Paul Liberatore, The Road to Hell (New York:
atlantic Monthly Press, 1996)

7. Tmari Abubakari Obadele (Milton Henry), Free the Land!
#ashington DC: House of Songhay, 1984)

8. Eric Mann, Comrade George: An Investigation into the Official
Story of His Assassination (Cambridge, MA: Hovey Street Press, 1972),

Russ:u"r\moon'snms

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